Quiet Australia ‘long overdue for a declared Indo-Pacific strategy’, says expert

Australia has become one of the “quieter voices” in the region, according to the current National Security College head, former government senior strategic analyst, Australian diplomat and founding director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute from 2007 to 2015.

“Australia is now one of the quieter voices on the very framework that matches our geography,” he said during a speech at the 2024 Vernon Parker Oration, late last month.

“Australia was the first to officially name this our region of strategic interest, in the 2013 Defence White Paper, and we still do in the recent National Defence Strategy. We were instrumental in encouraging other nations to reimagine their geopolitics in this way.

“Diplomatic histories will tell that Indonesia, ASEAN, the Europeans, Britain, South Korea, even Japan and the United States, were quietly influenced in their Indo-Pacific thinking by Australia as an early mover and activist.

“Yet those players now all have their openly declared Indo-Pacific policy documents – outlooks or more fulsome strategies – while Australia does not.

“It won’t surprise you that I believe Australia is long overdue for a declared Indo-Pacific strategy, and one not only about defence.

“Why do we not have such a public strategy? I assume there are diplomatic and political sensitivities at play, such as concerns that our friends in the Pacific equate the term Indo-Pacific with the strategic rivalries they would rather avoid.

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“But government is foregoing the opportunity to tell a consistent and integrated story – to our people, to all the arms of government and to our partners – about how to find our way in the broader region.

“And explaining all the elements of national power we are using, and how they must truly fit together to give us the best chance of security in a region where strategic risk is accumulating and accelerating. If that means we need to be more forthright about risks and threats and their origins, so be it.

“We have many of the elements of an Indo-Pacific strategy, but the risk is that parts of our system and our polity don’t see the whole picture and where their contribution fits.”

Professor Medcalf also weighed in on recent criticism aimed at the cost and policy aims of the AUKUS trilateral agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom.

“The place of AUKUS is not well enough understood,” he said to the meeting attendees, including Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mark Hammond and Rear Admiral Justin Jones, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, as well as members of the Australian Naval Institute.

“Some observers seem to think it will crowd out other parts of our statecraft – engagement with Asian partners, or the use of levers other than defence. Others warn it could crowd out other defence capabilities.

“And other voices – politically powerful ones – give the impression it is largely about jobs and industry, whereas that is a secondary consideration.

“It remains entirely within the gift of government to ensure that none of these perceptions is true.

“We will need political buy-in across multiple governments across three countries – like-minded democracies to be sure, but minimising partisan point-scoring will be key. And there are some rather important elections coming up.

“And this means a premium on informing political players – including legislators in all three countries – and respecting their concerns in good faith. On AUKUS, there will be no rewards for political complacency, at any point.

“On the question of tempering ambition with small-realism: while I admire the ambition of the optimal pathway, I take the view we do not need 100 per cent success for AUKUS to have a transformative impact.

“I am persuaded of the viability of leasing Virginia Class submarines from the United States. And it’s important not to be stuck in a negative parochialism of the moment each time there’s a political or bureaucratic hurdle in the US system, each of which so far has been overcome.

“I am confident of the viability of developing the expertise and workforce base we need in Australia – and it is heartening that my sector, the university sector, is so keen to engage, which suggests we care about national security after all.

“Where there will remain significant scepticism in some quarters – and scepticism is there to be allayed – is the prospect of Australia, with Britain, building a whole new class of nuclear-power submarines. This will require singular persistence of political will and regular reprosecution of the strategic case.

“As for the diplomacy of AUKUS, it does not require me to say that initially it was somewhat ragged, to say the least. But it’s impressive how well we’ve advanced through it.

“Indeed, it’s a reminder that Australia benefits when our statecraft can be confident, audacious, patient and persistent.

“And a reminder that the alliance with the United States is not at odds with our engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, who variously accept, understand or welcome what we are seeking to do.

“Turning again then to the SSN capability, it makes strong sense for Australian security and in the context of our somewhat unspoken, dare I say submerged, Indo-Pacific strategy.

“Some critics argue AUKUS constricts us – as if the submarines are good for one scenario only, or some ploy to bind us to Washington.

“In fact, nuclear-powered submarines can help Australia get beyond the Indo-Pacific paradox – with range and reach in deterrence and surveillance, to reduce the tyranny of distance.

“In that sense, the capability could mark a coming of age for Australia as a serious power – albeit, yes, within an alliance, an alliance of our choosing.”