War in Taiwan – Strategy, characteristics and methodology

In years gone by, discourse on the threat of Taiwanese-Chinese conflict was intentionally ambiguous. Few openly discussed the West’s role in defending the island against an invading force, and even fewer developed operational-strategic level insights into how the West could militarily protect Taiwan. These hushed conversations morphed over recent years, with the defence of Taiwan and the broader South China Sea the centrepiece of Australian and American military policy.

Just last week, Australian and American posturing on the role of China in the region reached apotheosis. Minister for Defence Peter Dutton drew a definitive line in the sand ruling out the policy of appeasement, marking a new era of frank and overt dialogue on Chinese ambitions in Taiwan and beyond.

“In my view, acquiescence or appeasement is a tactic that ends in a cul-de-sac of strategic misfortune or worse,” Minister Dutton said at a National Press Club address.

“Just look at how China has exploited prolonged efforts to agree a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to expand its territorial occupation and militarisation of the region at cost to the security of ASEAN and to the region.”

Minister Dutton’s speech reflected a sober assessment of the ever evolving characteristics of Chinese competitive control and coercion, implicitly noting the impact of Chinese initiatives such as Belt and Road on China’s global influence and the standing of the rules-based order.

“Does the Chinese government wish to occupy other countries? Not in my judgement,” Minister Dutton suggested.

“But they do see us as tributary states. And that surrender of sovereignty and abandonment of any adherence to the international rule of law is what our country has fought against since Federation.

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“It has come at great human cost and any repeat of the mistakes of the 1930s would again exact a great cost on our country and many more.”

The fiery address was delivered merely weeks after the minister asserted that it would be “inconceivable” for Australia not to support Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of a Chinese invasion.

While politicians and military theorists in the West have come to terms with supporting Taiwan against armed conflict, it is not immediately clear which path the US-led coalition would choose.

Jacquelyn Schneider in War on the Rocks this week analyses the changing attitudes in the US towards defending Taiwan, and how the West could mount a successful defence of Taiwanese sovereignty.

“Recent polling suggests that, for the first time in many years, a majority of the American public supports defending Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion. Given the potential for this conflict to include American soldiers, the public deserves to know what they are buying when they make this decision,” Schneider notes.

Schneider references recent findings from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs to demonstrate the changing attitudes in the US.

“The American public supports a range of US policies in support of Taiwan. Majorities favour US recognition of Taiwan as an independent country (69 per cent), supporting its inclusion in international organisations (65 per cent), and signing a US-Taiwan free trade agreement (57 per cent),” findings from the Chicago Council found.

“A slimmer majority (53 per cent) support the United States' signing a formal alliance with Taiwan, and a plurality (46 per cent) favour explicitly committing to defend Taiwan if China invades.”

Traditionally, analysts have understood conflict in Taiwan to be characterised by the United States’ qualitative advantage in which the US Navy and Air Force would overwhelm invading forces. This qualitative edge has diminished.

“Department of Defense concepts like AirSea Battle and the “third offset” all envisage high-tech fights in which, faced with an onslaught of Chinese missile volleys, air attacks, and destroyers, the United States comes to the defense of Taiwan with stealth fighters, long-range missiles, and stealthy submarines,” Schneider argues.

“Meanwhile, as both sides battle for air and sea superiority, they simultaneously try to blind one another with cyber operations, electronic warfare, and space attacks.”

With the narrowing qualitative edge, the US may simply to be able to overcome China’s initial invasion force.

“There is a reasonable chance that China wins the first round of high-tech conflict. Declassified wargaming results, think tank reports, and congressional testimony all warn that the US military — which will ostensibly be fighting to defend Taiwan from behind the island while dependent on fragile logistics chains — could lose the first volleys (or at least find itself seriously disadvantaged) in a Chinese quest to retake Taiwan,” Schneider argues.

Schneider outlines that not only has the capability of the US military to overcome their adversaries narrowed, but years of insurgency focused warfare within the United States’ military apparatus and lack of training with their Taiwanese counterparts would create difficulties for US-Taiwanese interoperability. Simply, many of the skills required to undertake conventional war have not been employed for decades.

“And while the battles of World War II and Korean War are from a different time technologically, these skills — mass landings, retaking lost territory, defending coastal positions, and warding off invasions of thousands of troops — have become historical relics rather than campaigns the US military is prepared to conduct,” Schneider wrote.

Schneider provides a very sobering – and perhaps humbling – analysis of potential conflict in Taiwan. But there are numerous avenues to victory.

How can the West fight a war in Taiwan?

The US’ adversaries have always been incredibly adept at asymmetric warfare, using grey-zone activities and exploitable vectors to undermine US credibility or military capabilities.

Look no further than the Russian Gerasimov Doctrine. Over recent years, Russia cultivated pro-Russian terror organisations in Eastern Europe, allegedly provided the Taliban with bounties for killing US soldiers and developed information campaigns to influence the behaviour of international populations. Speaking on cyber-enabled information warfare, Major General Mick Ryan succinctly described the information vector – which can be applied to asymmetrical warfare in its broadest sense – as creating an environment in which your enemies “no longer want to fight you”.

The US-led coalition must rely on the exploitation of three key asymmetric vectors to make the invasion of Taiwan simply too costly, and make the invaders “no longer want to fight you”. The three vectors are: SOF-coordinated regional participation, cyber-enabled warfare and a Taiwanese insurgency.

SOF: Speaking in a podcast with the Modern War Institute, Admiral (Ret’d) James Stavridis and Marine turned author Elliot Ackerman argue that the US enjoys a competitive advantage regarding alliances and relationships in the region. The pair note that American SOF teams could leverage and foster relationships with allied militaries in the lead up to the conflict, who can not only support the US’ narrative but also provide clandestine kinetic benefits.

Cyber: Further, many analysts have posited that the US still maintains cyber superiority over China. In a Defence Connect Podcast with Dr Peter Layton in October, it was revealed that Chinese systems and networks possess a far lower resilience against cyber threat actors than Western networks, as the Chinese government has built in inherent exploitable loopholes in Chinese computer systems to enable the government to easily hack their own citizens. Such loopholes, coupled with a large pool of public-private investment into the cyber security industry, provide easily exploitable opportunities for the US for both espionage and subversion.

Insurgency: Finally, despite overwhelming military superiority, the costs of a PRC invasion of Taiwan and effectively suppressing the Taiwanese population will be significant. Wang Mouzhou in The Diplomat explained, “Ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore landings are extremely hazardous for the invasion force. In the first Gulf War, American military planners were rumored to estimate that an amphibious invasion of Saddam Hussein-occupied Kuwait would cost up to 10,000 American lives… A 2015 RAND study estimated that United States submarines alone could sink 41 per cent of Chinese amphibious ships in a theoretical 2017 conflict.” Taiwan is considerably better defended than Hussein’s Iraq, and the cost of human capital would likely send shockwaves throughout the region and at home in China.

Further, many of Taiwan’s citizens will simply become ungovernable for the occupying forces. Mouzhou argues, “The United States has spent significant blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan and has achieved relatively few results. An invasion of Taiwan could provide the PRC with an object lesson in the difficulties of counterinsurgency... It is extremely difficult to pacify an invaded region. Unlike, say, Crimea, individuals in Taiwan are quite likely to actively resist their occupiers.” As with the Allies in World War II, it is likely that fomenting a local insurgency would be a cornerstone of American policy to pacify superpower.

While a diminishing qualitative edge, and little quantitative advantage, the US nevertheless possess the capabilities to rely on exploitable vectors of asymmetric warfare for the defence of Taiwan.

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