Learning the lessons of the past, key to future success: UNSW academic

Australia has had a long, tough relationship with the “tyranny of distance”. On one hand, the nation’s populace has treated it with disdain, hostility, and as an inconvenience, while for Australia’s political and strategic leaders, our geographic isolation has provided a double-edged sword for defence planning — distance from enemies also means distance from allies, dramatically impacting the nation’s long-term national security. 

However, the rise of the Indo-Pacific means this “tyranny of distance” has been replaced by a “predicament of proximity” — in particular, the rise of China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, along with several other regional nations, is serving to reshape the economic and strategic paradigms that provided the unprecedented period of economic development, stability, and prosperity since the end of the Second World War. 

Today’s geopolitical and strategic predicament is not without its precedent, with the early years of the post-war years proving eerily similar to the challenges that contemporary Australia faces. Learning the lessons following Japan’s blitzkrieg through Southeast Asia, and successful routing of both British and American forces throughout both the region and wider Pacific, served as a confronting wake-up call for Australia.

As Australia’s primary security relationship shifted from the British Empire to the triumphant United States at the end of the war, the growing threat of communism in the region, driven by the successful Chinese revolution in 1949 and the following Korean crisis saw Australian forces drawn into direct conflict with former North Korean and Chinese forces. In response to this perfect storm of external global factors, Australia’s leaders sought to confront potential threats to the nation by engaging them away from continental Australia to avoid any repeat of the Papua New Guinea campaign or any direct attack against Australian cities as had occurred numerous times throughout the Pacific campaign. 

Growing domestic concern about the threat of communism in Southeast Asia and the mounting arms race between the US and the Soviet Union served to amplify Australia’s fears about the threat of a “red” invasion, leading to Australia’s direct involvement as part of the United Nations force in Korea, as well as playing a pivotal role in responding to the Malayan Emergency and curbing a growing insurgency on Australia’s doorstep. 

A decade of strife on the Malayan Peninsula, beginning in 1950, resulted in Australia establishing and maintaining a forward deployed force based at RAAF Base Butterworth as part of the British-led Far East Strategic Reserve, entrenching Australia’s position as a regional security benefactor committed to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

The outbreak of the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 1960s equally served to highlight the inherent instability and volatility of Southeast Asia, with the potential for extensive impact on Australia’s national and economic security. Again, Australia’s intervention to subdue a regional conflict that posed a threat to strategically critical sea lines of communication reinforced the necessity for a robust Australian presence in the region.  

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Fast forward and mounting domestic political dissatisfaction, the new Whitlam government, and the mounting cost of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict, combined with rapidly declining US public support for the conflict, saw the nation’s post-Second World War strategic reality and doctrine begin to shift away from regional intervention and towards a policy favouring the defence of the Australian mainland and outlying territories.

This post-war dynamic outlined in the 1976 Dibb Review became the basis for Australia’s strategic policy and doctrine to this day, however, governments of both sides have recognised that Australia’s new geopolitical reality requires a radically new approach to ensure the long-term maintenance and protection of our national security, prosperity and interests in this evolving, multi-polar world. 

Enter UNSW Canberra historian Richard Dunley, who has drawn significant parallels between the Defence Review conducted in June 1945 and the Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review which has been described by the Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles as critical to ensuring “that our defence force remains positioned to meet our global and regional security challenges”.

Distance cuts both ways

As previously mentioned, Australia’s strategic policy has long depended on its geographic isolation for its economic and strategic security. This distance from the great conflagrations of the 20th century has provided a well understood and documented protection for the fledgling nation, however, this is now less relevant than ever, as Dunley explains, “A number of modern commentators are at pains to point out the strategic advantages granted to Australia by its distance from any major power. There is considerable merit to such arguments, and the likelihood of any country seeking to mount a major invasion of Australia was, and is, slim. However, the defence committee recognised, drawing off bitter recent experience, that Australia’s strategic isolation cut both ways.

“When discussing the primary strategic threat, the report noted that Australia was ‘further from her markets in peace, and her allies in war’ than virtually any other country. The committee went on to acknowledge how Australia’s essential ‘lines of communication with the outside world may be seriously interrupted … thousands of miles from her coast’. The chief of naval staff put it more bluntly to cabinet, telling its members that ‘the basic foundation of [Australia’s] defence problem was the protection of the merchant ship’. This has not changed in the intervening 80 years.”

It is critical to understand that in the early years, post-World War Two, both the Australian public and Australia’s strategic policy community and political leaders understood the importance of establishing and maintaining an independent Australian strategic umbrella in the region, particularly throughout Southeast Asia — which was defined by an impressive array of conventional capabilities. 

Australia’s policy of “Forward Defence” saw the government increase defence spending, with the Australian Army to increase in size by some 50 per cent over three years, from 22,000 to 33,000 through the introduction of the National Service Act. Meanwhile, the Navy’s two aircraft carriers, HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, were supported by a series of three American-designed and built destroyers, six frigates, anti-submarine helicopters, and the venerable Oberon Class submarines, while the Air Force also saw an extensive period of modernisation, with a focus on long-range strike and conventional deterrence capabilities. 

Air Force’s acquisition of new Mirage fighter aircraft, F-111 strike aircraft, C-130 Hercules and P-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrol aircraft rounded out the Australian Defence Force’s plans for a force designed to serve as a strategic deterrence and expeditionary focused force capable of supporting and defending Australia’s regional interests.

While a far cry from the superpower levels of force projection wielded by the US, Soviet Union and the European powers, Australia’s ability to project forward presence into Southeast Asia underpinned a policy of strategic engagement and partnership building at the regional level. This provided the basis for the dual operating concepts of independent sovereign power and allied partner, as Dunley explains: “For protection against sporadic raids and invasion, the defence committee expected Australian forces to be able to operate independently. The same, however, was not true for the primary strategic threat to Australia, namely the interruption of sea communications. This would require ‘a powerful empire or allied fleet superior to that of any possible enemy’.

“The chief of naval staff at the time stated that the Royal Australian Navy needed to be capable of ‘taking its place in an empire fleet or operating as an independent unit’. The committee’s force structure recommendations reflected this — setting out the need for forces to act in concert with Australia’s allies, as well as hold independent capabilities,” Dunley explained. 

Getting the balance right and learning from the past

For both Dunley and the government, getting the balance right is critical, something outlined by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, who stated, “To meet these challenges, the review will examine force structure, force posture and preparedness, and investment prioritisation, to ensure Defence has the right capabilities to meet our growing strategic needs.”

While the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will always be limited by the country’s relatively small population, however, this doesn’t mean that Australia cannot and should not support a larger, more capable ADF, while focusing on developing a lean, muscular, and adaptable force capable of a range of operations supporting the nation’s national security objectives. Developing such a force could require an expansion in both size and platform acquisition across each of the branches of the ADF, as well as a restructuring of each branch to maximise capability across a range of combat and humanitarian support contingencies, mobility, interoperability, and expeditionary capability.   

Such expansions would also serve as a major win for Australia’s domestic defence industry, which would see an increase in platform acquisition, minimising the peak and trough cycles and “valleys of death” that have traditionally characterised Australian defence industry development and hindered the development of long-term, domestic acquisition capability.

Dunley explains the importance of such an approach in light of the rapidly deteriorating geostrategic environment, stating, “Australia’s position in the world has changed significantly since 1945, not least through the disappearance of any sense of overarching imperial connection, but the reality that the RAN will have to work together with allies to secure the country’s sea communications remains. Thus, a return to a more open discussion of how Australian capabilities might fit into a wider coalition might not be misplaced.”

Going further, Dunley explains the importance of reviewing and unpacking the lessons learned in the past, to avoid the constant Australian attitude of reinventing the wheel, where he states, “Glancing back to another defence review suggests that we can overestimate the novelty of the issues facing us and considering how previous defence leaders have sought to address them can perhaps provide greater clarity about some of Australia’s fundamental defence challenges.”

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning