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New analysis has shone a spotlight on China’s growing food insecurity, driven by water shortages, natural disasters, polluted soil and demographic change. So, can China feed itself in a conflict?
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In June, a Defence Connect analysis pulled apart Europe’s unravelling energy crisis, driven by a reduction of imports of gas from Russia and the premature closure of traditional baseload power systems. The results of Europe’s energy crisis have concerned national security analysts the world over, with producer prices in Germany increasing by 33.6 percent between May 2021 and 2022 – thus adding further burden onto the already strained budgets of militaries and defence businesses alike.
Food, likewise, is essential to a state’s war readiness.
Recent research published by the US Army University Press’ Military Review unpacked China’s primary agricultural trends to determine whether the CCP would be able to feed the nation’s population in the event of a prolonged war.
According to the paper written by Major Jamie Critelli and Captain Gustavo Ferreira, the use of agricultural produce and food as an offensive tool in the event of conflict would threaten the regime’s ability to feed its population – and as such even threaten regime stability.
The pair observe that while China remains one of the world’s agricultural hubs, production over recent years has been unable to meet the growing food demands of the Chinese population.
“Despite this remarkable progress, Chinese authorities are increasingly challenged to feed their 1.4 billion people. Recent events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, several outbreaks of African swine fever, floods sweeping southern regions, and severe droughts in the northern areas have revealed weaknesses in China’s food security,” the pair argue.
As a result of this agricultural instability, the pair suggest that food imports have substantially increased – with price hikes observed across other agricultural produce.
MAJ Critelli and CAPT Ferreira further illustrate that the reduction of available arable land may make the trends a permanent fixture.
“Rapid urbanisation, pollution, and uses of land for other purposes have all contributed to a rapid decline of agricultural land in China. The total pollution rate in China’s farmland soil is estimated at 10 per cent, and about 2.5 per cent of that land cannot be cultivated due to excessive contamination with heavy metals,” the pair note.
Such statistics paint an interesting picture of China’s agricultural capabilities. Indeed, even in a wartime scenario, China would not possess the available land to rapidly increase food production to overcome trade shortages and to feed its population.
“As a result, it is estimated that the country has a domestic planting area shortage of 90 million hectares.”
This shortage of arable land has been exacerbated by over-reliance on irrigation; not only do the pair argue that China’s agricultural sector is half as efficient as the typical developed nation regarding water delivery, but also that the UN has outlined the country’s agricultural regions will likely face water shortages over coming years.
Amid this worsening agricultural climate for the CCP, China has increased its reliance on agricultural imports.
“China is already the world’s largest food importer, but by 2030, Chinese foods imports shares are expected to increase between fivefold and sevenfold over today’s baseline, depending on overall economic growth,” they note.
There is, however, a disconnect between the nation’s observable industry trends and the rhetoric emerging from Beijing on China’s agricultural capacity.
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to avoid international dependency by supporting domestic production and by stocking grain reserves, and it claims that China has enough wheat and rice reserves to feed its population for up to two years,” they argue.
Such bold statements almost appear incongruent with the regime’s “Clean Plate Campaign”.
As China’s agricultural output provides an interesting determinant as to whether the nation is considering military action, the pair contend that the industry requires greater insight from the military community.
“This study also identifies key agricultural indicators that warrant close monitoring by the US intelligence and military communities as they could signal preparation efforts by China for a military campaign,” the pair theorise.
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