AUKUS faces triple-pronged challenge

“Pillar 1” of the AUKUS technology sharing agreement — struck between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — is well underway, with formal plans to develop a future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) due to be tabled in March.

Key representatives from the member nations have met to discuss design options, with the UK’s Astute Class and the US’ Virginia Class SSN designs proposed for the RAN’s next-generation fleet.

The Commonwealth government’s Nuclear Submarine Taskforce is expected to determine whether Australia would proceed with a set design — potentially involving off-the-shelf purchases — or a bespoke solution leveraging an existing platform’s base design.

Expediting the delivery has been a core focus of the Albanese government, which has acknowledged a potential capability gap.

Alternative capabilities are being explored to shore-up Australia’s defences in the event of protracted delivery of the SSNs.

But while pillar 1 is in progress, AUKUS partners are yet to define a strategy for “Pillar 2”, which relates to the sharing of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and hypersonics.

According to Iain MacGillivray, Bronte Munro, and Gregory Brown — analysts at ASPI’s Washington DC office — three high-level challenges lie ahead for the trilateral agreement. 

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The analysts begin by noting a “lack of clarity” around AUKUS’ “strategic purpose” and what each member nation seeks to achieve.

“The inability to define specific, shared goals beyond banalities of protecting the ‘rules-based order’ or technology sharing to ‘deter Chinese aggression’ may belie a failure to identify different threat perceptions and risk appetites, which, if accounted for, help determine how to rank the technologies that are critical to advancing specific interests for each partner,” they write in ASPI’s The Strategist. 

“Does AUKUS strengthen integrated deterrence against a common threat, namely China, or may some technology transfers—even discussion of them—trigger escalation in some scenarios?”

Accordingly, if “power projection” underpins AUKUS for one or more of its members, pillar 2 must be “tailored” to reflect this objective.

“It is understandable that more time is needed here given that the efforts under pillar 1 are the initial priority. Determining metrics for measuring AUKUS’s worth is necessary before making any further claims of success, however,” they add.

The second challenge, according to the analysts, is the “narrative” around AUKUS, which could be a source of confusion for regional allies and partners, potentially triggering fears the deal could destabilise the Indo-Pacific.  

“Canberra, London and Washington need to have explicit and uncomplicated discussions with allies and partners about what they intend the deal to accomplish more broadly,” MacGillivray, Munro, and Brown continue.

“Is AUKUS a trial run for a similar, future initiative with Japan, France or other countries in the Indo-Pacific?

“The potential for Chinese disinformation to colour perceptions of the deal will grow the longer that the AUKUS members delay announcements and fail to fully explain its parameters and objectives.”

The analysts claim AUKUS partners need to better understand scepticism of AUKUS from regional partners, absent Chinese influence.

The trio then flag AUKUS’ failure to assess the role of “commercial industry, supply chains and broader society” in shaping pillar 2.

“Shared bureaucratic, legal and practical infrastructure is needed to support sustained advanced technology sharing across myriad critical technologies—all of which are at various stages of development,” they write.

“Each partner needs to conduct a comprehensive review of its supply chains and skills gaps to ensure shared technology is utilised and retained.”

The analysts conclude by stressing the differences between pillar 1 and 2 of the agreement, adding a “top-down approach needs grassroots support” if AUKUS is to succeed.

“Pillar 2 exceeds the scope of traditional defence capability sharing, and this alone will necessitate creative and uncomfortable changes at all levels to ensure its success,” they write.

“Long-term momentum may be difficult to sustain without greater industry and civil-society stakes in AUKUS’s development and a better understanding of its potential benefits.

“Domestic diplomacy will need the support of think tanks, educational institutions and ‘track 2’ planning to clarify and refine AUKUS over time.”

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