A best practice approach for naval acquisitions

There has been widespread cynical regard for the goals and execution of naval shipbuilding programs in Australia after several cases of over-budget, overtime and even cancelled programs. Yet the efforts to achieve success in current and future programs cling tenaciously to following the same ineffective processes that failed the earlier programs.

These flawed processes range from treating ships in the same manner as infantry fighting vehicles or frontline aircraft as though whatever works for them should surely work for ships and submarines. As a corollary, we have amalgamated all capability acquisition and sustainment expertise under the same hierarchy just to make sure we treat all of them the same.

But of course, they are not the same; naval programs — ships and submarines — each single unit represent a major investment, and even in the most urgent programs, is delivered in discrete time frames that make inevitable subtle differences in each from its predecessor.

Shipbuilding is a centuries-old competence that has always recognised the essentiality of configuration and status of each vessel as well as the class-wide and fleet-wide similarities and commonalities.

So, for Australia, then we should look more carefully at the processes we follow for naval programs, acquisition matters especially, so we optimise both the capability delivery and the availability for operations through life.

If we look around the horizon for best practice, a good place to look is the United States Navy (USN) which continues to acquire large numbers of ships and submarines every year and does so with arguably much greater success than does Australia.

So, what could we learn from their approach?

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First, the USN is proactive as is exemplified by their attack submarine (SSN) programs, with the Virginia Class still in full tilt delivering two boats each year from two shipyards, and this will continue until they have a replacement program up to speed as discussed below.

However, they have recently noted reduced availability due to the lack of replacement, repairable subassemblies due to insufficient investment, and stated that the next SSN class must achieve better availability by design.

The USN commitment to such an approach is based on their government-endorsed force structure requirement for number of ships and submarines of each class to fulfil defined roles. This is a top-level force specification that Australia only occasionally declares.

For submarines in 2009, we actually did state clearly the need to increase the number of boats from six to 12 and here we are 13 years later and nothing to show for that lead time.

The USN looked at the changing strategic environment, ever changing technology and the lead time needed to achieve a successful transition from Virginia Class to the next class called SSN(X) and decided this needed a 15-year research and development program that was begun in 2016.

Delivery of the first SSN(X) is needed to coincide with the last of the Virginia Class currently scheduled in 2035, that is 19 years after the start of the R&D program dedicated to SSN(X).

So, where is the Australian R&D program arising from the 2009 target for doubling the size of the submarine force? Well, after a lot of political toing and froing, we actually kicked off the Attack program in 2016 and that was intended to deliver the first boats to coincide with the life-extended Collins Class but then came AUKUS. Back to the drawing board except that now the goal is at least eight SSNs for Australia.

Another critical lesson we should take from the USN is they work within the Congressional oversight that only provides funding incrementally a year at a time. This means every program receives full scrutiny on a regular basis, and programs will only be funded if they are to continue.

The USN Sea Wolf SSN program was cut short to three boats because the scrutiny noted the need for program cost-reductions, and this led to the switch to the Virginia program.

Another strict lesson is the disciplined process applied by the USN to individual design differences in successive vessels. This is always overseen to avoid cost and schedule impacts on deliveries and the sustainment variations — a process Australia does understand but sometimes has difficulty in practicing.

Turning to other naval programs such as surface combatant ships — guided missile destroyers (DDG) and frigates (FFG), general purpose frigates and anti-submarine corvettes, similar lessons can be applied: state clearly the number required and role of each class; work out the timeframe and budget accordingly. Then review each program each year before approving the incremental funding for the coming fiscal year.

Of course, there will be long-lead items to be funded as well as the next year’s work but that then provides similar scrutiny as mentioned above as each long-lead investment is approved.

Finally, the secret of the USN success also derives from the professionalism of everyone involved — uniform, public service and industry participants in the programs. And the media and political hierarchy understand this and don’t spend all their time finding fault for media headlines and political pointscoring. They even publicise the successes as well as the lessons learned.

For a great insight into this process, one only needs to look through the many publications from the US Congressional Research Service that deal with precisely the kinds of issues I have raised here.

Christopher Skinner served 30 years in the Royal Australian Navy as a weapons and electrical engineering Officer in six surface warships, in the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation, the Vietnam War and surveillance of the North-West Indian Ocean. Shore service included secondment to the Defence Research Centre, Salisbury and to the US Naval Sea Systems Command to manage the lead-ship trials for a joint frigate project, Superintendent of Missile and Torpedo Maintenance, and the initial project director for the ANZAC frigate program of 10 ships for Australia and New Zealand. He is a member of several naval and geopolitical institutes, but the opinions expressed here are his own.