The challenge of too much success in Ukraine

In early September, military commentators all over the globe waited anxiously for news about the heavily publicised Kherson counteroffensive. Of course, for operational security the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense regularly calls for complete communication blackouts.

The counteroffensive was intentionally bullish, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky himself stating in late August that the country will seek to retake Crimea, a firm statement of objectives for the Ukrainian people who refuse to cede any inch of territorial sovereignty.

Except, the counteroffensive was a sleight of hand. While reporters and military spokespeople hypothesised endlessly about the counteroffensive in the country’s south, several hundred kilometres to the north-east, the Ukrainian Armed Forces recaptured some 3,000 squared kilometres of Russian occupied territory over a matter of days.

While Ukraine’s battlefield success has evidenced the effect of mission command in combat over Russian shock and awe, western military hardware has likewise seemingly reached its apotheosis.

While internet memes — such as Saint Javelin — in the early days of the invasion shone a spotlight on the West’s technological superiority over Russia, the gap has increased with the use of Hight Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and loitering munitions on the battlefield. Indeed, even the RAAF has acknowledged that the HIMARS have proven a game changer.

While this has seemingly bought the world’s “second army” to heel and increased the confidence of Western military planners in their technology and doctrine, some commentators have warned against recent battlefield successes spurring Western hubris and complacency.

Writing for War on the Rocks, Michael Spirtas, associate director of the International Security and Defence Policy Program within the RAND National Security Research Division and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, explained that success on the battlefields of Ukraine may “decrease the urgency of efforts to strengthen Taiwan,” therefore leaving the West unprepared for the next potential flashpoint in the modern era of great power competition.

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According to the analyst, Chinese military planners are observing, assessing and overcoming many of Russia’s military failings, therefore suggesting that those vectors of success in Ukraine would likely not be replicable in the event of a conflict in Taiwan.

Indeed, the litany of Russian errors would likely bolster Chinese military capabilities, teaching lessons in which “some relate to strategy, some relate to the use of information, some relate to logistics, and some relate to the tactical fight.”

The first crucial point of difference between Ukraine and Taiwan is the existence of friendly border nations. These enabled the streamlined export of cutting-edge military capabilities and expertise to bolster the Ukrainian military.

This does not hold true for Taiwan.

“The many land routes of supply across Europe have allowed the United States and its allies to transport arms, humanitarian aid, and other assistance during the conflict. Taiwan, of course, is an island, and it would be much more difficult to send in the same level of supplies during a conflict. China could contest both sea and air access to Taiwan,” Spirtas wrote.

Secondly, considering China’s economic might, it will likely prove harder to convince the world to isolate China as it did Russia.

The statistics do speak for themselves on this matter, with the China International Import Expo boasting that the country has become “a top trading partner of over 120 countries and regions.”

Thirdly, military support to Taiwan is considerably smaller than that of Ukraine. According to Spirtas, the US Senate’s 2023 National Defense Authorisation Act backs $10 billion in military assistance over five years to Taiwan. This is miniscule relative to the estimated $17 to $25 billion given to Ukraine since the invasion of Russia.

Spirtas continues, arguing that wars can only be fought with the Army at hand. Therefore, drip feeding funding to Taiwan is sub-optimal policy.

“Part of the problem is that China can intervene when it chooses, so it is impossible for policymakers to know exactly when conflict might occur.”

Though the War in Ukraine has given fundamental lessons to the PLA, it has likewise help shaped Taiwan’s irregular warfare doctrines.

“There are questions about whether the concept will prove viable, but the example of Ukraine has helped inspire Taiwan to take steps to prepare its people to engage in civilian resistance by providing courses to its people on medical rescue, self-defense combat, and rescue and evacuation,” Spirtas notes.

While the West must celebrate Ukrainian wins when they occur, like Icarus, the West cannot fly too close to the sun and forget the fundamental lessons of warfare.