What are the strategic implications of China’s accelerated production of nuclear weapons?
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Late last month, the US Department of Defense published its 2022 China Military Power Report, outlining key developments in the People’s Liberation Army’s nuclear weapons production program.
The Pentagon noted that over the next decade, China aims to “modernise, diversify, and expand” its nuclear forces, with current efforts exceeding previous attempts “in both scale and complexity”.
“The PRC is investing in and expanding the number of its land, sea, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces,” the Pentagon report stated.
“The PRC is also supporting this expansion by increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities.”
The US estimates that over the course of 2021, Beijing likely “accelerated its nuclear expansion”, with its operational nuclear warheads stockpile potentially surpassing 400.
Notably, the Pentagon warns if China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it would likely field a stockpile of approximately 1,500 warheads by 2035.
According to Patty-Jane Geller — senior policy analyst, Center for National Defense at the Heritage Foundation — if China achieves this target, it’s stockpile would equal the nuclear arsenal of the United States, which reportedly deploys around 1,550 nuclear weapons.
“Last year’s report estimated that China would have 1,000 warheads fielded by 2030, but this new assessment indicates China’s intent to achieve nuclear parity with, or surpass, the US,” she writes in a piece originally published in The Daily Signal.
Second, the new report states that China’s nuclear build-up — which already had been described by the commander of US Strategic Command as a “strategic breakout” — has accelerated.
Geller flags the sharp increase in the Pentagon’s projections, with the 2020 report expecting China’s nuclear arsenal to double to 400 by 2030.
“The 2022 report now states that China has already done so — in just two years,” she observes.
“Indeed, this acceleration matches the prediction from Adm. Charles Richard, commander of US Strategic Command, that ‘whatever the time estimate that the intelligence community gives you on anything from China, divide it by two and maybe by four and you will get closer to the right answer’.”
Geller adds it would be “unwise” to presume China would stop its acceleration in 2035, given its ambitions to become a “top military power and supplant the US on the world stage”.
She goes on to warn that the United States’ current nuclear force is not designed to deter a Chinese nuclear threat of this size.
“The size and composition of the US nuclear deterrent was designed around 2010, based on assumptions of a more benign threat environment than the one we see today,” she writes.
“At that time — when decisions about the future US nuclear force were made — China was expected to maintain its historic ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.
“No one predicted the rapid nuclear expansion we’re seeing today. As nuclear threats continue to grow, so does the concern that US nuclear forces may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the new and dynamic threat environment.”
Geller also points to the Pentagon’s report of China’s increased capacity to produce plutonium — a core material used for the development of nuclear weapons.
“Access to plutonium has been regarded by some analysts as a limiting factor for China’s nuclear program,” she writes.
In contrast, the US lacks the capacity to produce plutonium pits, which compose the core of nuclear weapons.
“The US currently is working to reconstitute its ability to produce plutonium pits, with the goal of producing 80 pits per year,” she observes.
“But this capability is not expected to be fully operational until 2032 at the earliest.
In short, the Pentagon report suggests that China still will possess a larger warhead production capacity even if the US fully achieves its own production goals.”
Moreover, the US target of producing 80 pits a year aims to replace existing weapons rather than support the development of new warheads.
“In other words, US plutonium pit production only will enable the US to replace its existing forces while China’s weapons production will increase its arsenal dramatically,” she adds.
As such, these current production trends would provide a Chinese President Xi Jinping with a “path to nuclear superiority”.
Geller concludes: “The US, for its part, would have few options to respond if China decided to continue building beyond 1,500 warheads.
“As China continues to improve infrastructure to support nuclear expansion, America may need to re-evaluate its own warhead production plans to ensure we can pace the growing Chinese nuclear threat.”
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