Industry critical to allied naval interchangeability

As the global centre of geopolitical and strategic focus pivots away from the traditionally landlocked Western and Central European theatre toward the broad-spectrum maritime-dominated Indo-Pacific, decades of low-intensity, uncontested operations have taken their toll on the United States Navy.  

In stark contrast, Beijing has continued to modernise the qualitative and quantitative capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), now the largest navy in the world, shifting the once second rate, “brown water” navy, to become an increasingly capable “blue water”, global navy at an ever increasing pace. 

Meanwhile, the US Navy and its supporting industrial architecture, once the unassailable leader and security guarantor for much of the world and the global economy is now a shadow of its former might, leaving the US Navy and its global partners, including the Royal Australian Navy, to face an increasingly uphill battle to field a range of next-generation capabilities ranging from hypersonic weapons, through to advanced surface and submarine capabilities.  

In response, the concept of capability aggregation has re-emerged as a key focal point for the US and its allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea in recent years as a means of enhancing interoperability and deepening strategic capability through common platforms (e.g. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, P-8A Poseidon and Aegis combat system) to maximise collective security and deterrence against potential adversaries. 

Now, US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday has called for America’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific to become “interchangeable”, a significant step change from the prior calls for interoperability — with industry set to play an enhanced role in delivering interchangeability for the US and its allies, especially Australia. 

Focus on enhancing ‘high-end’ partners already gaining Aussie buy-in

For ADM Gilday, the push to get allies thinking and acting on interchangeability is already yielding results, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with ADM Gilday citing a number of successful recent examples during the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference, namely: 

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• The US took tactical control of several international aircraft carriers in the US European Command area of operations in late-2022.
• US intelligence sharing with Ukraine has provided the European nation with significant tactical advantages over the Russian military, without compromising intelligence sources.
• A number of US allies have already participated in Project Overmatch and are beginning to acquire the necessary equipment to integrate with the US.

ADM Gilday explained the strategic thinking behind the US focus on interchangeability with key allies, “We are trying to entice our high-end partners to go beyond interoperability into interchangeability. It’s a push to put us in a position where, if we do have to fight tonight, we’re not stumbling.”

These comments were reinforced by the Australian Naval attaché in Washington, Commodore Darren Grogen, who explained that while Australia and the US are fielding an ever growing number of common platforms including the F-35, the P-8A Poseidon and MH-60R Romeo, there remains a number of challenges for capability aggregation, namely, while the platforms remain common there are some differences. CDRE Grogen explained, “I still can’t embark these on my ship, I can’t land one of those [MH-60] Romeos on my deck. They’re the challenges we need to overcome.” CDRE Grogen further explained, “The more we work together, the closer we’re going to get with that. We still have, obviously, issues with the parts; there’s American parts and Australian parts.”

Critically, in a major milestone for the delivery of interchangeability, the US Pacific Fleet recently created the position of Deputy Director of Maritime Operations, a role filled by an Australian two star admiral — whereby if the Director of Maritime Operations was to be on leave, the Australian leader would conceivably be in charge of US naval operations in the region. 

Australian industry participation in programs like the F-35 program, combined with the potential embodied by the AUKUS agreement provides further avenues for industry to provide further avenues for interchangeability through common component warehousing and maintenance depots similar to BAE Systems Australia’s regional maintenance and sustainment depot for the F-35. 

Additionally, as programs like Australia’s multi-billion Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise continue to mature and the missile stocks increase in volume, Australian-based maintenance and sustainment depots, as well as warehousing can play a significant role in interchangeability between the United States and Australia as an initial starting point, while also building economic and industrial resilience and diversity as a fundamental component of national sovereignty. 

Room for further consideration

The growing realisation that both the United States and allies like Australia will need to get the balance of its naval capabilities just right, not just to support the US as part of a larger joint task force, but to ensure that the Royal Australian Navy can continue to operate independently and complete its core mission reliably and responsively. 

This emphasis on a “high-low” mix will ensure that the Royal Australian Navy’s high-end capabilities, like frigates and destroyers, are capable of serving as part of larger allied formations, while upgunned offshore patrol vessels can serve a key role in securing sea lines and long-range constabulary patrols, while strategic force multipliers like the proposed nuclear submarines serve as key strategic game changers.  

Today, strategic sea lines of communication support over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea (SCS) and the strategic waterways and choke points of South-East Asia annually.

The Indian Ocean and its critical global sea lines of communication are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy. 

Australia is not immune to these geopolitical and strategic factors and as an island nation heavily dependent on sea transport — with 99 per cent of the nation’s exports, a substantial amount of its strategic imports, namely liquid fuel, and a substantial proportion of the nation’s domestic freight depending on the ocean —  it is a necessity to understand and adapt, and introduce a focus on maritime power projection and sea control.

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