A senior US general has issued a major wake-up call to British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, telling the United Kingdom that the British Army is “no longer” a top tier global fighting force, spelling trouble for the UK in an era of renewed great power competition and raising questions about where Australia actually ranks.
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Just as the United Kingdom seemed to be regaining some semblance of stability following the chaos of the Brexit vote, the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing political fallout following the resignation of Boris Johnson, followed by the subsequent transition from Liz Truss to Rishi Sunak, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, added further fuel to the fire thrusting the United Kingdom into a position not experienced since the early days of the Second World War.
For the British Armed Forces, the Russian invasion and subsequent waves of US and UK-led financial and military aid couldn’t come at a worse time. Despite an ambitious plan for the modernisation and restructuring of the British Armed Forces by former prime minister Boris Johnson, which aimed to focus the nation’s attention towards the rapidly developing multipolar world order, particularly in eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
In doing so, Johnson sought to re-establish the UK as a pre-eminent global military, economic, and political power, or a new “Global Britain”. This radical approach echoed comments made by former UK defence secretary Gavin Williamson in early 2019, when he promised a “major departure and reorientation” and the first major shift in UK defence policy for the first time since the introduction of the “east of Suez” doctrine in the 1960s.
At the time, Williamson described the post-Brexit era as “our biggest moment as a nation since the end of the Second World War, when we can recast ourselves in a different way, we can actually play the role on the world stage that the world expects us to play”. These lofty ambitions appear to have run aground, with rather disastrous results for the British Armed Forces and the British Army, in particular.
Johnson’s plan for the British Army envisaged the major restructuring of the British Army to focus on power projection and rapid expeditionary capability as part of the Army 2020 plan — this plan is designed to support concurrent deployments in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.
No longer a ‘top tier’ force
Despite the ambitions designed to transform the British Army, the economic impact of COVID-19, compounded by decades of cuts to the nation’s defence has left the British Army a shadow of its former glory — with major ramifications for the United Kingdom as a global power in the era of renewed and growing great power competition and Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s position as a “war time prime minister”.
This point has recently been reinforced by a senior US general who had pointed warning for the United Kingdom’s Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace: “Bottom line ... it’s an entire service unable to protect the UK and our allies for a decade”. This was further compounded by a series of concerning details outlined about the state of readiness of the British Armed Forces, namely:
- The British Armed Forces would run out of ammunition “in a few days” if called upon to fight.
- The Royal Air Force lacks the ability to defend its skies against the level of missile and drone strikes that Ukraine is enduring.
- It would take five to 10 years for the Army to be able to field a warfighting division of some 25,000 to 30,000 troops backed by the required tanks, artillery and helicopters.
- Thirty per cent of the UK’s forces on high readiness are reservists who are unable to mobilise within NATO timelines.
- The majority of the Army’s fleet of armoured vehicles, including tanks, was built between 30 to 60 years ago and full replacements are not due for years.
Perhaps the most concerning part of this warning, the US general reportedly told Wallace, “You haven’t got a tier one [force]. It’s barely tier two [force].” This is particularly concerning for the United Kingdom, when the US, Russia, China, and France are ranked as “tier one” powers, while Germany and Italy are examples of “tier two” powers.
Where does this leave Australia?
While Australia’s defence and strategic policy community waits with bated breath for the release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and its implications for the Australian Defence Force, once can’t help but ask, where does Australia rank and how will the DSR impact our capability moving forward?
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: "A de-globalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."
Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch