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Imagine nearly a century after the end of the Second World War telling Europeans that German military weakness would be one of the key factors hindering European resistance to Russian aggression. Well, oddly enough, that is where we find ourselves and Australia can learn important lessons from the predicaments Europe finds itself in.
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Since its formation following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Germany has been at the epicentre of all of the major geo-political, economic and strategic conflagrations of the 20th century — backed by an unrivalled industrial power base, advanced manufacturing, innovative warfighting doctrine and a seemingly unyielding, iron will, the central European nation dominated the affairs of Europe, that is until now.
While the traditional balance of power in Europe has been a complicated equation, balancing the relative power of France, Germany, the offshore balancing nature of Great Britain and the juggernaut to the east, Russia and its various iterations as an imperial power under the tsars and a revolutionary power as the Soviet Union — the two most influential powers, Russia and Germany have tentatively balanced one another through periods of neutral co-operation or outright hostility.
The current conflict gripping Eastern Europe, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine is just the latest incarnation of this delicate dance with the United States fulfilling the role of offshore balancer, replacing the United Kingdom — however, the traditional power dynamics have played a greater role in the current events, the most significant of which is Germany's post-Second World War guilt and post-Cold War apathy toward maintaining a strategic military capability.
This predicament is explained by former Stratfor analyst, Peter Zeihan in his book, 'The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalisation' where he states, "Future Europe’s problems are many...The Germans fear that not having a deal with the Russians means war...Not all European states are created equal. For every British heavyweight, there is a Greek basket case. For every insulated France, there is a vulnerable Latvia. Some countries are secure or rich or have a tradition of power projection...
"Perhaps worst of all, the biggest economic player (Germany) is the one with no options but to be the center weight of everything, while the two countries with the greatest capacity to go solo (France and the United Kingdom) hedged their bets and never really integrated with the rest of Europe," Zeihan states.
Despite Germany's position, the post-Second World War paradigm and particularly, the post-war guilt has played a central role in shaping Germany's attitudes toward European security and in particular, its role in serving as a strategic anchor on the continent. Germany has long come under fire for its ever declining spending on defence, particularly as a central figure within the NATO alliance, most significantly drawing the ire of successive US presidents from Barack Obama to Donald Trump.
Recognising these challenges, German newspaper Der Spiegel has recently conducted a detailed analysis, titled 'An Examination of the Truly Dire State of Germany's Military' which takes a closer look at the material challenges facing the Germany military, with a powerful warning for Australia as our own government considers the nation's strategic future and capabilities in the forthcoming Defence Strategic Review scheduled for release in late-March.
"The cupboards are almost bare"
Despite Germany's status as a truly global industrial power and a globally recognised leader in the realms of advanced manufacturing, Germany's military modernisation in the aftermath of the Cold War has been somewhat lacklustre, resulting in major delays to acquisition programs, faulty equipment, costly overruns for major programs — if all of this is starting to sound a little familiar, don't worry, you're not alone.
With the war in Ukraine shedding light on the lack of preparedness across Europe and the broader Western World, German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz has moved to remedy the predicament, recently approving a 100 billion Euro "special fund" to overhaul the German military and prepare it for the era of great power competition — Scholz details this shift, stating in February, "It is clear that we must invest much more in the security of our country in order to protect our freedom and our democracy.
"The goal is a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us," critically, while Scholz's intent is clear: to prepare German military for conflict, the challenges the Bundeswehr faces are legion, with Der Spiegel quoting a report from the commander of the 10th Panzer Division, following a recent exercise, where: "during an exercise with 18 Puma infantry fighting vehicles, all 18 of them broke down. It was a worrisome incident given that the ultra-modern weapons systems are a key component of the NATO rapid-reaction force."
This is then reinforced by Alfons Mais, Lieutenant General of the German Army, who states, "The cupboards are almost bare" and by André Wüstner, chairman of the German Bundeswehr Association, who adds, "We continue to be in free fall."
In the most recent report from December 2022, Mais' colleague, the Inspector General for the Bundeswehr, Eberhard Zorn, painted an even worse picture for the state of the German military in the face of mounting pressure on the power to step up its game and enhance its capacity to respond to aggression in Europe, with Zorn's report highlighting, "when it comes to equipment, it’s yellow. According to the accompanying explanation, the army is currently unable to send artillery units to Lithuania. The Bundeswehr has for years suffered from a shortage of artillery, a problem made worse by arms deliveries to Ukraine. It will take several years for this deficit to be eliminated.
"Anti-aircraft defense is likewise deficient due to parallel commitments to the NATO rapid reaction force."
This predicament is further exacerbated with Zorn's report highlighting, "the Bundeswehr exhibits "severe capability deficits" in air defense, the air force lacks armaments for its warplanes, and anti-aircraft units lack guided missiles...The navy has insufficient stocks of reserve and replacement parts, while the medical services "are not able to muster sufficient supplies of bandages and medications for military operations," due to delivery bottlenecks from suppliers. The Bundeswehr, in other words, doesn’t even have enough Band-Aids."
It just gets worse
If the situation identified by Zorn wasn't bad enough, Zorn's report details further capability limitations for the Bundeswehr, namely, "of the various helicopter models belonging to the navy, just 30 per cent at most were available in mid-November, as were a third of the military’s ancient Tornado fighter jets and just over half of its Marder infantry fighting vehicles. Only half of the CH-53 heavy transport helicopters, also ancient, are operational. Just a shade more than half of the Bundeswehr’s PzH 2000 self-propelled guns are available, two-thirds of its frigates and half of its (six) submarines."
While the equipment predicament is part of the equation, Germany, like Australia, the United States and much of the Western World is facing increasingly concerning shortages of critical guided weapons, bombs and other related munitions and supporting command and control infrastructure in the face of growing supply demands from Ukraine — something Zorn's report details, stating, "In particular, the lack of necessary material (for example modern heavy equipment, command and control equipment, munitions and replacement parts) must be addressed. In addition to the delivery of heavy equipment, the continual outward flow of replacement parts and munitions has reached a relevant magnitude."
Not to be discounted, the Bundeswehr also faces mounting manpower problems, following decades of cuts to manpower as a result of government sequestration to save money in the aftermath of the Eurozone and Global Financial Crisis of 2008, with the German government prioritising fiscal savings, as a result reducing manpower available for the German military, something not addressed despite Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014.
Der Spiegel details the push by former defence minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who commissioned a reform commission "that recommended shrinking the Bundeswehr to 180,000 soldiers and ending Germany's compulsory military service" — this point directly impacts the deployability of the German military, with Alfons Mais explaining to Der Spiegel, "the three German divisions and the eight brigades beneath them "are not immediately deployable" as large units for national and alliance defense — none of them."
However, unlike the decades preceding the Second World War, Australia has lived experience of both living under a strategic umbrella and operating one as it did in large part during the decade immediately following the end of the War in the Pacific, providing a unique understanding of the benefits of establishing such a structure in concert with regional partners led by Australia.
It is clear that as a nation, Australia is at a precipice and both the Australian public and the nation’s political and strategic leaders need to decide what they want the nation to be: do they want the nation to become an economic, political and strategic backwater caught between two competing great empires and a growing cluster of periphery great powers? Or does Australia “have a crack” and actively establish itself as an Indo-Pacific great power with all the benefits it entails?
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: "A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."
Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
