Prudence demands planning for a Plan B in a potential post-American world order

Australia, like many nations around the world, is at the edge of a precipice of immense economic, political, and strategic change. The post-Second World War order, established in the dying days of the war and formalised with the Bretton Woods Conference and the formation of the United Nations, set the stage for the period of stability, prosperity, and growth which transformed the world despite periods of tumult. 

By putting an end to the often-ancient rivalries between varying imperial powers, the United States, through its post-war might, guaranteed the freedom of the seas and promoted an explosion of free trade across the globe paving the way for the modern, interconnected global economy and period of innovation we enjoy today.

Through this might, both conventional in its strategic arsenal, the United States established what has become known as a “strategic umbrella” where for greater input into their ally’s security policy and easier access to their markets, the United States would do the heavy lifting on the global geostrategic stage.

Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Western Europe, and parts of north Asia, in particular, have served as the beneficiaries of this new globalised world and radically new approach, ironed out at the Bretton Woods Conference, and then more drastically implemented through policies like the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe following the devastation of the Second World War, this golden era of the Pax Americana is now coming to an end.

This epochal end was reinforced by concerning comments made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the dying days of 2022, when he stated: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”

In revealing the declining relative power of the United States, Secretary Blinken has fuelled renewed longstanding concerns about the apparent commitment of the world’s “indispensable nation” to maintaining its post-war project, with dramatic implications for Australia and other nations that have depended heavily upon the United States. 

Enter Professor Walter Russell Mead, the James Clarke Chace Professor for Foreign Affairs at Bard College who has highlighted that “America shrugs, and the World makes plans”, highlighting this growing concern about the United States’ commitment to the post-war order. 

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Plan A and Plan A Plus

Central to Professor Mead’s thesis is a belief identified by Japanese foreign affairs commentator Akita Hiroyuki that “America’s unquestioned supremacy after the Cold War established a global economic and security system that worked very well for key American allies like Germany and Japan. For these countries, their preferred foreign policy, which he calls Plan A, would be to carry on as usual, free-riding on American power and basking in the resulting peace and prosperity.”

This positioning is based upon the long-held, post-Cold War belief that the Pax Americana would correlate with the “end of history” and the ultimate triumph of the liberal democratic, capitalist world order over the failed 20th century experiments of fascism and communism which had posed such significant threats to the global order and were ultimately responsible for the collapse of the old imperial order which had dominated history prior to that. 

Australia, like Germany and Japan, had during this period, become increasingly dependent upon the United States for its strategic heavy lifting, ultimately now leaving these nations unprepared to face the double-edged sword of a diminished US commitment to maintaining the global order and the relative rising strategic, economic, and political power of peer and near-peer powers who equally have played the long game. 

Professor Mead goes further stating, “The trouble is that as challengers like China, Russia, and Iran undermine the stability of the American order and as the Americans themselves seem less reliable and predictable — Plan A is no longer enough ... These countries want the American order to survive but realise that they must work harder to make up for perceived American weakness.”

This echoes the growing Australian realisation that as a nation, it must do more to secure its own interests, with a little help from our friends of course. This recognition is of course the driving force behind the Australian government’s comprehensive Defence Strategic Review which is expected to be released in just a few short weeks and will be the most consequential review of the nation’s strategic capabilities since the 1970s at least. 

“Countries that choose Plan A Plus are tightening their relations with the US, increasing defence spending, and intensifying efforts to strengthen the network of alliances that underpin the world order,” Professor Mead adds. 

Importantly for Professor Mead, this shift has been seen, in some part as a major coup for the United States, in that it had tried and seemingly failed for decades to get their allies, particularly those in Europe, to lift their weight. 

Score one benefit to come from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I guess. 

It is believed, this collective weight and aggregation of capability will provide the United States and its allies with an enhanced response and capacity to resist peer and near-peer competitors, something Professor Mead highlights, stating: “From an American standpoint, getting our allies to Plan A Plus is good. It’s what we’ve tried and failed to do for decades in Europe, and the embrace of such thinking in the Indo-Pacific, from India to Japan and Korea, has created a web of relationships that help counter China. In an A Plus world, our enemies would be deterred, our friends empowered — and the US would maintain a world system that benefits many people besides ourselves at a more reasonable cost.”

What if Plan A fails? 

Despite the renewed initiative and commitment shown by key allies like Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and yes, even Germany is now starting to realise the threats it faces, there is still an underlying insecurity in both the commitment and capability of the United States to continue maintaining the post-war global order. 

Professor Mead explains, “But other countries can’t help but worry. What if American political polarisation and economic mismanagement continue to undermine American power so that the US-based order continues to decay despite greater allied support? If countries lose confidence in the ability of the US order to survive, even with stepped up support from allies, they will inevitably begin to plan for their security in a post-American world.”

Surely the comments made by Secretary Blinken reveal the relative vulnerability of the US position, if not the growing revelations about the ailing state of America, and more broadly, the West’s industrial infrastructure, coupled with a suicidal push to further impact industrial capacity by pursuing unreliable renewable energy across the developed world reveals that no one nation is match fit. 

But these aren’t the only factors, something both Professor Mead and Akita highlight, with Mead stating, “It isn’t primarily the state of the American military that drives people to contemplate Plan B — at least not yet. It is questions about our will, competence, and political and social coherence that keep our allies up at night. For Europeans, the fear that Donald Trump might return to the White House most worries them. Many Asian and Middle Eastern countries had fewer problems with Mr Trump, but they also worry about his, and America’s, unpredictability.”

While many developed nations have begun their shift to the “Plan A Plus” approach, some have already begun their transition to begin the detailed stages of “Plan B” planning for the end of the post-war American order, in a manner, hedging their bets. 

Professor Mead details, “In the Middle East, the transition to a Plan B world is already under way. For longtime allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the American world order is receding in the rear-view mirror. Fairly or not, President Biden is widely seen as both weaker and less reliable than Mr Trump — who wasn’t considered a particularly able foreign-policy leader in his own right. As the aftershocks from the Afghan withdrawal continue to reverberate and as Iran advances relentlessly toward a nuclear weapon with no visible response from the US, Plan B looks more realistic every day.”

While I would not entirely call nations like Saudi Arabia “allies”, the point is valid and their recognition of the potential decline in both US commitment and capacity raises further questions worth considering, something, Professor Mead highlights, stating, “But our allies aren’t doing these things because their confidence in us is growing. And if their confidence keeps diminishing, more countries will edge toward Plan B — and more parts of the world will begin to look like the Middle East.”

For Australia, the question is if our own “Plan A Plus” approach is enough becomes more poignant as we prepare for the release of the Defence Strategic Review and the subsequent implementation period which will follow. 

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.  

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains:

"A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."

Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..