How does Australia turn the tide in a new Cold War?

For many historians, strategic thinkers, and political decision-makers, the horrors of the Second World War could accurately be seen as the final, most painful stages of labour before the birth of the new world order. 

As the fires of war were finally subdued, bringing the conflict to an end across Europe and the vast expanse of the Pacific, men and women across the globe collectively breathed a sigh of relief, as the carnage and horrors of the previous six years were replaced by a renewed sense of optimism and hope. 

In taking stock, the allies, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, who had emerged utterly triumphant, stood unquestionably atop the ashes of formerly great imperial powers, bringing to an end the age of imperial conquest and ushering in a new period of opportunity and competition. 

The economic, political, and strategic competition that would begin to take shape as the US and the Soviet Union eyed off one another across the globe would become known as the Cold War, a period of intense, often sporadically hot competition between the two superpowers. 

This intense competition saw vast arsenals of weapons developed and fielded, proxy conflicts fought across the Asian, African, and South American continents and intriguing mutual games of espionage between the two camps, as former KGB officer Yuri Bezmenov explained, to engage in “ideological subversion” in an attempt to convince the other side of their opponent’s own benefits. 

The competitions between the ideologies of liberal democratic capitalism and the revolutionary doctrines of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao would come to characterise the latter half of the 20th century and set the stage for the world we find ourselves in today. 

While the collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20th century coming as somewhat of a surprise to many strategic thinkers and political leaders, the world embraced the “new world order” and the triumph of liberal democratic capitalism over the horrors of autocratic tyranny in this end of history, something we now know is fraught with hubris. 

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As the US-led world order completed a self-congratulatory lap of honour and took to expanding democracy across the world, particularly in the Middle East, the former Soviet bloc licked its wounds and began the long, arduous journey back toward relevance and a position of prominence on the global stage. 

This time however, the new revolutionary world order would not be led in major part by Russia, rather it would be spearheaded by Mao’s China, an economic, political, and strategic juggernaut that studied the lessons of history, has never quite recovered from its “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of colonial empires and has its eyes on usurping the global status quo. 

An order in retreat

No matter where one looks, the post-Second World War economic, political, and strategic order is in varying stages of retreat, decline or stagnation and is, more generally, under siege.

Declining confidence in the capacity, commitment, and unity of the United States to act as the world’s hegemon and security benefactor, coupled with the economic decline and stagnation now ravaging the Western world in the face of a boisterous, invigorated, and dynamic Chinese-led bloc, spells trouble.

Across Australia’s own northern and eastern approaches, Beijing’s influence peddling and expansionist ambitions in the Pacific, coupled with the new scramble for Africa and the mounting economic, strategic, and political partnerships established through new, multilateral international organisations, namely the BRICS organisation, are gradually stepping up their assault on the global order our own nation has become increasingly dependent upon. 

Despite the protestations of some recent US administrations and like-minded nations across the globe that the “adults are back in charge”, it is clear that the pre-eminence and the legitimacy of the United States’ position as the “leader of the free world” is abject freefall. 

Like someone going through the stages of grief, many are beginning to recognise at best, and accept at worst, that the best days of the Pax Americana and its order seem to be behind it. 

Nowhere is this clearer than in the recent commentary by French President Emmanuel Macron regarding Europe’s collective approach toward countering Beijing’s mounting ambitions and designs for the global order, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. 

“The great risk [to Europe is it ] gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy,” President Macron told reporters from France’s equivalent to Air Force One last week, going further, President Macron said, “The paradox would be that, overcome with panic, we believe we are just America’s followers ... The question Europeans need to answer … is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction.”

This position has been further exacerbated by Europe’s, shall we say, rather lacklustre response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, despite being at the “frontline”, traditional European powers like France and Germany have left the majority of the heavy lifting to the Americans and the British, demonstrating their approach is one of pure self-interest and where possible, it will take advantage of the United States and to a lesser extent, the British, to do the heavy lifting. 

In identifying this, despite increased rhetoric, coupled with a growing rotation of European military assets through the Indo-Pacific, how can Australia depend on the post-Second World War order’s “great powers” if their own investment and commitment to their own security is, well, less than stellar? 

This question becomes increasingly important when you account for the admission by the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, who, in the dying days of 2022, stated: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”

In response, Professor Walter Russell Mead, the James Clarke Chace Professor for Foreign Affairs at Bard College, who has highlighted that “America shrugs, and the world makes plans”, reinforces this growing concern about the United States’ commitment to the post-war order. 

Central to Professor Mead’s thesis is a belief identified by Japanese foreign affairs commentator Akita Hiroyuki that “America’s unquestioned supremacy after the Cold War established a global economic and security system that worked very well for key American allies like Germany and Japan. For these countries, their preferred foreign policy, which he calls Plan A, would be to carry on as usual, free riding on American power and basking in the resulting peace and prosperity”.

Australia, like Germany and Japan, had during this period, become increasingly dependent upon the United States for its strategic heavy lifting, ultimately now leaving these nations unprepared to face the double-edged sword of a diminished US commitment to maintaining the global order and the relative rising strategic, economic, and political power of peer and near-peer powers who equally have played the long game. 

Professor Mead goes further stating, “The trouble is that as challengers like China, Russia, and Iran undermine the stability of the American order and as the Americans themselves seem less reliable and predictable — Plan A is no longer enough ... These countries want the American order to survive but realise that they must work harder to make up for perceived American weakness.”

What if Plan A fails? Does Australia play the ‘long game’? 

Despite the renewed initiative and commitment shown by key allies like Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and yes, even Germany, is now starting to realise the threats it faces, there is still an underlying insecurity in both the commitment and capability of the United States to continue maintaining the post-war global order. 

Professor Mead explains, “But other countries can’t help but worry. What if American political polarisation and economic mismanagement continue to undermine American power so that the US-based order continues to decay despite greater allied support? If countries lose confidence in the ability of the US order to survive, even with stepped up support from allies, they will inevitably begin to plan for their security in a post-American world.”

Surely the comments made by Secretary Blinken reveal the relative vulnerability of the US position, if not the growing revelations about the ailing state of America, and more broadly, the West’s industrial infrastructure, coupled with a suicidal push to further impact industrial capacity by pursuing unreliable, renewable energy across the developed world reveals that no one nation is match fit. 

But these aren’t the only factors, something both Professor Mead and Akita highlight, with Mead stating, “It isn’t primarily the state of the American military that drives people to contemplate Plan B — at least not yet. It is questions about our will, competence, and political and social coherence that keep our allies up at night. For Europeans, the fear that Donald Trump might return to the White House most worries them. Many Asian and Middle Eastern countries had fewer problems with Mr Trump, but they also worry about his, and America’s, unpredictability.”

However, In the Middle East, the transition to a Plan B world is already underway. For longtime allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the American world order is receding in the rear-view mirror. Fairly or not, President Joe Biden is widely seen as both weaker and less reliable than Mr Trump — who wasn’t considered a particularly able foreign policy leader in his own right. As the aftershocks from the Afghan withdrawal continue to reverberate and as Iran advances relentlessly towards a nuclear weapon with no visible response from the US, Plan B looks more realistic every day.

For Australia, the question is if our own “Plan A Plus” approach is enough becomes more poignant as we prepare for the release of the Defence Strategic Review and the subsequent implementation period which will follow. 

Importantly, Australia’s Foreign Minister, Senator Penny Wong, has in some ways, positioned Australia’s own approach to one, similar to that of Europe’s own “new” approach, with the Minister telling the National Press Club, “We need to understand what is being competed for — that it is more than great power rivalry and is in fact nothing less than a contest over the way our region and our world works.

“Viewing the future of the region in terms simply of great powers competing for primacy means countries’ own national interests can fall out of focus ... It’s clear to me from my travels throughout the region that countries don’t want to live in a closed, hierarchical region where the rules are dictated by a single major power to suit its own interests,” Minister Wong added. 

In light of this confluence of circumstances, we have to ask, how can Australia turn the tide of this new Cold War in our own favour? 

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.  

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains:

"A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."

Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..