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With Army being reshaped to emphasise long-range fires and flexible amphibious operations in the aftermath of the DSR, is the emphasis on lighter vehicles and smaller, littoral craft going to give us the edge we need?
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Setting the scene, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated at the launch of the DSR, “We confront the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War, both in our region and indeed around the world. That’s why we’re investing in our capabilities and we’re investing, too, in our relationships to build a more secure Australia and a more stable and prosperous region.
“It is the most significant work that’s been done since the Second World War, looking in a comprehensive way at what is needed. It demonstrates that in a world where challenges to our national security are always evolving, we cannot fall back on old assumptions,” Prime Minister Albanese said.
At the core of the Defence Strategic Review is the broader reorientation of Australia’s tactical and strategic focus, away from Coalition-supported counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East or low-intensity, humanitarian interventions across the South Pacific towards a broader focus on peer-level threats and great power competition encapsulated in a “new” conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific.
This has largely been driven by a recognition of two principle factors, first that: “Australia’s strategic circumstances and the risks we face are now radically different. No longer is our alliance partner, the United States, the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific. Intense China–United States competition is the defining feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict. The nature of conflict and threats have also changed.”
Second, that while it is a major driver, great power competition, namely that between the United States and China isn’t the only source of potential conflict or challenge to Australia’s economic, political, and strategic interests across this diverse region, as the Defence Strategic Review states: “Regional countries continue to modernise their military forces. China’s military build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War. This has occurred alongside significant economic development, benefiting many countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia.
“This build-up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent. China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests. China is also engaged in strategic competition in Australia’s near neighbourhood.”
Recognising this, the government’s major restructuring and modernisation of the Australian Defence Force is all about preparing the various branches to respond to these key challenges, with Army staring down the barrel (no pun intended) of a major reconfiguration.
Are we asking Army to do too much?
As part of this restructuring of the Army, the DSR outlines that the Australian Army must be optimised for “littoral manoeuvre operations by sea, land, and air from Australia, with enhanced long-range fires”.
To this end, the DSR recommended the scaling back of the multi-billion-dollar LAND 400 Phase 3 program, with the number of new infantry fighting vehicles more than halved from 450 to 129 — as indicated in the report, those vehicles will provide one mechanised battalion for littoral manoeuvre, training, repair, and attrition stock.
Meanwhile, Army will also receive half the planned self-propelled howitzers initially planned, with the government confirming the cancellation of a second regiment of 30 self-propelled howitzer artillery under LAND 8116 Phase 2 because they do not provide the required range or lethality, according to the review — the first 30 howitzers which are under construction in Geelong by Hanwha will not be cancelled.
However, as part of the cost savings as a result of these “reprioritisations”, Army will see an expanded acquisition of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) capability and an acceleration of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), while littoral manoeuvrability would be supported by the rapid acceleration of the Army’s littoral manoeuvre vessels (LMV) including medium and heavy landing craft under LAND 8710 Phases 1 and 2.
With such a significant scaling back of the resources available to Army, are we at risk of placing the nation’s first responders under undue pressure, and are we equipping the force to successfully complete the mission?
One has to ask in the case of the IFV program, is simply sticking with a non-amphibious variant of the Lynx or Redback enough to support the Army’s amphibious ambitions, or would we be better suited by acquiring both an amphibious version and a solely land-based version to not only enhance Army’s close combat survivability, but also expand the industrial offering in light of industry concern?
Increasing survivability should be a focus of amphibious ops
If “littoral manoeuvre” is now the course de jour as outlined in the DSR, I can’t help but ask if the proposed structure of the Army is sufficient to meet the tactical and strategic requirements that will be placed upon it — this only becomes a more poignant question when you account for plans to grow the ADF’s workforce to 80,000 in the next couple of decades (concerns about the proposed recruitment timeline not withstanding).
To this point, is the proposed scalping of the LAND 400 Phase 3 program the correct course of action, particularly if we’re going to place larger numbers of personnel in harm’s way through the use of smaller, littoral manoeuvre vessels or when relevant using our large amphibious vessels like HMA Ships Canberra, Adelaide and Choules or even the proposed LMVs?
Now you would be forgiven for saying, “I don’t recall seeing an amphibious IFV option being presented as part of LAND 400 Phase 3” and to a degree, you would be correct, except in 2019, Rheinmetall did at least publicly float the development of an amphibious variant of the Lynx IFV, alongside two other variants.
Indeed, Rheinmetall’s variant was stated as providing a “protected amphibious-variant Lynx which will enhance the amphibious capability and survivability of the Australian Army when deploying from the Canberra Class LHDs and other large amphibious warfare ships”.
It should be said that I am not specifically advocating for the Rheinmetall solution and that should Hanwha present a similar solution to fill this blatantly obvious capability gap, then the competing vehicles should be judged on their individual merits and assessed against the requirements established by the Army.
Ultimately, this solution could also serve to provide industry partners with the opportunity to expand their supply proposals to Army, in part making up for the proposed cut back of the planned acquisition.
This capability would serve a similar role to that of the US Marine Corps’ venerable AAV-P7/A1, which is now being replaced by the BAE Systems Amphibious Combat Vehicle as their primary vehicle for bringing Marines from ship-to-shore and providing a tactical overmatch against potential adversaries in an amphibious setting.
Such a swimming capability will prove invaluable in the littoral environments of our immediate region and will enable our large hulled amphibious vessels to have greater stand off range, placing them at less risk, while enhancing the tactical advantages afforded to assets like the LMVs by establishing survivable beachheads early in an engagement, allowing for greater follow on mass to be generated.
Surely, such a capability would be preferable for Australian decision makers within the context of the responsibilities identified in the DSR?
Final thoughts
Ultimately, Army like the broader ADF, needs to undergo a broader force structure planning and development process. Simply outlining future acquisitions and trying to mash it together and saying this will fit is not a solution to the very real tactical and strategic challenges we face.
Army in particular will require a major reorganisation to account for the proposed increase in the ADF personnel power and to adequately integrate the suite of new capabilities, however, we can’t forget that the primary responsibility of the Army is to close the gap and engage the enemy in a close combat environment across the land and amphibious-littoral environment.
Accordingly, it is important that Army be restructured to account for the new responsibilities without compromising its core mission, because undermining Army’s core mission will effectively undermine the core mission of the other branches.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
