Beware the allure of rose-coloured glasses, warns former Aussie diplomat

For almost our entire history, Australia has looked to larger, more powerful nations to frame our world view, our strategic partnerships, and broader engagement on the global stage.

Beginning with the British Empire, Australia’s relationship with the global power paradigm, then dominated by the imperial powers of Europe made sense, as the young colony sought the safety of the world’s superpower.

It wasn’t until the disastrous routing of the British in Singapore in 1942 that Australia began to look for a new strategic benefactor, despite the stench of death arguably circling the British Empire since the end of the First World War.

Looking out across the vast expanse of the Pacific, Australia turned to what would become the world’s “indespensible nation”, the United States. Emerging from its period of self-imposed isolationism in the aftermath of the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 to become the world’s preeminent industrial, political, and strategic power at the war’s end, and the cornerstone of Australia’s new strategic outlook.

While the British would continue to play an important role in Australia’s future strategic planning, the withdrawal of British forces East of Suez in the early 1970s effectively heralded the end of Britain’s pivotal role in Australia’s military planning, the US continued to entrench itself as the nation’s premier strategic partner.

As the world readjusted to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Australia, like many nations, began to embrace the optimism and hope represented by theories about the “End of History” and the peace dividend, leaving the United States as the world’s sole and unquestioned superpower.

However, as we now know, this new paradigm was far from the promised “End of History” as Russia limped away, licking its wounds and China began its rapid ascendency to rival the post-Second World War order.

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China isn’t alone in its position of ascendency, nor is it alone in having its own ambitions and designs for the post-Western world order we now appear to be stumbling towards, in light of the domestic and international decline of both the United States and European powers. India has emerged as one of the world’s pre-eminent powers, now the sixth largest economy in the world according to the World Bank. The world’s largest “democracy” is also a central player in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economic and political bloc, rapidly evolving into an anti-post Second World War order bloc, already actively engaging in the undermining of the US-dollar centric international order (granted the US hasn’t done itself any favours in weaponising the dollar and wielding its power like a trust fund brat) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

At the same time, this ancient, and rising power also presents itself as a powerful balancing nation to Beijing’s rising power and ambitions for the broader Indo-Pacific and has positioned itself brilliantly under Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a central member of the Quad and for Australia, our new great power hope, should the United States descend into isolationism, or falter in the defence of the Indo-Pacific order.

Indeed, both sides of Australia’s political debate have been actively courting the Hindu-nationalist Modi, despite its continued economic, political, and strategic support and engagement with Russia, in flagrant disregard for sanctions over the Ukrainian war and its active participation in economic, political, and strategic blocs and organisations that are committed to undermining and supplanting the post-Second World War order.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has repeatedly reinforced, “Australia and India share a commitment to a stable, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Together, we have an important role to play in supporting this vision. As friends and partners, the relationship between our countries has never been closer.”

However, for former Australian diplomat, including to India, John McCarthy, Australia has to avoid the pitfalls of rose-coloured glasses as it has in the past, with particular scepticism for the rising superpower.

“Since our international engagement quickened after the World War II, Australia has habitually lionised big countries for a while — only for our enthusiasm to fade through lassitude or disappointment,” McCarthy explained, setting the scene.

The enemy of my enemy, isn’t always your friend

For former diplomat McCarthy, Australia’s traditional approach of “lionising” great powers is a dangerous path to proceed, particularly as it relates to India and its position in the future of the Indo-Pacific, with Australia’s emphasis on economic opportunity often colouring the nation’s view of reality.

“Over the past two decades, Australia has rightly recognised the rise of India. Its population of 1.4 billion exceeds China’s. It is the world’s third-biggest global economy in purchasing power parity terms, and it should soon be third in nominal terms. We now have four offices on the ground in India. It is our biggest source of immigrants. It is our fourth-biggest export destination. Education links are burgeoning. All to the good,” McCarthy explains.

Going further, McCarthy adds, “That said, despite qualms about India’s refusal to take issue with Russia on Ukraine, there is a tendency in Australia and elsewhere in the West to see India’s strategic outlook as like ours. For one thing, persons wholly or partly of South Asian origin hold many leadership positions in the United States, in Britain and in Canada. In time, the same will be true in Australia. But India does not share our world view.”

This reality is not only reinforced by India’s participation in the aforementioned BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but the rising power’s continued support of Russia’s economic interests, particularly defence and energy industries, combined with their reluctance to chastise the recalcitrant power over the invasion of Ukraine, presents challenges.

Russia has sort to capitalise on this “division”, actively goading and gloating over the “compromise” of the Indian partnership via a number of means, with a number of standout examples.

Earlier this week, the director general and chief executive officer of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO), Dr Ajay Sahai, told the Russian news agency TASS that he expected that the volume of oil supplies from Russia to India will increase, the growth will reach at least another 5 per cent.

This is particularly important when Sahai detailed the growth in Indian oil consumption from Russia, with him explaining to TASS, “In March 2021 it was 0.3 per cent and in March 2023 it was 30 per cent.”

Unpacking this further, Sahai “stressed that Indian companies benefit from buying Russian oil at a very competitive price ... India, the world’s third-largest importer of crude oil after China and the United States, has refused to accept the Western cap on Russian oil prices and has continued to buy it. According to OPEC’s April report, Russia has become the leading supplier of oil to both India and China. Russian oil accounted for 38 per cent of total shipments to the South Asian nation in February, according to the report”.

This is reinforced by the continued strengthening of Russia and India’s defence collaboration, and the growing economic strength of India’s civil manufacturing industrial base and the Russian export market.

Alexander Mikheev, CEO of Russia’s state defence export agency Rosoboronexport, said, “There are joint projects in the interest of the Indian Navy; [we] expect cooperation in respect of AD (air defence) equipment … Our work in India is a bright example of a comprehensive industrial partnership that encompasses joint projects for all branches of the armed forces, and features a degree of cooperation among enterprises of the two countries that is unique within the global market."

Mikheev unpacked this further, saying, “We have a long-term project with HAL for the licensed production of the most widespread airframe in the Indian Air Force — the Su-30MKI; we are waiting for a decision to produce Ka-226T helicopters on a joint venture basis. T-90 and T-72 tanks, [as well as] BMP-2 MICV, Mango and Invar munitions are produced in India. Production of the Kalashnikov AK-203 [assault rifle] was launched at a plant in the city of Korwa, which will achieve a localisation level of 100 per cent over time."

Meanwhile, India’s growing economic and industrial capacity and emphasis on exporting to Russia’s market reinforces India's incentive to double down on organisations like the BRICS and SCO and this was again reinforced by Dr Ajay Sahai, who added, “Indian companies are exporting cars globally. But that’s a call which individual companies have to take, producers should analyse and decide. All that we can tell them is that it’s a huge market in Russia. The market is waiting for you. If you want to jump into the market, this is the right time.”

Going further, this was reinforced by recent diplomatic visits to New Delhi in April by Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov who ”said that Russia was ready to negotiate supplies of Indian cars to the country. However, he noted that no official proposals had been received. Between April 2022 and February 2023, the trade turnover between Russia and India reached approximately $45 billion”.

Shifting back to McCarthy, he reinforces these points, “With justification, India sees itself as a force in international affairs. It aspires to be a powerful pole in a multipolar world. It adheres to a doctrine of strategic autonomy. It is guided by what it thinks is best for India, not by alliances or what others want of it. India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was a Chinese initiative.”

Going further, McCarthy, perhaps rather abruptly, reinforces that India is not really our friend, despite the rhetoric, “Never a proponent of the Western-inspired liberal international order, India is a leader of the disparate but re-energised Global South — effectively the developing world. As the Ukraine war has progressed, India has put distance between itself and Russia. But it still declines to impose sanctions on that country.”

Despite the rhetoric, India won’t join us in conflict with China, unless...

Importantly for McCarthy, there needs to be a realisation in Australia’s strategic and policymakers when it comes to our partner India, particularly in light of its broader economic, political and strategic designs, attitudes and ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific.

“India’s China-driven strategic congruence with the United States is not the same as a quasi-alliance relationship. It does not operate within a framework of mutual obligation. It does not expect others to come to its aid, and it will not join someone else’s war,” McCarthy said.

Importantly, McCarthy added, “It follows that India will not side militarily with the United States against China over Taiwan (although it might be helpful through use of its territory for transit of personnel and materiel). It also follows that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) will always have inherent limitations, even as it serves as a soft regional buttress against China, because India’s relationship with the US is qualitatively different to that of Japan and Australia.”

Ultimately, it becomes clear that India’s approach to relationships is far more transactional than is our own, or even that of the United States, with the rising power actively viewing their own self-interest as being of paramount importance for their policy making and long-term decision making, this approach is tantamount to a concept of “transactional realism”.

What this means is that India will only make decisions in its own national, political and ethnic interests, rather than within the confines of the broader post-war order that Australia and the United States have built and seek to defend. This is perhaps the most concerning point, that despite the rhetoric surrounding Australia’s burgeoning partnership with India, both individually and within the confines of the Quad, it is clear that the nation needs to reassess its doubling down on the relationship with India.

For McCarthy, this is particularly important given the state of democracy in India, particularly under Modi, with him saying, “Moreover, Narendra Modi’s India does not lend itself to identification with democratic principle, which remains — at least nominally — a driver of American, and less avidly, Australian, strategic affinity.

“Elections in India are generally fair and Modi’s sway is vigorously contested by the main opposition party, Congress, and by regional parties. However, Modi remains a Hindu supremacist whose political machine largely disregards the aspirations of Muslims and other minorities. It reacts vengefully to criticism. To some, India is an illiberal democracy, to others an electoral autocracy. But, for sure, it is not a liberal democracy,” McCarthy explains, raising concerns about the nature of our partner and its own interests and designs for the Indo-Pacific when viewed through the conceptual framework of democracy.

Importantly, McCarthy adds, “Our interests dictate that we put grunt into our dealings with India with energy and patience. But we must have realistic expectations and deal with it as it is, not as we might like it to be.

“If we can do so, we will have a better prospect of avoiding the mutual disappointment which has characterised some of our relationships in the past,” McCarthy states, in doing, so this has strange echoes of the Allies partnership with the Soviet Union during the Second World War, despite clear ideological, political and strategic disparity between the parties, and raises the question, are we artificially sowing the seeds of our next great threat?

Final thoughts

It is increasingly clear that Australia needs to embrace its own attitude and variation of “transactional realism”, one where our policymakers view the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be, based on a thorough understanding of the historic, cultural and societal differences between the emerging and established powers of the Indo-Pacific.

As the old saying goes, failing to learn from history leaves you doomed to repeat it. This is particularly important as Australia’s primary strategic benefactor, the United States, continues to stagnate in comparison to the world’s emerging great powers like China and India, while other regional powers like Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and the like continue to grow and exert their own influence and ambitions for the region.

This is not to say that Australia should go it alone, our alliances have always allowed us to punch above our weight, we do however require a radically new approach to engaging with others, preparing ourselves for future challenges and clearly articulating and protecting our values and interests at home and abroad.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..