Kissinger on coexistence, Taiwan and the future of US-China relations

For many historians, strategic thinkers, and political decision makers, the horrors of the Second World War could accurately be seen as the final, most painful stages of labour before the birth of the new world order.

As the fires of conflict finally subsided, bringing the conflict to an end across Europe and the vast expanse of the Pacific, men and women across the globe collectively breathed a sigh of relief, as the carnage and horrors of the previous six years were replaced by a renewed sense of optimism and hope.

Striding triumphant across the ashes of the formerly great imperial powers of Europe, the United States and Soviet Union sought to usher in a new period of prosperity and optimism.

Sadly, the elation and optimism of the early post-war days came crashing down as an iron curtain descended across much of Soviet-occupied Europe and competition between the two superpowers began to take shape.

This last great example of great power competition subsequently resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the rise of the US-led world order which emerged in the form of Pax Americana.

In doing so, as the US-led world completed a self-congratulatory lap of honour and took to expanding liberal democracy across the world, particularly in the Middle East, the former Soviet bloc licked its wounds and began the long, arduous journey back towards relevance and a position of prominence on the global stage.

Today, the new revolutionary world order would not be led in major part by Russia, rather it would be spearheaded by Mao’s China, an economic, political, and strategic juggernaut that extensively studied the lessons of history and has never quite recovered from its “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of colonial empires, with its eyes, seemingly on usurping the global status quo.

VIEW ALL

Now, for former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, it is critical for the United States and China to manage the relationship lest the world once again devolves into two, feuding nuclear armed camps.

There is a history of coexisting

Importantly, this question around the capacity for the US and China to coexist echoes recent findings by the US Congressional Research Service, which established the historical background of the challenges facing the United States and its partners, including Australia, stating: “The post–Cold War era of international relations — which began in the early 1990s and is generally characterised as having featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states — showed initial signs of fading in 2006–08 and by 2014 had given way to a situation of intensified US competition with China as well as Russia, as well as challenges by China and Russia to elements of the US-led international order established after World War II. For some observers, the ending of the post–Cold War era and emergence of GPC has been underscored by China and Russia’s announced strategic partnership and by Russia’s invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022.”

Using the historical basis of the US-China relationship, Dr Kissinger details the early discussions he shared with former premier of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai, during the opening of China in the 1970s, which highlighted just how far the relationship has fallen.

“We thought — and when I say we, I mean that Nixon had his view firmly in his own mind separately from me. I hadn’t met Nixon until he appointed me. Indeed, I opposed him publicly. On that second visit, we decided to prepare a communiqué. The Chinese proposed that each side state their own objectives, their own goals, and not pretend that we agreed after 25 years — by osmosis — on everything.

“So we listed a lot of disagreements, including on Taiwan. There we stated that the Taiwan solution needed to be settled, or whatever the phrase is — you can look it up — without the use of force. And then we listed a number of agreed objectives, one of which was to oppose hegemony by anybody, as a principle of policy. The [Shanghai] Communiqué was essentially agreed on this visit, except for the part on Taiwan, which was left open because only Mao had the right to do so formally. But Mao had seen and approved the statement of opposing objectives,” Dr Kissinger detailed.

Despite the optimism expressed here, this agreement eventually gave rise to Kissinger’s ultimate success, the One China policy, as the US sought to use Beijing to help balance increased Soviet aggression in central Asia and complicate Soviet strategic decision making, ultimately handing Taipei over to Beijing eventually.

“We’d stated in our version of the communiqué [that] the United States [acknowledges] that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have the goal of One China. The United States [does not] challenge that proposition. So that was our commitment to One China. But the formulation of that time recognised Taiwan as the authorities of China. There is no doubt that the implication of our conversations was that we would not support the Two China policy.

“And that they would not use force … The one important thing to add is, this became a bipartisan policy. Not necessarily in this detail, [but in substance,] every American administration of both parties made it clear that we had a commitment to One China and to a peaceful outcome on Taiwan. So it’s lasted into the Trump administration,” Dr Kissinger explained.

The US has to be the first to move

As Beijing has repeatedly upped the antagonism toward Taiwan in recent years, and has then in recent months rapidly accelerated military exercises, probing Taiwan’s military responses, the most important question now becomes, despite the optimism from the original opening of China, can the US and China coexist without the threat of all out conflict breaking out?

For Kissinger, the answer, simply put, is kind of.

“Well, the basic question is this: ‘Was it possible?’ Or ‘Is it possible for China and the United States to coexist without the threat of all-out war with each other?’” Dr Kissinger posits.

Unpacking this further, Dr Kissinger explains, “I thought and still think that it was, that the negative proof has not yet been given. Because Taiwan is a special case. Every Chinese leader has asserted its essential connection to China; so did Chiang Kai-shek. So the margin for concession here is very limited. On the other hand, with the way things have evolved to now, it is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere. So that should be off the table. What I hope [is] that both leaders come to one fundamental understanding. Traditionally, in diplomacy, the proper set up [is to] settle something easy first, to get used to that.”

However, achieving this coexistence, for Kissinger, the impetus needs to be on the United States to initiate the detente between the two superpowers, he asks, “So, the key question is, is it possible for China and the United States to establish a relationship of a nature that reduces the danger of conflicts that arise autonomously, not sought by either side? And how do you do that?”

Unpacking this, Dr Kissinger states, “hopefully the American president, from my point of view, would say: ‘Mr. President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now, are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity. I think we should agree between ourselves to try to avoid such a situation.”

This position unquestionably puts the United States in the position of weakness, in being conciliatory for antagonism it has not initiated.

Going further, despite Dr Kissinger’s belief that the US can deploy its vast military might to dissuade aggression and reinforce America’s commitment, this is largely bluff posturing, with Dr Kissinger stating, “on Taiwan we can deploy our forces in such a way that assures our intention. Because, realistically, I’m sure Taiwan can’t be maintained in its present form in a war”.

We have to realise, we’re in a new world

Importantly for Kissinger, while the US-China relationship is undoubtedly the most consequential of the 21st century, we face an increasingly multipolar world, with its unique, yet no less important and serious challenges.

“We all have to admit we’re in a new world … there is no guaranteed course,” Dr Kissinger explained.

This new, “deglobalised” world presents unique challenges, perhaps best explained by US strategist Peter Zeihan, who explains: “A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation.”

For Australia, this becomes increasingly important as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Final thoughts

Importantly, if Australia is going to truly respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the global shift in the balance and centre of economic, political, and strategic power to our immediate region, we as a nation need to collectively take responsibility for our own future.

We also need to address the domestic challenges we confront, namely, the social and economic disenfranchisement and disconnection many young Australians face, because if our young people don’t feel invested in our nation, then they definitely won’t step forward to defend the nation and our values.

A unifying, inspirational Grand Strategy which not only articulates our values and principles, but equally identifies a vision at both the macro and micro level, with clearly defined objectives and metrics for delivering provides the nation with the capacity to resist the traditional and hybrid challenges of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..