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With the government’s DSR identifying the need for a larger, more dispersed fleet to “complement” the long-range and deterrence-focused mission of nuclear-powered submarines, why is there such an emphasis on smaller, more limited vessels?
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As an island nation, Australia’s sovereignty, security, and prosperity is intrinsically linked to our maritime surrounds and the uncontested and unmolested access to the global maritime commons.
This reality is critically important in the light of mounting regional and global naval build ups and is the driving force behind the nation’s pursuit of the trilateral AUKUS agreement which will deliver the nation’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which has drawn extensive attention and mixed reactions both at home and abroad.
At the core of this renewed emphasis, the long-awaited Defence Strategic Review (DSR) highlights the renewed importance of the nation’s maritime security, stating: “Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade.”
In order to deliver this, the DSR has emphasised a three-pronged approach, renewing and reinforcing the nation’s commitment to the AUKUS trilateral agreement and the nation’s pathway to delivering the SSN-AUKUS, nuclear-powered submarines, and, what is described as: “An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances.”
This major step change in the thinking of Navy’s mission profile, responsibilities, and implications for force structure have been further influenced by the government’s plans to field two distinct tiers that are capable of “enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence, and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of small surface vessels”.
However, in order to deliver this desired outcome, the government has initiated yet another “short, sharp” review into the size, composition, and nature of Australia’s future surface fleet force structure and the way in which it complements the nation’s future nuclear-powered submarine fleet.
To this end, the DSR announced: “We have recommended that the government directs an independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure, and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. The analysis must assess the capability requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as outlined in this review. This should include assessment of cost, schedule, risk, and the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option. This examination should be completed by the end of Q3 2023.”
This was reinforced by the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Richard Marles, who articulated the need for a “short, sharp” review into the make-up of the Australian Navy’s surface fleet, to reshape it into a flexible, future-proofed force capable of meeting the tactical and strategic operational requirements placed upon the service by the nation’s policymakers.
While we can all recognise the necessity to reorientate the surface fleet force structure to better complement the capability delivered by the nation’s future nuclear-powered submarine fleet, there are still some serious questions.
It is equally important to account for the strategic role the future surface fleet will play within the broader confines of the nation’s defence posture, particularly within the context of the Defence Strategic Review, namely this important point: “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.”
Tier One and Tier Two ships v Cutting our nose off to spite our face
Much of the public commentary, combined with the government’s actions in the initial delivery of the DSR’s findings highlights a push toward the “reprioritisation” of funding from contentious programs like LAND 400 Phase 3 in favour of delivering other capabilities, in this instance HIMARS to establish Army as the cutting edge of the nation’s strike capabilities, at least until the delivery of our nuclear submarine fleet.
Navy hasn’t escaped this speculation, with the multi-billion-dollar Hunter Class frigate program, seemingly in the firing line as part of the government’s reprioritisation plans to build the dispersed fleet of smaller, more numerous vessels, while still maintaining some form of balance in a Tier One and Tier Two model.
Explaining further, the government and the review believes such a force structure should incorporate “Tier 1” and “Tier 2” surface combatants to provide for “increased strike, air defence, presence operations, and anti-submarine warfare”, the review unpacks this, stating: “Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence, and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of small surface vessels.”
This seemingly indicates an expansion of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, bulking the fleet out with smaller, corvette style vessels to provide a continuous, regional presence, with vessels that aren’t as focused on high-intensity conflict, but still capable of adding something to any prospective fight.
These “Tier 2” vessels would be complemented by larger, more complex “Tier 1” vessels, similar to the Hobart Class and Hunter Class, respectively — adding to this, the review states: “This would significantly increase Navy’s capability through a greater number of lethal vessels with enhanced long-range strike (maritime and land) and air defence capabilities, together with the ability to provide presence in our northern maritime approaches.”
There does appear to be a very large, very distinct elephant in the room, that is that the two priorities, being Australia’s immediate region and the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade require VASTLY different solutions.
The Deputy Prime Minister’s insistence that much of the world is shifting away from larger surface combatants towards a numerically larger fleet of smaller vessels isn’t an entirely accurate statement.
The United States Navy is shifting from the maligned littoral combat ships towards larger, heavier armed guided missile frigates in the Constellation Class, meanwhile, the Royal Navy is maintaining its order for the anti-submarine warfare City (Type 26) Class frigates, while scaling back its smaller River Class OPVs to emphasise, larger, general purpose patrol frigates in the Inspiration Class.
Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is equally doubling down on its mass production of large, highly capable surface combatants, namely, guided missile destroyers, frigates, cruisers, and of course, amphibious warfare ships and aircraft carriers, while balancing those domestic requirements with increasing numbers of large, long-range ocean-going corvettes for use in “maritime security” and coast guard duties.
Many commentators have sought to highlight the suitability of platforms like an up-gunned variant of the Arafura Class or Navantia’s Avante Class corvettes with their comparatively smaller operational ranges as viable solutions to adding much needed bulk to the Navy’s surface fleet at the cost of larger, more costly vessels like the Hunter Class frigates.
Both of these solutions present vessels designed for long-range patrol, in an offshore patrol environment, not for delivering high-end warfighting capabilities to the Navy, raising a particularly important question, namely, if we were to pursue one of those options, are we actually delivering “real” capability to the Navy?
Again, I have to ask, would it perhaps be better to indeed up-gun the Arafura Class but reduce the order from the original 12 to six, to serve as complements to the evolved Cape Class vessels being procured by the Navy for offshore maritime patrol missions?
This would see Australia more effectively minimising the maritime border patrol responsibilities of the Navy. With savings redirected towards beefing up the high-end warfighting capabilities of the surface fleet, or do we cancel the maligned Hunter Class program and buy an off-the-shelf design and cut out the middle man?
Going further, BAE Systems Australia has presented a solution to Navy, providing a modified version of the Hunter Class, reconfigured to serve in an air warfare destroyer role to complement the existing Hobart Class, while maintaining the original nine ship build as planned. Meanwhile, Navantia Australia has pitched an additional three Hobart Class destroyers to be built either in Australia, Spain or a hybrid to add additional missile cells to the fleet.
Or is there a middle path? Can we balance our nuclear-powered submarine ambitions with a fundamental reshaping and expansion of the surface fleet?
The answer is yes, however, we need to be strategic in our thinking and requests of Navy.
Final thoughts
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically, and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.
Importantly, if Australia is going to truly respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the global shift in the balance and centre of economic, political, and strategic power to our immediate region, we, as a nation, need to collectively take responsibility for our own future.
The best way to effectively expand the combat power of the Royal Australian Navy is to focus on combat vessels, not up-gunned constabulary vessels. This means a reduction by half of the Arafura Class order, while up-gunning the remaining order, adding extra fire power to the base design and maintaining a scaled back mine countermeasures and hydrographic support order will fulfil those operational requirements, with savings being redirected to accelerate the acquisition of the Naval Strike and Tomahawk missile systems.
Furthermore, adding an additional three Hobart Class vessels, including a modular block in the form of a “Hobart payload module” expanding the number of missile cells installed on the “Block II” vessels, with the “Block I” vessels, HMAS Hobart, Sydney and Brisbane, respectively, receiving the technology insertion as part of the planned combat system enhancements and upgrades.
Meanwhile, cutting three Hunter Class from the planned order would be an initial shock to BAE, however, the currently in development Type 83 destroyer program would provide incentive for the Australian government to continue the development of the Hunter Class hull as a longer term replacement for the Hobart Class, with savings put into the new block of Hobart Class ships and an additional Supply Class replenishment vessel at the cost of the Joint Support Ship program under SEA 2200.
Mothballing or selling HMAS Choules and joining the British Littoral Strike Ship program could equally provide an enhanced amphibious and humanitarian relief presence to complement the planned acquisition of more littoral manoeuvre vessels without impacting the combat vessel production line or costs.
Finally, working with the New Zealand government to establish the production line for a lighter, long-range general purpose patrol frigate with minimal changes (stop reinventing the wheel every chance you get, Defence) to replace the ageing Anzac Class vessels in a shorter-term time frame, provides greater capability and long-range presence.
Rationalising the type of vessels, combined with the number of vessels, also serves to build economies of scale, support a continuous naval shipbuilding program and support the broader national resilience and economic diversity. But those are just my thoughts.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
