Embracing the opportunities: The DSR, NRF and ambitious whole-of-nation planning

Anybody who has spent enough time in the policy-making environment will know intrinsically that a lot of the wheels and levers of power fail to move because of a lack of mandate, despite changes in government, minister, councillor or the like.

In Australia, this lethargy has long been the butt of jokes around the family dinner table, however, what is often not understood is that this institutional lethargy is a result of a number of factors, ranging from poor leadership through to the much maligned “swamp” popularised by former US President Donald Trump.

Conversely, it has equally been accepted that the true power of liberal democracy comes from the consent and mandate of the governed, based on the belief that those governing would act solely in the interests of the nation and its people.

Now what does all of this have to do with the Defence Strategic Review or the National Reconstruction Fund? Two of the Albanese government’s fundamental “successes” of this surprisingly resilient government have something a number of other major policy initiatives over the past few decades have fallen shy on: mandate.

Intrinsic mandate is essential for the enduring success of any democracy, not only does it convey the consent of the governed, it also empowers the government to pursue ambitious policy and make genuine change.

Arguably, both the Defence Strategic Review and the National Reconstruction Fund represent two of the most ambitious, and to paraphrase the government, “consequential” policy initiatives of the Albanese government, now indeed enjoy the mandate from the Australian people to reshape the nation’s trajectory.

The era of great power competition and the whole-of-nation response

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There can be no doubt that Australia, like much of the world, is now grappling with the very real realities of renewed great power competition. While this concept was long thought dead and buried in the chaotic celebrations that swept across the victorious liberal-democratic world order in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, we now know that this “End of History” is far from the reality.

Rather, the world’s authoritarian powers turned inward, at least in some capacity, focusing on themselves and did something the West seems incapable of doing, learning the lessons of the past in order to avoid repeating those failures.

In stark contrast, the West’s myopic fever dream of rampant globalisation, free trade, “just-in-time” supply chains and the belief that democracy and trade would remedy all of the world’s ethnic, religious, cultural, and historic enmities has sown the seeds for the challenging geopolitical and strategic environment we now face.

Enter the era of renewed great power competition following the emergence of once great ancient powers across Asia, coupled with the emergence of new powers across Africa and South America with unique ambitions and designs for the global order that fly in stark opposition to the “free and open” post-Second World War order and its international organs.

The emergence of parallel multilateral organisations, including that of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), coupled with the very clear penetration of international organisations including the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization by these authoritarian, or authoritarian-adjacent nations largely across the developing world further enhances the multipolarity of the world and mounting tensions between the world’s great powers, namely the United States and China.

Across the globe, great power competition is in full swing and visible, whether it is the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the pseudo-proxy war between NATO and Putin’s Russia, in the Middle East between Russia and China and the United States, across the vast landmass that is Africa or closer to home in the Indo-Pacific, where the very nature of great power competition is now a multiplayer game involving China, India, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia all competing for dominance.

This competition has been further enhanced by the emergence of “grey zone” or hybrid warfare which leverages a whole-of-nation response to subvert the sociopolitical and cultural cohesion of a potential adversary, thus directly impacting their capacity to more acutely and rapidly respond to traditional hard power advances elsewhere in the world.

While the often-central planning approach taken by these authoritarian, or authoritarian-adjacent nations stands anathema to the broadly individualistic nature of nations like Australia, embracing the whole-of-nation response and using it as a guideline can begin to tip the scales back in our favour.

That is where initiatives like the Defence Strategic Review (as broad brush as it is) and the National Reconstruction Fund can begin to play a role in preparing the nation to weather the coming economic, political, and geostrategic challenges on the horizon.

However, while the individual parts, in this instance, the Defence Strategic Review and the National Reconstruction Fund, serve as a good foundation, the whole is still lacking a coherent, considered plan for the nation. Furthermore, these individual platforms, at least publicly, appear to be light in detail and high on optimism.

In the case of the Defence Strategic Review, we see: “National Defence must be part of a broader national strategy of whole-of-government coordinated and focused statecraft and diplomacy in our region. This approach requires much more active Australian statecraft that works to support the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

“Key to successful outcomes in implementing National Defence will be: national leadership, statecraft and diplomatic proficiency; accelerated military preparedness; economic stewardship; scientific and technological prowess; and climate change action and domestic resilience. It will be challenging to effect ... Australian statecraft now requires a consistent and coordinated whole-of-government approach to international affairs and the harmonisation of a range of domestic and external national security portfolios, from trade and investment to education, minerals and resources, clean energy, climate, industry, infrastructure and more.”

This is further reinforced by the rather light on National Reconstruction Fund, which is, according to the Albanese government, designed to “provide finance for projects that diversify and transform Australia’s industry and economy”.

Australia’s whole-of-nation response

Many nations have recognised that a radical shift in the way they respond to this new era of great power competition. The United States, as a great power in its own right, has long embraced the power of a central plan and supporting narrative in the vein of “Manifest Destiny” through which the nation’s policymakers, working with industry and through the mandate provided by the American people, guided the nation towards becoming the “indispensable nation”.

The overarching power of a national mandate, coupled with a supporting narrative and ambitious policy initiatives with clear objectives beyond nebulous framing language, provides an avenue forward, indeed, the government’s own shift towards a biennial National Defence updates, in a similar manner to that of the United States with its annual National Security Strategy documents, provides both the guiding principle and reporting mechanism for the Australian public to remain informed, to measure progress, and of course, to provide continued consent.

This approach will go a long way to avoid the confusion and lack of informed public Australia, as a largely complacent nation faces, and provides an opportunity for the nation to begin to invest more deeply in the broader concepts of national security and critically, national interest in the era of great power competition.

This is perhaps best summarised by the late Major General and senator for NSW, Jim Molan AO, DSC who told Defence Connect in 2020, “We have managed to get away with not having a national security strategy only because we have lived in a tranquil region since 1945. But our strategic environment is changing quickly, and we need to prepare for a turbulent future. Developing a national security strategy would be a vital first step towards building the capacity we need to face the potential challenges that are coming.

“Most Australians can be forgiven for believing that successive Defence white papers, in conjunction with foreign affairs white papers and reviews into energy, including liquid fuels, water and food security, constitute a true national security strategy. Unfortunately, without the guidance of an overarching national security strategy, we get lost in the sub-strategies.”

Avoiding these pitfalls, combined with Australian policymakers learning the lessons of history and embracing the opportunities of this new, holistic, “whole-of-nation” approach to national security will serve the nation well.

But what building blocks does Australia need to lay in order to withstand the economic, political and geostrategic headwinds we face? Well in this instance, success leaves clues, and thankfully, historical forebears have identified the key “hard power” factors that underpin national security in this new era of great power competition, namely:

• Conventional military capabilities – including air, land and sea-based power projection capabilities;
• Strategic deterrence capabilities – including, but not limited to a nuclear triad, strategic bomber and naval strategic force multipliers; and
• Economic power – focused on maintaining strategic industries with a focus on being globally competitive across manufacturing, resource and energy, innovation and research and development.

With each of these three “hard power” factors in mind, the rapidly deteriorating circumstances from the east coast of Africa to the Bismarck Archipelago and up to the Philippines, which include Australia’s strategically vital sea lines of communication and resupply, particularly for liquid energy, as well as market access for our raw materials and agricultural produce, will require significant capability investment to ensure Australia’s national security and resilience remains intact.

Final thoughts

As a nation, Australia is at a precipice and both the Australian public and the nation’s political and strategic leaders need to decide what they want the nation to be: do they want the nation to become an economic, political and strategic backwater caught between two competing great empires and a growing cluster of periphery great powers? Or does Australia “have a crack” and actively establish itself as a regional great power with all the benefits it entails?

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the sociopolitical and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.

Equally, we have to begin to confront the question of “What sort of region and world do we want to live in and hand down to our children?”, for if Australia does not embrace the opportunities presented by the Indo-Pacific and more broadly the era of competition that is coming to characterise the 21st century, we will have the world created for us by nations that hold their national interests as sacrosanct and put them before all other considerations.

In the second part of this short series, we will discuss the elements of “soft power” including a unifying national narrative, an image for the average Australian, and the rallying call Australia needs that will prove equally essential to shaping Australia’s role, position, and capacity to withstand attempts at overt or covert coercion in the era of great power competition.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..