Time to be realistic about India’s role and designs for the multipolar world

Beginning with the British Empire, Australia’s relationship with the broader global power paradigm has been defined by deference to larger, more “consequential” nations who would be responsible for guiding the framing of our world view, our strategic partnerships, and broader engagement on the global stage.

Following the disastrous collapse and routing of imperial British power in the Indo-Pacific at Singapore in 1942, Australia began to look for a new great power strategic benefactor.

Looking out across the vast expanse of the Pacific, Australia turned to what would become the world’s “indispensable nation”, the United States. Emerging from its period of self-imposed isolationism in the aftermath of the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 to become the world’s pre-eminent industrial, political, and strategic power at war’s end and the cornerstone of Australia’s strategic outlook.

While the British would continue to play an important role in Australia’s future strategic planning, the withdrawal of British forces East of Suez in the early 1970s effectively heralded the end of Britain’s pivotal role in Australia’s military planning, the US continued to entrench itself as the nation’s premier strategic partner.

As the world adapted following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Australia, like many nations, began to embrace the optimism and hope represented by theories about the “End of History” and the peace dividend, leaving the United States as the world’s sole and unquestioned superpower.

However, as we now know, this new paradigm was far from the promised “End of History” as Russia limped away, licking its wounds and China began its rapid ascendency to rival the post-Second World War order.

China isn’t alone in its position of ascendency, nor is it alone in having its own ambitions and designs for the post-Western world order we now appear to be stumbling towards in light of the domestic and international decline of both the United States and European powers.

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India, one of antiquity’s other ancient powers, has emerged to become one of the world’s pre-eminent economic, political, and strategic powers, now the fifth largest economy in the world according to the International Monetary Fund when measured on nominal Gross Domestic Product, with GDP per capita still lagging dramatically, with the rising power ranked 139th globally.

The world’s largest “democracy” is also a central player in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economic and political bloc, rapidly evolving into an anti-post Second World War order bloc, actively engaging in the undermining of the US-dollar-centric international order and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

While at the same time, this rising power has positioned itself firmly within the emerging post-Second World War economic, political, and strategic organs, India is equally seeking to “hedge” its bets by working with Australia, the US, and Japan as a central member of the Quad and for Australia.

However, for a growing number of strategic policy experts, the seeming “duplicity” of India gives pause for thought and concern about just how deeply entrenched and invested in the relationship with India Australia and the broader Western alliance network should be.

Don’t be blinded by the shiny objects

In an effort to avoid history repeating itself, former ambassador to the US, Japan, and Indonesia, and high commissioner to India, John McCarthy has warned, it is time for the West to “get real” about India.

Much like the waves of optimism in political, economic, and strategic circles following the opening of China in the 1970s, the degree of elation and optimism surrounding India’s potential is responsible for much of the Western world’s approach towards India.

McCarthy explains this, stating, “In the past few years, India’s attraction for the West has increased because of its size and wealth. It is now the most populous nation globally, and in purchasing power parity terms has the world’s third highest GDP. Its attraction has grown as concerns about China have multiplied.”

Despite this optimism, McCarthy, citing Harvard academic Graham Allison, warns that many nations, especially Australia with its history of lionising great powers, need to be far more realistic about the trajectory of India’s economy and ambitions for the increasingly multipolar world.

“Allison, inter alia, suggested that we need to reflect on several ‘inconvenient truths’:

• We have been wrong in the past about the pace of the rise of India — namely in the early 1990s and the middle of the first decade of this century.
• India’s economy is much smaller than China’s — and the gap has increased, not decreased. In the early 2000s, China’s GDP was two to three times as large as India’s. It is now roughly five times as large.
• India has been falling behind in the development of science and technology to power economic growth. China spends 2 per cent of GDP on research and development, compared with India’s 0.7 per cent. On artificial intelligence, the figures are startling. For example, China holds 65 per cent of AI patents, while India holds just 3 per cent.
• China’s workforce is more productive than India’s. The quality of their respective workforces is affected by poverty and nutrition levels. As one example, according to the 2022 UN State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, 16.3 per cent of India’s population was undernourished in 2019–21 compared with less than 2.5 per cent of China’s population.”

These points are further expanded upon by Ashley Tellis, Tata chair for strategic affairs and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writing for Foreign Affairs and highlights the central role India’s policy of independence plays, along with the equally pivotal role of Indian self-interest in its approach to domestic and international political, economic, and strategic affairs.

“Washington’s current expectations of India are misplaced. India’s significant weaknesses compared with China, and its inescapable proximity to it, guarantee that New Delhi will never involve itself in any US confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security. India values cooperation with Washington for the tangible benefits it brings but does not believe that it must, in turn, materially support the United States in any crisis — even one involving a common threat such as China,” Tellis explains.

Technology transfers and the post-COVID-19 shift away from China-centric supply chains has been a major driving force behind New Delhi’s own push to develop sovereign manufacturing industries to mimic the success of the Chinese and South Korean industrialisation models.

This “Make in India, Make for the World’ policy implemented by the unabashed Hindu-supremacist Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, depends heavily on critical technology and intellectual property transfers from the West, particularly the United States, something that Tellis adds, may be misguided: “Although the Biden administration seems inclined to be more liberal on this compared with its predecessors, only time will tell whether the initiative delivers on India’s aspirations for greater access to advanced US technology in support of Modi’s ‘Make in India, Make for World’ drive, which aims to transform India into a major global manufacturing hub that could one day compete with, if not supplant, China as the workshop of the world.”

There are fundamental differences in our values, our objectives, and motivations

Pivotally for McCarthy, there needs to be a realisation in Australia’s strategic and policymakers when it comes to our partner India, particularly considering its broader economic, political, and strategic designs, attitudes, and ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific.

Front and centre is India’s handling of its relationship with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine and broader relationship with the post-Second World War, liberal world order, with McCarthy adding, “Moreover, India will differ radically from the West on some questions. True, as the Ukraine war has progressed, India has put some daylight between itself and Russia. But it declines to impose sanctions on Moscow. Both countries benefit from Russia’s sales of oil to India.

“And never a proponent of the Western-inspired liberal international order, India is also a leader of the disparate — but re-energised — global south, effectively the developing world.”

Ultimately, it becomes clear that India’s approach to relationships is far more transactional than is our own, or even that of the United States, with the rising power actively viewing their own self-interest as being of paramount importance for their policy making and long-term decision making.

Unpacking this further, Tellis explains that while “Washington began to entertain the more expansive notion that its support for New Delhi would gradually induce India to play a greater military role in containing China’s growing power.

“But on the most burdensome challenge facing Washington in the Indo-Pacific — securing meaningful military contributions to defeat any potential Chinese aggression — India will likely refuse to play a role in situations where its own security is not directly threatened. In such circumstances, New Delhi may at best offer tacit support,” Tellis explains further.

Equally, another central area that is often advertised as cause for furthering our great collaboration and integration with India is the “shared values” of the world’s democracies, and by association, their shared interest in preserving the post-Second World War global order.

McCarthy explains, “The problem is that Modi’s government can only lend itself to highly qualified identification with democratic principles. Elections in India are generally fair, and Modi’s sway is vigorously contested by the main opposition party, by Congress and by regional parties. That’s good.

“However, Modi remains an unabashed Hindu supremacist whose political machine largely disregards the aspirations of Muslims and other minorities. It reacts vengefully to criticism and scores badly on most of the international indexes that measure democratic freedoms. To some, India is an illiberal democracy; to others, it’s an electoral autocracy. But, for sure, it is not a liberal democracy,” he explains further, highlighting the clearly ethnic bias and lens through which Indian public policy and strategic thinking is framed and formulated.

This attitude, particularly towards the post-Second World War order is further highlighted by Tellis who explains, “New Delhi’s deepening defence ties with Washington, therefore, must not be interpreted as driven by either strong support for the liberal international order or the desire to participate in collective defence against Chinese aggression. Rather, the intensifying security relationship is conceived by Indian policymakers as a means of bolstering India’s own national defence capabilities but does not include any obligation to support the United States in other global crises.”

Final thoughts

It is increasingly clear that Australia needs to embrace its own attitude and variation of “transactional realism”, one where our policymakers view the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be, based on a thorough understanding of the historic, cultural, and societal differences between the emerging and established powers of the Indo-Pacific.

After all, we can see nations across the Indo-Pacific, and indeed, more broadly on the global stage beginning to make decisions in their own self-interest, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact on “just in time” global supply chains.

As the old saying goes, failing to learn from history leaves you doomed to repeat it. This is particularly important as Australia’s primary strategic benefactor, the United States, continues to stagnate in comparison to the world’s emerging great powers like China and India, while other regional powers like Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the like, continue to grow and exert their own influence and ambitions for the region.

This is not to say that Australia should go it alone, our alliances have always allowed us to punch above our weight, we do, however, require a radically new approach to engaging with others, preparing ourselves for future challenges and clearly articulating and protecting our values and interests at home and abroad.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..