US explores lessons and mistakes of Afghanistan evacuation

The lead-up, collapse, and aftermath of the US military mission in the country has been highlighted by the US Department of State in a 90-day After Action Review on Afghanistan released this week.

The report examines the situation worsening from January 2020, the process of Kabul falling to the Taliban, and the end of a 20-year presence in the country culminating in the dramatic Kabul airlift emergency evacuation in August 2021. More than 125,000 people, including 6,000 private US citizens, were airlifted during the operation.

It further identifies preliminary weaknesses associated with the collapse and provides recommendations to respond to future complex international crises.

“The decisions of both President Trump and President Biden to end the US military mission posed significant challenges for the department as it sought to maintain a robust diplomatic and assistance presence in Kabul and provide continued support to the Afghan government and people,” the report said.

“As conditions on the ground deteriorated and the prospects for successful peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban grew dimmer, leadership in the department and at embassy Kabul faced the dilemma that significantly reducing the remaining US presence in Afghanistan and accelerating the departure of at-risk Afghans risked undermining confidence in the Afghan government and triggering the very collapse the United States hoped to avoid.”

Compounding pressure from political concerns, the report highlights that the Department of State was confronted by an unprecedented and complex task to execute a massive humanitarian airlift within barely two weeks, following the sudden departure of President Ashraf Ghani, the collapse of Afghan Security Forces and the Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021. The final evacuation response was further delayed by concerns about signalling a loss of confidence in the Ghani government.

“The sudden departure of President Ghani and the collapse of Afghan Security Forces served as a stark reminder that the future of the country would ultimately be determined by the Afghans themselves, not the United States and its allies and partners,” the report stated.

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“Two US presidents had decided to withdraw US military forces from Afghanistan on the basis of an agreement negotiated with the Taliban, even as the United States worked to secure at the negotiating table an intra-Afghan peace deal.

“That deal never materialised, but even up to the fall of Kabul, there were efforts underway in Doha to reach an accord that might have created an interim government and allowed the US civilian mission in Afghanistan to remain.”

The report speculates that the February 2020 Agreement was being used by the Taliban as a stalling device pending US military departure, while local leadership did not fully appreciate the gravity of the situation and believed the United States might, at the last minute, reverse the withdrawal decision.

“Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the State Department faced the enormous challenge of maintaining a large diplomatic and assistance mission in Kabul despite the impending withdrawal of US forces that provided critical security, intelligence, and life support functions,” the report said.

“Some questioned whether this was possible or whether senior officials ever fully appreciated the level of risk it entailed, but the department worked diligently to accomplish the mission (despite external factors such as COVID-19 pandemic).

“The AAR team was struck by the differences in style and decision making, most notably the relative lack of an inter-agency process in the Trump administration and the intense inter-agency process that characterised the initial period of the Biden administration.

“This included a particular focus very early in the Biden administration on the fate of those eligible for SIVs as well as larger numbers of other at-risk Afghans who might need assistance in the event of a Taliban victory. This led to the successful launch of an initiative under department leadership to reduce the backlog of SIV applicants and begin moving those eligible from the country.”

The After Action Review report highlighted that department and embassy Kabul staff had prepared for various scenarios including the possibility of a full evacuation, but there was not a sufficient sense of urgency. In addition, key decisions of which citizens and their families should be prioritised for evacuation had not been made.

Evacuation leaders faced information demands for the welfare and whereabouts of US and international citizens, private company employees, and various individuals in Afghanistan they did not have ready access to and had never before been asked to provide.

In some cases, the department proved unable to buffer staff in Kabul from receiving multiple, direct calls, and messages from current or former senior officials, members of Congress, and prominent private citizens demanding they provide assistance to specific at-risk Afghans. In addition, there was also no centralised case management system to track and collate those inquiries, further complicating the evacuation.

The report found the spontaneous mass appeals to assist at-risk Afghans also resulted in increased risk to members of the military and department employees. This is illustrated by the deaths of 13 US service members and more than 150 Afghans killed in an ISIS-K terrorist attack near the Abbey Gate at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on 26 August 2021.

“The AAR team recognises the need going forward to insulate worst-case contingency planning and preparations from political concerns,” the report said.

“Success (of the embassy evacuation) was overshadowed by the scenes of chaos and panic that ensued as tens of thousands of Afghans sought desperately to flee the country in palpable fear of a potential Taliban bloodbath.

“There may have been no way to prepare fully for the situation once Kabul fell to the Taliban and the non-combatant evacuation operation morphed into the largest humanitarian evacuation since the fall of Saigon.

“In the final analysis, there is no substitute for the smart, hard-working, dedicated professionals that the department could count upon in this crisis.

“We should be proud of what they and their partners in uniform accomplished during this evacuation and what they continue to do to help US citizens and at-risk Afghans in the aftermath of the Taliban takeover.”

The After Action Review findings determined decisions of both administrations to end the US military mission in Afghanistan had serious consequences for the viability of the Afghan government and its security. Both administrations had insufficient senior-level consideration of worst-case scenarios and how quickly those might follow.

Clear answers were not available about how the United States would meet the May 2021 deadline for a full military withdrawal, how it could maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul or what would happen to Special Immigrant Visa program citizens (a system severely backlogged at the time) or at-risk Afghans.

The decision to hand over Bagram Air Base to the Afghan government meant that Hamid Karzai International Airport would be the only avenue for a possible non-combatant evacuation operation.

Senior administration officials had not made clear decisions about how many at-risk Afghan nationals would be included, how they would be prioritised and how long their evacuation might take.

Predictions varied, but up until almost the time Kabul fell, most estimates indicated Afghan government forces could hold the city for weeks, if not months. Compounding that failure, a plan to retain some US forces to provide critical security had not been clearly established by the time Kabul fell in August 2021.

“Once the crisis began and embassy Kabul relocated to HKIA, the department was quick to surge additional personnel and resources to Kabul, Doha, and the temporary safe havens or so-called ‘lily pads’ where those who were evacuated were taken for temporary shelter and further vetting and screening before onward travel to the United States,” the report said.

“The department demonstrated great agility in funding, staffing, and provisioning the reception enter at the Dulles Expo Center with virtually no notice, as well as staffing and supporting other processing sites.

“The department has no systematic process to debrief task force and other crisis response staff promptly after a crisis, especially to assess and support the physical, mental, and emotional impact of their experiences.”

The report recommends department leadership should consider strengthening overall crisis preparedness; and the Office of Crisis Management and Strategy should serve as the department’s focal point and be fully staffed as a priority.

It’s recommended that the department invest in crisis management software, a case management system for tracking congressional and other special interest cases while insulating crisis planning and preparation from policy or political concerns.

In complex crises, the department is recommended to appoint a principal-level crisis leader, strategic communications senior official, and other leadership to provide direction and protect crisis responders from direct appeals for assistance.

Specially trained flyaway teams are also recommended to be established to be deployable at short notice during a crisis.