Has anything really changed since the DSR? The jury is still out

In many ways, the Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR) has broken the mould of Australian defence and strategic planning, a marked departure from the Defence of Australia-era which championed continental-focused defence posture and ensuing force structure.

Setting the scene, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated at the launch of the DSR, “We confront the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War, both in our region and indeed around the world. That’s why we’re investing in our capabilities and we’re investing, too, in our relationships to build a more secure Australia and a more stable and prosperous region.

“It is the most significant work that’s been done since the Second World War, looking in a comprehensive way at what is needed. It demonstrates that in a world where challenges to our national security are always evolving, we cannot fall back on old assumptions,” Prime Minister Albanese said.

At the core of the Defence Strategic Review is the broader reorientation of Australia’s tactical and strategic focus, away from Coalition-supported counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East or low-intensity, humanitarian interventions across the South Pacific towards a broader focus and conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific.

This shift, while not quite being a return to the Cold War-era policy of forward defence, is marked by power projection-focused capabilities and an active presence throughout the region. Underscoring this dramatic shift in national posture is the almost yin and yang-like concepts of “impactful projection” and “national defence,” each forming the central delivery mechanisms of a broader conceptualisation of Australian deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Leading us to the specific conceptualisation is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles at the release of the Defence Strategic Review where he explains the definition and theory of “impactful projection” and states, “I think, increasingly, we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before.”

While this emphasis on the Indo-Pacific has its origins dating back to the 2013 Defence White Paper, the new government’s focus is far broader, far more direct, and far more ambitious in its scope.

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This renewed focus on a broader concept Indo-Pacific is driven in large part by a number of key findings in the Defence Strategic Review, namely, “Australia’s strategic circumstances and the risks we face are now radically different. No longer is our alliance partner, the United States, the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific. Intense China–United States competition is the defining feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict. The nature of conflict and threats have also changed.”

Yet despite this reinvigorated and radical shift from previous Australian strategy and doctrine based in the fundamental reimagining of the Indo-Pacific as a region, for many, the rubber is yet to hit the road, begging the question, has anything really changed?

‘Diabolical’ delays or considered movements?

For The Australian’s Greg Sheridan, the rhetoric simply isn’t matching the reality or the dire strategic circumstances now rapidly changing the balance of power across both the Indo-Pacific and more broadly across the globe, highlighting the growing concern and discontent in a piece for The Weekend Australian, titled, “‘Diabolical’ defence delays an act of national betrayal”.

“Nothing of consequence happened at AUSMIN regarding Australia’s defence capabilities. All the muscle movements were purely American. This fits a long and crippling Australian pattern. Under the Albanese government we have reverted completely to our worst selves on defence. We’re going to do almost nothing consequential over the next 10 years other than get the Americans to do more on our land,” Sheridan articulates.

Like Sheridan, I am a devoted proponent of the US alliance and the broader role it plays in regional and global affairs, however, where we both draw the line, is as Sheridan states, “In a dismal, cynical way, that’s smart enough. No one is a stronger supporter of the US alliance than me. It’s pathetic, though, that being a US ally is our only military policy. Still, it’s something. And of course it’s effective, so long as the Americans are always happy to shoulder, unilaterally, the burden of our defence.”

While the rhetoric of the DSR does seemingly highlight a shift away from overwhelming dependence on the United States through statements like this, “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.”

Much of Sheridan’s sustained criticism emphasis is focused on the continuing delays, funding reprioritisations, and downright refusal to expand other capabilities with seemingly no sense of urgency in capability acquisition (existing supply chain constraints notwithstanding), he highlights this, stating, “Not only won’t we do anything new for ourselves, we are cutting long-planned capabilities, such as the last squadron of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and various armed drone programs. And we’re cutting money on defence compared with previous forward estimates. And we won’t fund anything new for the Navy’s surface fleet.”

Expanding on this point, Sheridan adds, “We’ve made an in-principle announcement that we’ll buy High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) for the Army. These are modern artillery pieces, tactical weapons in land battles. This was an in-principle announcement only. There is not even a project number identified for this purchase yet. So it’s probably at least two years away. However, the HIMARS bears no relationship to our strategic circumstances. The HIMARS is the only new weapon type we’re scheduled to get from the Defence Strategic Review.

“The DSR confirmed this was because of China’s military build-up and that we needed a sharp, fast concentration on maritime capabilities. To free up funds for this we cut the order for army’s infantry fighting vehicles by two-thirds and halved the order for self-propelled howitzers ... What about the missiles we’ll be building and allegedly selling to the Americans? It turns out these are Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, the shorter-range version of rockets fired by HIMARS. At the moment they have a range of 70 kilometres to 90 kilometres. In time this will go to 120 kilometres,” Sheridan states.

Adding further doom and gloom to the situation, Sheridan adds, “The ambition is we will be producing some of these shorter-range rockets by end 2025. Given the vast bureaucratic processes this still has to go through inside Defence, it’s extremely unlikely they will come into production before 2026. Yet the missile building initiative was first announced in the Defence Strategic Update of 2020.”

Moving to the favourite whipping horse of many commentators, the much maligned Hunter Class frigate program which is sure to be under the microscope of the government’s naval surface fleet review, Sheridan reinforces concerns about the decisions and the apparent delay in decisive decision making taken by the government, stating, “it’s now inconceivable the government will do something radical like abandon the deeply troubled $45 billion Hunter frigate program. These frigates will weigh 10,000 tonnes, nearly half as heavy again as the AWDs, and have only 32 vertical launch system cells on them. They will be optimised for anti-submarine warfare but will be slow and overweight. With only 32 VLS cells they’ll be entirely incapable of defending themselves, so you could send them into harm’s way only if they were defended by an AWD and probably a nuclear-powered submarine. And we don’t get the first Hunter frigates for another decade.”

This is particularly important within the broader context of the size, structure, and scale of the Australian Defence Force in coming decades, particularly the Navy amid renewed emphasis on maritime mobility, long-range power projection as part of the doctrine of “impactful projection”, something Sheridan expands on, saying, “It also seems we’re not going to move quickly to build corvettes or light frigates instead of the completely militarily useless offshore patrol vessels. Instead we’ll build landing craft first with the notional mission of transporting our infantry fighting vehicles, and our ludicrous money-eating tanks, to hot spots in the South Pacific. We could buy proper missile destroyers, Tomahawks, land-based missiles, corvettes, more F-35s and F-18s, and much else if we wanted to spend the money. But we don’t believe in defending ourselves.”

This controversial opinion from one of Australia’s preeminent journalists and the lack of public outrage only serves to highlight just how little stock the Australian public place in the importance of national security and our capacity needed to holistically defend the nations and our interests, while promoting the opportunities needed to ensure our continued prosperity, stability, and cohesiveness as a nation.

Final thoughts

Importantly, in this era of renewed competition between autarchy and democracy, this is a conversation that needs to be had in the open with the Australian people, as ultimately, they will be called upon to help implement it, to consent to the direction, and to defend it should diplomacy fail.

This requires a greater degree of transparency and a culture of collaboration between the nation’s strategic policymakers and elected officials and the constituents they represent and serve – equally, this approach will need to entice the Australian public to once again invest in and believe in the future direction of the nation.

Expanding and enhancing the opportunities available to Australians while building critical economic resilience, and as a result, deterrence to economic coercion, should be the core focus of the government because only when our economy is strong can we ensure that we can deter aggression towards the nation or our interests.

This also requires a greater degree of transparency and a culture of collaboration between the nation’s strategic policymakers, elected officials and the constituents they represent and serve – equally, this approach will need to entice the Australian public to once again invest in and believe in the future direction of the nation.

Additionally, Australia will need to have an honest conversation about how we view ourselves and what our own ambitions are. Is it reasonable for Australia to position itself as a “middle” or “regional” power in this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment? Equally, if we are going to brand ourselves as such, shouldn’t we aim for the top tier to ensure we get the best deal for ourselves and our future generations?

So, as I began with in the first part of this short series, Australia, “no one cares, do the work” and perhaps, most importantly, “no one is coming to save you”, as uncomfortable as it is.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..