Chinese, Russian think tanks accuse AUKUS of risking arms race, conflict

The Sino-Russian joint research report on the risks of US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global security was released on 2 August this year by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Center.

The report alleges nuclear submarine cooperation between the United States, Britain, and Australia is a major challenge to the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, that all three counties are forcibly advancing nuclear submarine cooperation despite international opposition and the transfer of enriched uranium to a non-nuclear-weapon state seriously violates international goals.

A meeting discussing the special research report on nuclear submarine cooperation was attended by CACDA vice-president Li Chijiang, United Nations permanent representative Ambassador Li Song, former Chinese ambassador to Australia Cheng Jingye, and more than 70 people from Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.

“The AUKUS initiatives envisages the transfer from two nuclear weapon states-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to a non-nuclear-weapon state-party to the NPT of the following materiel,” the report said.

“Military submarines with nuclear propulsion; weapons-grade HEU nuclear fuel for those submarines in quantities enough for 160 nuclear warheads; intermediate range precision-guided missiles of the type prohibited by the now defunct INF Treaty with non-nuclear warheads.

“It should be noted at the same time, that the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or nuclear-armed missiles is not envisaged under the current AUKUS deal.

“However, even if this transaction does not involve nuclear weapons per se, it is without any precedent and of such magnitude that a profound review of its consistency with the non-proliferation regime is definitely required.”

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The report alleges that the AUKUS deal to establish a fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) for Australia will lead to the transfer of four tonnes of highly enriched uranium at enrichment level of 93–97 percent U-235 for submarine propulsion systems, theoretically enough to produce 160 nuclear explosive devices.

The report further alleges recent Australian defence agreements such as the importation of Tomahawk cruise missiles (range 1,600 kilometres), conflicts with agreements made under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, impacts IAEA safeguards and stimulates regional nuclear armaments.

The report also questioned if Royal Australian Navy planned Virginia Class submarines would be equipped with hypersonic weapons being developed under the US Navy Conventional Prompt Strike program for 2028.

“The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal will prompt other countries to reconsider their submarine ambitions, unleashing new nuclear proliferation momentum among NNWS that pursue nuclear-powered submarines or have expressed similar intentions,” the report said.

“Second, non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.

“While current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.

“The precedent set by AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is likely to spur some countries to follow suit in possessing nuclear submarines, as well as other anti-submarine warfare and long-range strike capabilities, triggering a regional submarine arms race, raising the risk of military conflict, which can eventually escalate all the way to the nuclear threshold.”

The report recommends a need for broad and inclusive discussions, and the continued study of the AUKUS alliance’s meaning and consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and geopolitical environment.

It also recommends ensuring the safety and security of nuclear material and technology, the establishment of a special committee open to all IAEA member states and a special expert group.

“One of very serious potential and not fully realised consequences of such model is stimulation of the interest in participating non-nuclear-weapon states in nuclear weapons options. In the case of Australia, this is particularly disturbing, given this country’s past nuclear weapons aspirations and preparations which continued since early 1950s till mid-1970s,” the report said.

“Australia had explored several pathways to nuclear weapons possession, initially by receiving weapons from the UK, and later by developing own capabilities.

“As a result, confidence of other regional states in Australia’s continued absence of nuclear ambitions may erode (which, in turn, would lead to their increased demands for more openness and more rigid verification of Australia’s non-proliferation obligations).

“It can also be argued that the AUKUS project will likely reduce political and moral barriers to nuclear proliferation in the region.

“(From AUKUS) one should expect an intensified arms race, involving new weapons systems, further destabilisation of strategic situation, new uncertainties for regional security, up to triggering military confrontation and increased nuclear risks.”