Japanese defence budget reveals major expansion in naval, air forces

Japan has long been recognised as one of the world’s great powers, buoyed by a sizeable population and economic clout, industrious culture and formidable martial history.

Whether in the years following the unprecedented routing of Imperial Russia at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 where Japan rapidly established itself as a true peer competitor for the Western imperial powers and their vast Asian colonial holdings. Or Japan’s rapid and unprecedented blitzkrieg through the Pacific following the successful, yet brutal occupation of Manchuria beginning in the early-1930s and through Southeast Asia following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Despite defeat at the hands of the United States and allies during the Pacific campaign, the period of national reconstruction through the early post-war years saw the nation once again transformed into one of the world’s truly consequential economic powers.

While constrained by the post-war, pacifist constitution which placed effective limits on the sort of capabilities Japan could field and the foreign deployment of the nation’s “armed forces”, the rapidly deteriorating geopolitical and strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific has prompted a sustained period of investment in a range of next-generation capabilities.

In particular, Beijing’s continued assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and renewed antagonism towards Taiwan has attracted ever growing attention and concern across the Indo-Pacific.

Equally important in the contemporary Japanese context is the ever-present danger of the nuclear armed rogue state North Korea and its own repeated provocations which pose a direct threat to the Japanese home islands and its interests, particularly the economically and strategically vital sea lines of communication through the region have prompted further investment in Japan’s military.

Expanded maritime capabilities

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As an island nation, Japan, like Australia, is dependent on the enduring freedom and security of the global maritime commons. The nation learned this lesson the hard way through the Pacific War, when the United States and regional allies like Australia conducted unrestricted warfare on the nation’s maritime trade fleets, effectively bringing the island empire to its knees through a slow, brutal war of attrition.

Recognising this, the already impressive Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is undergoing further investment and an expansion of the existing fleet as part of the Kishida administration’s US$53 billion (AU$82.14 billion) defence budget, in some ways shredding the limitations of the post-Second World War constitution to expand the JMSDF’s capabilities to directly counter potential peer competitor threats to the nation’s maritime and economic security.

First and foremost is the expansion of the nation’s Aegis-powered surface combatants, with the development and acquisition of two large, aegis system equipped vessels (ASEVs) worth US$2.6 billion (AU$4.024 billion) delivering two, 12,000-tonne “cruisers”, with a crew complement of 240 personnel and 128 vertical launch system cells, with delivery of the first vessel expected for Fiscal Year (FY) 2027.

Further expanding the surface combatant fleet of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the budget calls for the construction of two new guided missile frigates to serve as the first of a dozen such vessels, delivering an expanding and upgraded capability of the existing and in-service fleet of 12 Mogami Class frigates (demonstrating a truly successful model for a continuous naval shipbuilding strategy).

Going further, Kishida’s administration has approved US$290 million (AU$448.7 million) to modify Izumo, lead ship of the Izumo Class vessels, to operate a growing fleet of F-35Bs following the successful modernisation and modification of Izumo’s sister ship, Kaga, providing two light aircraft carriers to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force for the first time since the Second World War.

Supporting this, the JMSDF requested US$860 million (AU$1.33 billion) for seven F-35Bs to operate from the deck of Izumo and Kaga beginning in FY2027, along with US$737 million (AU$1.14 billion) for eight F-35As for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

These developments represent a major step towards the “normalisation” of Japan’s defence posture as the nation and its allies, including both the United States and Australia, seek to leverage Japan’s industrial, technological, and economic might to create an aggregation of tactical and strategic weight to counter the mounting aggression of Beijing.

Fire power is critical

While it is redundant to say this, having an impressive fleet of surface combatants is effectively useless, however without the firepower to provide offensive and defensive effects, leaves the fleet less then useless.

In response to China and North Korea’s mounting antagonism and direct challenges to Japan’s national and economic security, Prime Minister Kishida’s administration has committed to an extensive armament program combining domestically developed weapons systems and foreign designed and manufactured platforms.

Joint development is also essential to providing next-generation capabilities, with Japan and the United States committing US$512.7 million (AU$793.49 million) to jointly develop a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) announced recently at the Camp David meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden, and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, with a targeted in-service date of the early-2030s.

This will be complemented by the development of a domestic, next-generation surface-to-ship/surface-to-surface guided missile worth US$218.7 million (AU$338.35 million) to provide Japanese surface ships and potentially island-based defensive systems with a potent, next-generation strike capability to deliver an interconnected web of effectors across the Western Pacific and Japan’s economic exclusive zone.

Japan has also confirmed the development of an electronic warfare variant of is Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft, worth US$95.7 million (AU$148 million) to support multi-domain operations across the region.

Final thoughts

Japan’s realistic approach to its national security, coupled with its tried-and-tested approach to delivering sustained capability provides insightful and powerful examples for Australian consideration and discussion.

The continued realisation by the Kishida government and its predecessors that Japan needs to develop a sizeable and peer-adversary focused naval capability, in particular, equally provides further examples of growth and development opportunities for the Royal Australian Navy as part of the government’s Naval Surface Fleet Review and is based in the reality of the evolving Indo-Pacific threat environment.

Equally, while the language used in the Defence Strategic Review and in shaping the development and implementation of both Forward Defence and Defence of Australia, particularly around the differing concepts of “our immediate region”, the sheer geographic scale of our region, as it is now defined, requires a fundamental overhaul of the Australian Defence Force and our primary area of responsibility.

Importantly, deferring all capacity to effectively “punch” to forward deployed forces from the United States, leaves Australia incredibly vulnerable in the event of hostilities breaking out in the Indo-Pacific, leaving Australia potentially isolated from our great and powerful friend for even short periods of time.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the sociopolitical and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..