I was wrong: Compared to the DSR, Defence of Australia would have given us ‘real’ power

No major public policy is perfect, there is no escaping that reality, and in the realm of Australian public policy, this is arguably the undeniable status quo.

Australia’s history of defence and national security policy is as storied as the nation itself, with the wild oscillations between the various policies, doctrines, and ensuing force structures which shape the way the nation has and continues to interact with the region and the broader world.

Equally relevant when assessing Australia’s history of defence policies, doctrines, and ensuing force postures is the impact of the world’s great powers and their actions, ambitions, and designs for the globe.

Beginning with Australia’s earliest “great power relationship”, the British Empire, much of the nation’s early period of defence policy was heavily influenced by the direct interests, designs, and ambitions of the British Empire in the “Far East”.

Serving as a bastion of the Empire far from the centre of imperial power however presented significant challenges, particularly as the relative power of the British began to decline in the years following World War One.

Coming to a head with the fall of Singapore in 1942, Australia looked to America for a new “great and powerful friend” under the arms of whom we could gain some semblance of safety and security throughout the Second World War.

Learning the lessons of the Second World War, namely the uncomfortable reality that despite the best of intentions, our great and powerful friends may not always have the capacity to come to our aid when needed, the Australian government and people were stirred to action.

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Under the broader protective global umbrella provided by the United States and to a lesser extent, the British Empire, Australia embraced the doctrine of Forward Defence, leveraging operational skills across the domains of warfare, developed during the war, to implement a strategic umbrella in what is now known as the Indo-Pacific.

Forward Defence would be characterised by a robust force structure that included strategic bombers, aircraft carrier battlegroups and an Army designed for great power conflict.

Alliances played a central part of enhancing the strength of Australia’s robust, muscular doctrine and force posture of engaging forward, deep into Southeast Asia.

However, it wasn’t to last, with the newly elected Whitlam government overturning Forward Defence in light of it being linked to Australia’s disastrous participation in the Vietnam conflict without a clear successor.

That is, at least, until the Hawke government and the 1986 Dibb Review and ensuing 1987 Defence White Paper titled, Defence of Australia, which shifted away from the doctrine, policy, and force structure of Forward Defence to emphasise the creation of a “balanced force”.

Failing to deliver on Defence of Australia

Championed by Australian strategist Paul Dibb, the Defence of Australia white paper released in 1987 advocated “self-reliance” and a sense of “balance” between the individual services to maximise the deterrence and active response capabilities available to the Australian Defence Force.

At the core of this decision was the growing recognition that Australia didn’t have to develop major strategic capabilities, and more importantly for our policymakers, we couldn’t afford to, based on our limited materiel, financial and manpower resources.

Dibb’s white paper highlights this, stating: “This government’s policy of defence self-reliance gives priority to the ability to defend ourselves with our own resources. Australia must have the military capability to prevent an enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our territory, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force. These are uniquely Australian interests and Australia must have the independent military capability to defend them.”

As the potential for peer competitor conflict subsided and the Islamic terrorism became the priority, successive Australian governments embraced the post-Cold War peace dividend and significantly scaled back the nation’s investment in its defence capabilities and doctrines, despite rhetoric and maintaining spending at the vaunted 2 per cent of GDP (periodic exceptions notwithstanding).

All of this seemed to go swimmingly, with Australia only ever expected to provide niche capabilities to larger, coalition forces, and would enjoy a period of “warning time” that would give the nation sufficient time to build the domestic capabilities to deter and fight any potential adversary.

With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that while much of the Western world was focused on disastrous interventions in the Middle East, equally ambitious, revisionist, and committed powers were quietly watching, investing, and positioning themselves to eventually replace the post-Second World War order.

However, perhaps unsurprisingly, given the elation in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the force structure proposed by the Defence of Australia policy wasn’t necessarily always delivered by successive governments.

An emphasis on ‘Continental Defence’

It is inescapable that much of the emphasis of the Defence of Australia Police is focused upon the continental defence of the Australian continent and the control of the critical “Sea-Air Gap” in our northern approaches through Southeast Asia.

In order to deliver this, the 1987 Defence White Paper called for a major reorientation of the Australian Defence Force, focusing on developing a “joint” and “balanced force” depending on advanced warning, technological supremacy, self-reliance and alliances all providing “mass” to Australia’s otherwise limited resources.

Long-range strike was at the core of the Defence of Australia, with the nation’s long-range strike capabilities centred on the Air Force’s fleet of F-111s with a range in excess of 5,000 kilometres and the nation’s fleet of Oberon Class submarines and eventually, Collins Class submarines.

Controlling the “Sea-Air Gap” depended on the F-111 fleet and Australia’s then-new, classic F/A-18A/B Hornet fleet and what was projected to be a surface fleet of “16 to 17 major surface combatants” made up of the Perth Class guided missile destroyers and Adelaide Class frigates, supported by a large number of “Tier 2” surface combatants, our venerable Anzac Class frigates.

This combination of capabilities would ensure Australia’s control of the critical sea lanes of communication that crisscross Southeast Asia and the airspace across northern Australia and the region.

Meanwhile, the Defence of Australia’s proposal for Army emphasised the development of a “highly mobile force” which would deliver as the white paper explains, “We need a force structure that includes a light air portable force, capable of rapid deployment; forces capable of following up an initial deployment; and the availability of greater combat power to reinforce deployed formations if necessary.”

If all of this is sounding a tad familiar, don’t worry, you’re not alone.

The combined long-range strike capacity to be delivered by the Air Force and Navy has not been replaced since the retirement of the F-111 fleet and due to a number of ongoing issues with the Collins Class fleet.

Now, on paper, the Defence Strategic Review proposes a number of solutions in its transition from the “Balanced Force” to a “Focused Force”, but is it enough and is it right?

I was wrong and the ‘Focused Force’

Beginning with the “Balanced Force”, the Defence Strategic Review defines it as: “A balanced force is designed to be able to respond to a range of contingencies when the strategic situation remains uncertain. This force design required that the ADF respond to low-level threats related to continental defence, regional operations in support of Australian interests and global support to our alliance partner, the United States.

“In this approach, while the balance of the force was primarily designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of contingencies. This conceptual approach to force structure planning, which has led to like-for-like replacements in military platforms in the ADF, is deeply ingrained in Defence’s culture,” the DSR explains.

Conversely, the Defence Strategic Review defines a “Focused Force” thus: “This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks. The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.”

As part of this emphasis on developing a “Focused Force”, we are seeing the focus on “long-range” weapons systems including HIMARS, including the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) missiles with a maximum projected range in excess of 500 kilometres, LRASM again with a maximum range of less than 950 kilometres, and Tomahawk with a range between 1,500–2,500 kilometres, respectively, and of course, the planned nuclear submarine fleet.

We are still to find out just how significant the changes to the Navy will be, although all the conjecture seems to point to a hybrid mix of niche, high-end capabilities and mid-tier platforms but in larger numbers.

Meanwhile, Air Force remains in a state of limbo with the scuttlebutt indicating that Australia will not pursue the acquisition of the final squadron of F-35As to bring our fleet to 100 airframes, while minor expansions to the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and air lift fleets round out projections for the Air Force.

Equally, for Army, the government announced, “1st Brigade will be light, agile, and quick to deploy in the littoral environment. Third Brigade will be an armoured brigade designed for amphibious operations with the Royal Australian Navy in order to secure decisive terrain. Seventh Brigade will be motorised and optimised to project by air and sea to respond to regional contingencies.”

Minister for Defence Richard Males reinforced the importance of this, stating, “These changes to Army are about responding to the recommendations of the Defence Strategic Review to maintain peace, security, and prosperity in our region.

“This will mean Army has a concentration of people and capabilities in Australia’s north, making it easier to deploy for training, major exercises or to support our partners and allies in the region,” the defence minister explained.

Despite all of this and the rhetoric out of the government surrounding the capabilities outlined in the Defence Strategic Review, it is pretty clear the Defence of Australia policy, despite its very, very significant flaws is VASTLY superior to what has been proposed under the Defence Strategic Review.

Simply put, while I have been wrong in my criticism of the Defence of Australia policy, it is clear we need to do better.

Final thoughts

The rapidly deteriorating geopolitical and strategic environment that is transforming the global and regional security paradigm requires a realistic analysis and assessment by Australia’s policymakers.

Equally, while taking shortcuts to end up with 50 per cent of something, as opposed to 100 per cent of nothing, as proposed by the government is an admirable goal. However, ultimately, it will only prove more costly in the long run as we scramble to rapidly develop high-end warfighting capability.

Equally, both the Australian government and the Australian public have to accept and understand that we will need to dramatically increase spending in our national defence and do so over the long term, rather than short-term sugar hits or sleight of hand that push money out over the forward estimates and allow inflation to account for “increases” in spending, despite there being little-to-no new money in real terms.

Ultimately, this comes back to the government’s shift away from a “Balanced Force” towards “Focused Force” as championed in the Defence Strategic Review and the foundational problem that is our lack of clearly defined role and objectives for our own defence capabilities.

This reality equally fails to account for the planned increase in ADF personnel by 2040 and places ultimate hope in a series of as yet to be developed “wunderwaffe” or wonder weapons, like autonomous systems, cyber or tactical weapons like HIMARs and others that are being shoehorned into fulfilling “strategic” roles to provide both “impactful projection” and deterrence against “any potential adversary”.

Importantly, no one has said that defending the nation in this era of renewed and increasingly capable great power competition will be cheap or easy and we have to accept that uncomfortable reality.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..