Confronting an emboldened new Axis

For the briefest period in the aftermath of the devastation of the Second World War, global peace, stability, and prosperity looked like real possibilities, marking a truly defining turning point in humanity’s history.

Built in the rubble of the old world order of colonial empires, the potential for this new world was quickly dashed as two new, armed, ideologically-focused camps emerged with vastly different visions of the global future.

Circling one another in the boxing ring that was the post-war globe was the revolutionary world of Marxist Communism as championed by Stalin’s Soviet Union and then, in short order, Mao’s People’s Republic of China.

These nations and their expanding bloc stood diametrically opposed to the “exploitative” nature of the capitalist Western world, citing centuries of exploitation of the working class and native populations by the ruling elite and colonial expansion to support the rapid post-war decolonisation of the “global South”.

In the opposite corner of the ring and standing defiantly opposite this order of revolutionary powers was the capitalist, Western, liberal democratic world, led in large part by the United States, which throughout the war, emerged as the world’s pre-eminent economic, industrial, and for a short time, nuclear power.

As both blocs solidified into a dichotomy of East versus West, the competition would largely – as a result of ever-present threat of direct nuclear exchange and devastating confrontation between the two competing global hegemons – be kept cold.

Fast forward to today and the jubilation and hubris which characterised the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union has now transformed into a far less optimistic vision of the future, as once again, the historical “norms” of great power competition and multipolarity are alive and well.

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Accordingly, it is no secret that our world is changing, the order and structures that have promoted peace, prosperity, and stability over the last eight decades are fraying under the inevitable march of time.

Unlike the previous Cold War, which was heavily influenced by the ideological differences, this contemporary “Cold War” is largely defined by a combination of economic, strategic, and demographic competitions, marking the emergence of a rapidly different form of competition.

In the modern context, this new “Cold War” is developing against the backdrop of an increasingly “multipolar world”, characterised by a more complex understanding of international power and the relative “tiers” as a means for understanding their position in this new global paradigm.

At the apex of this new hierarchy, we have competing great powers, including the United States, the People’s Republic of China, India, and to a lesser extent, Russia, followed by great power “adjacent” and emerging great power “adjacent” nations including Germany, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, and others.

Rounding out this new multipolar world are the middle powers, including Australia, Italy, Canada and minor, or developing powers largely across the “global south” of formerly colonial holdings, each with their own interests, ambitions, and designs for the global order and balance of power.

Highlighting this current conundrum is The Australian’s foreign editor, Greg Sheridan, in a piece titled, Israel-Gaza conflict reveals a failure of Western defence has emboldened China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, in which he argues, “Not since World War II has the West been so strategically threatened as today. All of the West’s most powerful and important enemies are involved in military attack against it, or supporting attack by their allies, or proclaiming they plan to attack soon.”

A house divided can’t stand

Against the mounting regional and broader global shifts in the balance of power and a seemingly unifying bloc of revisionist powers, the Western world appears fractured, chaotic, and divided. With mounting economic pressures, domestic political atomisation and polarisation, disenfranchisement and a phenomenon of “managed decline” characterising the public policy of many Western governments, contrasted by the bold, invigorated, and ambitious designs for the globe standing opposite.

Sheridan details this, stating, “At the same time, the West has never been more divided, more internally feeble, nor looked less likely to display necessary purpose and strength. Its leaders scramble to cope with each crisis but do almost nothing to build capacity to prevail in sustained conflict.”

No matter where we look, the post-Second World War order is under assault, which Sheridan believes is the result of the overall decline of the Western world and its commitment to the ideals, principles, and integrity of the post-Second World War global order.

He explains, “Consider. Russia is attacking Ukraine even as we speak and has previously taken military action against other independent nations on its periphery, such as Georgia, while also threatening other east and central European democracies. More than once it has threatened the use of nuclear weapons.

“Iran, through proxies in Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Syria and Houthi rebels in Yemen, is attacking Israel and also attacking US troops located in Iraq and Syria. Iran, too, threatens to directly attack Israel, and US targets in the Middle East, if Israel’s retaliatory military action in Gaza is prolonged. Iran has laughed at efforts to get it back to an agreement on management of its nuclear industry and has now passed the threshold of enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.”

Going further and bringing it closer to home, Sheridan adds, “China, according to sober public remarks by ASIO head Mike Burgess, is involved in relentless cyber theft of intellectual property in Western nations, including in Australia, on an unprecedented scale. It has intensified cyber attacks on Taiwan. It has repeatedly rammed Philippine ships in Philippine waters in pursuit of completely baseless Chinese claims to sovereignty throughout the entire South China Sea. It is enlarging its arsenal of nuclear weapons as part of a massive military build-up. It has repeatedly threatened military action against Taiwan.”

We have to up our game

Despite a seemingly unassailable position of strength post-Cold War, the decades of costly conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia, coupled with a slew of domestic economic, political, and demographic issues have served to constrain and muddy the decision-making process, and indeed, decisionmakers in the United States and Australia as they come to terms with the new power dynamics.

This epochal end was reinforced by comments made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 22 December 2022, when he stated: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”

Equally, this feeds into the underlying sentiment that underpins this seminal statement in the recently released Defence Strategic Review, which states, “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.”

All of this ultimately leads to major concerns about the capacity of the United States and Australia to provide meaningful, aggregated deterrence capability in defence of Taiwan or any other contingency that may arise across the Indo-Pacific.

Sheridan expands on this predicament, saying, “Most shockingly, virtually no Western nation apart from Japan is making a serious effort to increase defence expenditure or its defence industrial base. That certainly includes Australia.

“As John Lee has argued, Australia’s failure to pull its weight in defence already threatens to undermine AUKUS. Everyone sees the Albanese government, like other Western governments, has rightly identified today’s uniquely dangerous strategic environment but not done anything about it except cuddling the Americans, hoping as ever that they’ll take care of business.”

Expanding on this and presenting a particularly confrontational question, Sheridan asks “Could the US possibly cope with three simultaneous wars and with allies that are almost universally useless militarily, like Australia? In a prolonged conflict between two big nations, or two big coalitions of nations, the likely winner is the side with the greatest military industrial capacity. That was true in the American civil war, in World War II, in many conflicts.”

This all combines to create a reality we need to accept – we need to up our own game.

Final thoughts

If Australia is going to survive and thrive in this new era, Australia’s policymakers and the public are going to have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.

All of this is underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.

Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers urgently need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policymaking since Federation.

Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific.

The most important question now becomes, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see both a narrative and strategy that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?