With our world rapidly devolving into a more competitive, multipolar world, many have raised questions on whether the US has had its eyes on the ball or let it slip, leading to the current predicament we face.
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The United States is unique among the nations, as the world’s pre-eminent economic, political, cultural, and strategic power, it has the capacity to rapidly shift the balance of power and flow of history almost unilaterally.
However, no matter what way the cookie crumbles, no one can deny that the past three decades haven’t been easy on the United States as a nation and for the Americans as a people.
Far from the period of eternal optimism, endless economic prosperity, progress, and the “End of History” promised following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has lurched from crisis to crisis beginning in the early 1990s.
Across the globe, the United States has been called upon to put an end to foreign incursions as was the case during the first Gulf War, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo or in response to acts of violent extremism as was the case with Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, waves of trade liberalisation and economic globalisation hollowed out middle- and working-class America, giving rise to opioid crises precipitating waves of “deaths of despair”, political polarisation, the culture wars, and mounting wealth inequality.
All of this combines to form a particularly bleak picture of the leader of the Free World in a particularly unstable time in history.
This uncomfortable reality hasn’t gone unnoticed, at home or abroad.
Indeed, recently, firebrand Republican senator Marco Rubio was incredibly robust in his assessment of the United States following the Chinese spy balloon fiasco, stating, “They did this on purpose. They understood that it was going to be spotted, they knew the US government would have to reveal it, that people were going to see it over the sky. And the message they were trying to send is what they believe internally, and that is that the United States is a once-great superpower that’s hollowed out, it’s in decline.”
Meanwhile, across the developing world, the recent expansion of the BRICS economic and pseudo-strategic security bloc, coupled with the limited efficacy of US sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, mounting tensions over Taiwan, and Hamas’ barbaric attack on Israel all serve to highlight that while the “cat is away, the mice will play”.
On the home front, it is easy to understand why generations of Americans are tired, worn out, and increasingly isolationist in the face of continued or expanded conflict abroad, declining prosperity and opportunity at home all presided over by what many consider to be a largely disconnected political elite.
For The Wall Street Journal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning editor, Paul A Gigot, in a piece titled, American isolationism is making a perilous moment even more so, paints a pretty bleak picture, stating, “I recently looked back at what my predecessor and mentor, Robert Bartley, said in 2002 upon his retirement. He surveyed his 30 years as editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal and the progress that had been made. America had won the Cold War, vanquished the stagflation of the 1970s and quieted the social convulsions of the 1960s and 1970s.
“Twenty-one years later, I wish I could say the same. Most of the victories Bartley celebrated have eroded or vanished. But then he predicted that too. His book, The Seven Fat Years, made clear that peace and prosperity are contingent, that the seven fat years in the Bible followed seven lean years. That the Belle Époque of the early 20th century soon gave way to World War I and Stalin, Hitler and Tojo,” Gigot explains.
Confronting the challenges
There is no shortage of foreign and domestic challenges facing both the United States and its collection of allies across the Western world, including Australia in this era of renewed great power competition and reinvigorated multipolarity.
Yet it is the political and military challenges in particular which resoundingly weaken the capacity of the US and its allies to resist the autocratic nations on march across the globe, something Gigot explains stating, “I want to address one of our current troubles, which is urgent but also solvable. That is the decline of America’s defences – military and political.
“This weakness has been exposed in sharp relief in the past two years, and it is worse than most know. We face an array of adversaries more formidable than at any time since World War II, and we aren’t prepared for the moment,” he details.
Citing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as an informative moment, revealing that in some cases, the emperor is wearing no clothes when it comes to the material capacity to directly resist territorial aggression by the likes of Russia and potentially China in the Indo-Pacific.
Gigot explains, “The war in Ukraine has taught us that our defence production lines are inadequate. Our long-range anti-ship missile stocks would run out in a week in a war over Taiwan. We trail Russia and China on hypersonic weapons.
“Or consider one example from the US Navy. The Navy’s attack submarines are the best deterrent we have against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Navy says it needs 66 hulls, yet only 31 were ‘operationally ready’ this past fiscal year. To satisfy the Navy’s needs, and meet our commitments under the AUKUS accords, we would have to build an average of at least 2.3 submarines a year. We are building 1.2. I could cite many such examples.”
“The relevant questions are: How did we get here? And what to do about it?” Gigot asks poignantly.
We forgot the lessons of history and a failure of US deterrence
Like the saying often attributed to Mark Twain, “History doesn’t repeat, but it does often rhyme”, the hubris that characterised the culture, politics, and strategic policy communities in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has been repeated throughout history by triumphant powers.
Meanwhile, on the periphery, emerging powers consolidated and prioritised their own expansion to challenge the status quo, if all of this sounds familiar, you’re on the money.
The past four decades have been no different, as Gigot explains, this is where our challenges began, “The answer to the first question is that we forgot the lesson of history. One of my military mentors was Andy Marshall, the legendary Pentagon strategist, who liked to say peace is best understood as an interlude between wars.
“Robert Gates issued a similar warning as he retired as defence secretary in 2011 when he said that, when wars end, the US always makes the mistake of drawing down defences and leaving ourselves vulnerable. We ignored him,” he explains.
All of this has resulted in dramatic, deadly results across the globe.
Gigot adds, “The obvious initial answer is to spend more on defence, and soon. But that is the easy part; we know the policy solution. The harder issue is finding the political will to do it, while persuading adversaries we are credible enough to restore American deterrence. As we have learned in Ukraine and now in the Middle East, US deterrence has faded. And the world’s rogues are on the march.”
America’s involvement across the Middle East throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century proved to be immensely costly not only for the American Treasury coffers but the lower and middle classes of the US, which were compounded by a hollowing out of the once mighty US industrial base in favour of cheaper, offshore manufacturing as part of the unrestricted globalisation of industry and trade.
The dualistic combination of these costs has only received some attention in public policy, academic and political circles, with most of the emphasis being placed heavily on the “blood and treasure” costs to the budget bottom line and manpower lost.
Critically, the real “at home” cost to America’s middle class and economic heartland has only served to ferment disillusion with the status quo, and most importantly, America’s role as the global policeman when conditions at home continue to worsen and successive generations of young men, in particular, are decimated by endless conflict.
Against this backdrop, The Australian Financial Review’s James Curran, in a piece titled, Another ‘forever wars’ distraction for America, raises concerns about America being potentially drawn into yet another “forever war” in the Middle East, which spells major issues for the already fraying global order.
Curran explains, stating, “For Washington, the implications for its domestic politics and its foreign policy are once more acute. Republicans suddenly look even more indulgent now for causing legislative dysfunction in the US Congress, a state of affairs that will only feed the perception of an America adrift as the world continues to burn.”
Unpacking the impacts of this further, Curran adds, “Washington has been looking to free itself of commitments around the world in an effort to focus not only on its home front but on the China challenge. But such is the lot of the sole superpower; it now has wars to manage in the Middle East and Europe simultaneously as it gears up Asian allies for strategic competition with China.”
Against this, it is hard to see how the United States or the world would benefit from direct, kinetic, US involvement in the Middle East, particularly given the potential for the relatively contained conflict to become a much larger, regional conflagration.
Seeking to ward off any potential Iranian involvement, the US, seeing its own limited influence in the region already waning, has sought help from Beijing to help contain any potential spillover that could embroil the Middle East in an ethnic and religious conflict not seen since the Crusades.
Curran explains this, saying, “it [the US] is now looking to China for help. Beijing, which toughened up its statement on the Hamas attacks after visiting American lawmakers pointed out it lacked sympathy for Israel, would still have welcomed US entreaties for it to intervene with Iran. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer emerged from a rare audience with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, confident Beijing will use its influence with Tehran so the conflagration doesn’t spread”.
All of this has combined to give rise to mounting concerns and renewed calls by some in the US political establishment to embrace a policy of isolationism, something Gigot believes presents a significant risk to the world.
“I’ll end by addressing the popular new line of the new right. Perhaps you’ve heard it: ‘Do you know what time it is?’ It’s intended as an insult, as in: Stop invoking Ronald Reagan, old man, and get with the 21st century. But it’s the wrong question. The right question is: What time do you want it to be?
“Do you want it to be the 1930s, when America watched from afar as dictators began to march? We pretended we were safe, only to be attacked with our guard down. It took four years and 400,000 dead Americans to win World War II. This isn’t yet the 1930s, but they will arrive soon enough on our present course.
“Or would you prefer this time to be like the 1970s and 1980s, when the American right united behind a mission of rearmament, economic revival and renewed national purpose? When we won the Cold War and ushered in two decades of prosperity,” Gogit asks.
Final thoughts
Only by recognising the relative decline of the United States (not a popular opinion to state out loud) and accepting that the United States has limitations can Australia truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.
However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstance, our national future will not be determined by these areas.
It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest-growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.
Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world, underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.
Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policymaking since Federation.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at