Despite protestations from the highest levels, the Pentagon appears to have broken ranks, with a spokesperson revealing that the US is going to struggle to pay for a range of contingencies as it ramps up deployments to the Middle East following the Hamas attacks on Israel in early October, accelerating the rise of the multipolar world.
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At every turn, it looks as if the global order upon which our wealth, security, and stability has been built over the last eight decades is under assault.
Whether it is on the steppes of eastern Europe, the rolling hills of the Holy Land or the vast waters of the Pacific, the blood is in the water and the sharks are circling.
At the centre of this emerging new world order is the relative decline of the world’s once undisputed economic, political, and strategic hegemon, the United States, coupled with the emergence of, or in some cases, re-emergence of once mighty historic powers with their own unique and often competing designs for the global order.
Where the United States once strode abroad victorious and unchallenged in the aftermath of the Cold War, optimism gave way to hubris and an expectation that the United States would unilaterally wield its immense power to solve the world’s problems.
From Somalia, Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo, to Afghanistan, Iraq (again), Libya, and Syria, alongside longstanding commitments to global security across Asia and Europe, the United States really embraced its position as the de facto “World Policeman”.
For the most part, the world was happy to allow the United States to unilaterally fulfil this role; however, this wasn’t to last.
Once great powers embraced the unrestricted economic opportunity and stability provided by the United States all the while beginning to plan and ultimately fulfil their ultimate, ideological objective – the end of the post-Second World War global order.
Revolutionary focused powers like China and a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin, among other emerging global powers, including India, Brazil, and a number of others, across the “developing world”, are seeking to enjoy the economic opportunities enjoyed by the “developed world”.
In order to achieve this, they have set about creating parallel multilateral organisations and institutions, largely led by the BRICS nations seeking to push back against what they perceive as a concerted and coordinated effort to contain and restrain the economic development of their own nations.
This confluence of events provides a foundation for understanding the predicament which now faces the world as the United States has announced it will deploy the combined might of Carrier Strike Group 12, led by USS Gerald R Ford, to the eastern Mediterranean following Hamas’ devastating and horrific sneak attack on Israel.
Yet, despite this latest show of intent and capability by the United States, not is all sunshine and lollipops for the world’s pre-eminent superpower, with growing concerns about the long-term willingness and capacity of the United States to maintain the global order.
This was first brought to the fore following comments made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 22 December 2022, in which he highlighted concerns about the capacity of the United States to directly deter and engage a competing great power: “When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have, I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression.”
Secretary Blinken’s comments were further reinforced by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, who, in a testimony before the US House armed services committee, laid bare the declining capacity of the US, “If there was a war on the Korean peninsula or great power war between the United States and Russia or the United States and China, the consumption rates would be off the charts … So I’m concerned. I know the secretary is ... we’ve got a ways to go to make sure our stockpiles are prepared for the real contingencies.”
Now, it appears to have gotten far worse, with the Pentagon confirming the latest American efforts to stabilise the Middle East following the sneak attack by Hamas on 7 October of this year, may be a bridge too far.
Unpacking this, Lara Seligman, writing for US-based Politico in a piece titled, ‘We’re taking it out of hide’: Pentagon says it has no money for Middle East buildup", reveals that increasingly, the emperor’s wardrobe is increasingly bare.
Congressional dysfunction to blame
Over the past 20 years, there has become an increasing sense, particularly among the American public, and increasingly by the world that has become dependent on the enduring benevolence, willingness, and capacity of the United States to maintain global order, that Congress is dysfunctional.
This has only become an increasingly prominent and accepted phenomenon given the increasing frequency at which budgetary and appropriations debates devolve into filibustered attempts to score political capital, by both sides of the aisle, often bringing the United States to the brink of default.
When it comes to defence expenditure, once considered a sacred cow in US political circles, the increasing trend towards insular policymaking across the US political divide means it, too, is in the crosshairs.
Highlighting this, Seligman explains, “The problem: Congressional dysfunction means the Pentagon has no money to pay for the buildup. The military, like the rest of the federal government, is operating under a temporary funding measure that freezes spending at the previous year’s levels. And because the Middle East troop movements weren’t planned, the Pentagon has had to pull money from existing operations and maintenance accounts, DOD spokesperson Chris Sherwood said.”
Now while this approach to appropriations and contingency planning is not new, or unusual for that matter, what it does serve to do is highlight two key points.
First, that the multipolar world is now well and truly here, any attempts at putting that genie back in the bottle are doomed to fail and pretending it isn’t here will only leave us more vulnerable.
Second, the arrival of this new world is going to strain the United States and its capacity to maintain global order, which we are now seeing unfold in real time before our eyes.
Unpacking the implications of these budgetary struggles, Seligman, quoting Pentagon spokesperson Chris Sherwood, states, “Because DOD had to hunt for funds, that means less money for training, exercises and deployments the military had already planned for the year. Some contractual payments could be delayed, Sherwood said.
“‘We’re taking it out of hide,’ Sherwood added. The buildup in the Middle East – which has included extending the deployment of the Gerald R Ford Carrier Strike Group operating off the coast of Israel – has therefore forced the military departments and US Central Command to reassess the requirements for current and future operations based on the developing conflict, he said,” Seligman explains.
This is by no means a new phenomenon, quite the contrary, it has been a long time coming, with many nations – not just the US – facing the first, second, and third order tactical and strategic implications of unplanned for contingencies.
Although for the United States, the implications are far more wide-reaching in their ramifications, something that Seligman details, saying, “Top Pentagon officials warn year after year about the harm that temporary funding measures have on military readiness. Operating under a stopgap measure prevents the department from starting any new programs or paying for anything above the previous year’s levels.”
Contemporary challenges are mounting
Of course, all of this has to be viewed against the backdrop that is the contemporary global geopolitical and strategic environment, mainly the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and now the hostilities sweeping across the Middle East, say nothing of the domestic sociopolitical, cultural, and ethnic tensions that are sweeping across Europe and the potential of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
This is something that Seligman details, highlighting the impact these concurrent crises have had on the United States and its global positions, stating, “That burden is now weighing heavier than usual on DOD, as the Pentagon supports two wars at once: in Ukraine and in Israel.”
All of this comes despite continued reassurances from the Biden administration and across the broader Western alliance network about continuing its materiel and financial support for Ukraine, “for as long as it takes”.
Daniel DePetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Chicago Tribune, highlights that despite some seriously lofty aspirations, these often fall flat in the face of the reality of industrial constraints, domestic political limitations, and broader geostrategic considerations.
DePetris states, “Lofty aspirations, however, are often blunted by cold, hard reality. And the reality is that the Biden administration’s Ukraine strategy is increasingly being tested by political, policy and resource constraints.”
Unpacking growing domestic challenges to sustained support for the Ukrainian resistance, DePetris adds, “Ukraine aid is a major topic of debate within the Republican Party writ large. While GOP congressional leadership remains largely onboard, the rank and file are either opposed to writing more checks or are tying additional aid to more stringent accountability measures such as the formation of a special inspector general.
However, this reluctance on the part of the Republican Party is equally reflected by the increasingly tired American public, particularly in the aftermath of the Biden administration’s disastrous response to the Maui wildfires with DePetris citing analysis by CNN, which revealed 55 per cent of Americans surveyed in July reveal they didn’t want Congress to authorise more war funding.
Further to this, as part of the same analysis, CNN reveals that 51 per cent of surveyed Americans believe the United States has already done enough to support Ukraine’s efforts.
All of this has been further reinforced not only by the comments made by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, but by Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks during a 21 November event in Washington, where she states, “We’ve gotten used to getting by, continuing resolution (CR) to CR, but it’s with significant consequence. That has a cost. You can’t buy back the time. You just can’t.”
As part of this, Hicks estimates that the Pentagon will face a US$35 billion (AU$52.74 billion) haircut in the coming year to the bottom line.
Seligman states of the coming deadline, “Once the continuing resolution runs out February 2, it’s up to lawmakers to pass a full-year spending bill. But if the bickering drags on through April, the Pentagon and other federal agencies will face a 1 per cent across-the-board spending cut.”
Final thoughts
Only by recognising the relative decline of the United States (not a popular opinion to state out loud) and accepting that the United States has limitations can Australia truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.
However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstance, our national future will not be determined by these areas.
It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.
Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world. Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, is serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.
Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policy making since Federation.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at