Inflection point 2024: The risks of WWIII and confronting global disorder

Throughout history, the geopolitical environment has been the story of the rise and fall of empires and the ensuing periods of order and disorder that characterised these ebbs and flows.

Whether it was the intense competition between Rome and Carthage, Britain’s struggle with Napoleonic France, and in lived memory, the economic, political, and strategic competition between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Today’s world of emerging great power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, Putin’s Russia and Modi’s India, are driving the growing multipolarity in a world beset by challenges.

Indeed, in recent years, the post-Second World War global order has come under assault both directly and indirectly as emerging powers like China and India, backed by established powers, including a resurgent and increasingly belligerent Russia, are all combining to begin building a parallel network of economic, political, and strategic organisations and arrangements to challenge the post-war global order.

At the core of this push is the intent to directly undermine the legitimacy and reputation of the United States and the post-war order as increasingly elitist, unjust, and “Western-centric” at the expense of the Global South.

Leading the charge for this new, increasingly contested and surprisingly, ideologically driven multipolar world is Mao’s, and now Xi’s China, seeking to leverage its immense economic, political, and strategic might to right the wrongs of the past, namely the “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of colonial empires, with its eyes firmly set on usurping the global status quo.

In stark contrast for the United States, the incumbent global hegemon, the last three decades of unrivalled dominance and optimism post-Cold War have equally seen a hollowing out of the once-unrivalled US economic and industrial base, with disastrous forays in military adventurism in the Middle East and Central Asia, all the while, the world’s emerging powers rapidly develop their own immense economies and strategic capabilities to reshape the world in their image.

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The evolving or rather deteriorating nature of this new global paradigm ultimately results in one thing: an increasingly disrupted and contested global environment that will directly impact global economic, political, and strategic security and for nations like Australia, which now finds itself at the epicentre of global competition, disruption to our prosperity, security, and stability in a new, multipolar world.

With all of this in mind and the situation on the ground in eastern Europe continuing to stagnate, making both Ukraine and Russia more desperate, and the Middle East a reinvigorated powder keg, it is easy to see how 2024 is fast shaping up to be a major inflection point for the global balance of power.

Highlighting this is Adam Creighton of The Australian, in a piece titled, Risk meter reaches all the way up to WWIII in 2024, in which he details the mounting challenges facing Australia and the world.

WWIII a real possibility

With global and regional competitions heating up, it is easy to understand why many consider the world in a state of disarray.

For Creighton, this disarray, disruption and potentiality for conflict is only becoming increasingly likely as the circumstances in the Red Sea, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe continue to unfold, let alone Beijing’s increasing hostility in the South China Sea and Taiwan.

Creighton explained this, stating, “Every other day ‘WWIII’ is trending on social media with suggestions this period of heightened risk could boil over, drawing the US and its allies into hot wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

“Meanwhile, China could trigger a confrontation of its own over Taiwan in the South China Sea that would pit the world’s two superpowers against each other. Can you think of any time in recent history when three distinct parts of the world have become powder kegs simultaneously?” Creighton asked.

Meanwhile, standing as a force of order, the United States faces mounting domestic and international challenges that serve to undermine its position as the global hegemon.

Creighton explained the now well-known domestic challenges facing the United States, stating, “And all of this is unfolding as the US faces the most divisive, distracting and potentially destabilising presidential election in its history. No year, at least in my lifetime, comes close to the dangers 2024 presents: for all the horror and shock of 9/11, it never seemed to present an existential threat to world peace.”

Yet some of these challenges have come as a result of disastrous, often arrogant decisions made by the US leadership during the two decades immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and have only served to isolate and, in some cases, antagonise or at worst entice counterproductive actions by emerging and established powers.

“The subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were obviously going to end in US short-term victories, given Washington’s overwhelming military power, however painful and regrettable the longer-term failures of those ventures. The 2008 financial crisis caused immense economic pain in many countries but produced nothing remotely comparable to what we are now witnessing geopolitically.”

Creighton added, “The Ukraine war may appear to have faltered into a stalemate, but the more dangerous phase is yet to come. The US, perhaps foolishly, has attached its reputation to a Ukrainian victory, promising Kyiv repeatedly of support ‘for as long as it takes’, tacitly promising Ukraine it would help the besieged nation eject Russian forces from the eastern provinces and even Crimea. US President Joe Biden repeatedly has described the conflict as one between good and evil, democracies and autocracies, casting Russia as an existential threat to Europe and world peace.”

The Ukraine situation is only a small part of the challenges facing the United States and its partners, including Australia, with the Middle East and Red Sea equally shaping up to test both the resolve and capacity of the United States to maintain global peace and stability particularly when set against the backdrop of a potentially wider regional or global conflict.

Creighton added, “For all Israel’s early successes in destroying Hamas operatives in Gaza after October 7, the conflict is unlikely to end soon and could well escalate. Hezbollah, more powerful than Hamas, threatened retaliation for Israel’s strike on a Hamas leader in Lebanon on January 2...

“Meanwhile, the Houthis, thankfully poor shots thus far, appear bent on hitting an allied ship in the Red Sea, which could convince the US to strike their paymaster Iran, whose various militias already have attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria more than 115 times since October,” he explained.

Not to be outdone as a potential powder keg ready to kickstart World War III, China’s increasing and repeated antagonism, hostility, and sabre-rattling in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, particularly in the lead-up to Taiwan’s upcoming election only serve as yet another flashpoint, one much closer to home.

Creighton stated, “In 2021 it would have been laughable to argue the risk of the Chinese Communist Party invading Taiwan presented only the third gravest risk to world peace. But here we are, and that region could easily move up the list. Much like (a far more benign) Japan before it, Chinese power arguably has peaked relative to the US, given the former’s self-inflicted demographic decline and its increasingly anaemic economic performance.

“Xi Jinping, having promised to reunify Taiwan with the mainland under his tenure, may need to move sooner rather than later, especially while the US is so distracted in Ukraine and the Middle East,” he added.

All of this ultimately combines to raise a number of questions for Australia, namely, what sort of economy do we want to have, what sort of defence capability do we need, and what role does Australia need to embrace in order to remain secure, prosperous, and independent in this new era of great power competition?

Final thoughts

While it is easy to dismiss the rising disruption as separate and isolated issues in geographically disparate locations, that would truly be a disastrous outcome for the United States and partners, including Australia, particularly as much of the global south are among the fastest-growing economies and largest populations in this newly emerging global order.

Whether India, Indonesia or South Africa, Brazil or developing nations across the former Soviet Bloc, or even NATO members like Erdogan’s Turkey, the global south is rapidly developing and seeking to shape their spheres of influence according to their ambitions, designs, and often ancient rivalries and ethnic tensions in accordance with their own transactional vision of the world, often where might makes right.

Only by recognising the relative decline of the United States (not a popular opinion to state out loud) and accepting that the United States has limitations, can Australia truly begin to take stock of the challenges of operating in this increasingly multipolar world.

However, it is critical for us to understand that Australia’s security, prosperity, and stability will not be determined by events in Europe, nor will they be determined by circumstances in the Middle East, while they may influence circumstances.

It is important to highlight that in the coming era of multipolarity, Australia will face an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific. Indeed, separate to the People’s Republic of China, our immediate region is home to some of the world’s largest populations with its fastest-growing economies with their own unique designs and economic, political, and strategic ambitions for the region.

Rather, we have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world. Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.

Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policy making since Federation.

Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see a narrative that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..