Capacity for escalation, proportionality critical to delivering credible deterrence, especially for Australia

We are nearly 12 months on from the release of the Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR), which in many ways broke the mold of Australia’s defence and strategic planning, marking a major departure from the Defence of Australia-era which championed continental-focused defence posture.

At the foundation of this seismic shift are the concepts of “impactful projection” and “national defence”, each forming the central delivery mechanisms of a broader conceptualisation of Australian deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

This brings us to two specific comments, the first from Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles who clearly articulated the role and importance of “impactful projection”, where he stated: “I think, increasingly, we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before.”

The second statement comes from the Defence Strategic Review, which shatters the long-held belief that Australia can depend on the United States for our “high-level” strategic security, where it stated: “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.”

In order to deliver this capacity to “unilaterally deter any state”, Australia is putting all of its proverbial eggs in a small number of baskets, namely, Australia’s future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and, to a lesser extent, platforms like the HIMARS and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to be our “silver bullet” solution to all of our problems.

Deterrence requires the capacity to escalate

Just as there is no “one size fits all” approach to deterrence, particularly in the contemporary context, there is no singular platform or series of platforms that can suitably provide deterrence.

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Simply put, no capability currently being planned or developed, not our future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, not our advanced F-35 fighters, or our planned HIMARS is capable of providing the capacity to “unilaterally deter any state” as articulated in the Defence Strategic Review.

Sorry to break it to you fans of those particular platforms and the capability they promise, but they are all part of a puzzle, not the silver bullet to all of our tactical and strategic maladies.

Rather, successful deterrence depends heavily on the capacity to escalate, with a final, ultimate “form” of power capable of changing a declared opponent or potential adversary’s strategic and tactical thinking.

In the contemporary Indo-Pacific, this requires the extensive application of nuance, particularly for Australia.

This is particularly important when we consider that deterrence isn’t merely confined to the realms of who can field the most nuclear warheads or who has the most tanks.

Rather, in the era of renewed great power competition, Australia requires the flexibility afforded by an adaptable force structure complemented by the necessary mass; and qualitative edge that has traditionally characterised Australia’s defence capabilities since the end of the Second World War.

The government has, in some ways, recognised this with the independent review into the Navy’s surface fleet, which is designed to shape the make-up of the surface fleet to complement the future nuclear-powered submarine fleet.

Equally, Australia will require the necessary doctrine of escalation with clearly defined thresholds and correlating response in line with a conventional deterrence strategy.

This approach fits in with the definition of deterrence established by American strategic policy academic Michael Keane, who stated: “The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes and requires rational decisionmakers.”

Expanding on this definition, Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, established two distinct factors for “defending state” to successfully implement a strategy of deterrence, predicated on balancing proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility via:

• Conventional military capabilities – including air, land, and sea-based power projection capabilities.
• Strategic deterrence capabilities – including but not limited to a nuclear triad, strategic bomber, and naval strategic force multipliers.
• Diplomacy and foreign policy – including but not limited to foreign aid, intelligence, and direct diplomatic efforts.
• Economic power – focused on maintaining strategic industries with a focus on being globally competitive across manufacturing, resource and energy, innovation, and research and development.

With these factors and requirements in mind, it becomes increasingly clear that across the recognised “hard” metrics of contemporary deterrence, both Australia’s immense (and justified) investment in a future nuclear-powered submarine fleet and next-generation strike capabilities like PrSM, coupled with the broader conceptualisation of deterrence, leaves Australia’s deterrence capabilities somewhat lacking, particularly if we have ambitions to “unilaterally deter any state”.

We’re still a far cry from being ‘match fit’

It is no secret that Australia, as a nation and society, is far from being considered “match fit”, importantly, we’re not alone in this reality, however, there is much that can be done to reverse these prospects.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the ongoing economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and Beijing’s mounting antagonism and ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific – as part of a broad global realignment to an increasingly multipolar world – have revealed that Australia’s “long break from history” is now well and truly over.

In order to survive and thrive in this new environment, Australia will be called upon to truly embrace what the government’s own Defence Strategic Review describes as “national defence” and a “whole-of-government approach” which includes a number of central components worthy of consideration, namely:

• Defence strategy and policy supporting whole-of-nation strategies.
• An enhanced and expanded alliance with the United States, including key force posture initiatives in Australia.
• A new, more focused approach to defence planning based on net assessment.
• A focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold any adversary at risk.
• A new approach to critical Defence capabilities that drives force structure.
• A new approach to force posture for the ADF.
• A whole-of-nation effort to develop strategic resilience.

On the economic front, our national economy has been largely defined by the export of the continent’s vast resource reserves and the agricultural booms, both of which have, in recent decades, been buoyed by the voracious demands of the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, namely China.

This comforting security blanket, flanked by education and services, has kept the Australian economy from spiralling into recession multiple times over the last two decades, while equally propelling our per capita wealth via the rapid growth in the Australian real estate market, enticing much of the Australian public into a sense of false security over the resilience, strength, complexity, and vitality of the national economy.

Despite the ice bath that was the pandemic-era, which did, in some ways, startle many leaders and the public across the globe into the frailty of “just in time” supply chains and the perils of offshoring major industrial capacity, for Australia, the lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic seem to have reverted to becoming mere playthings in political debates, all the while as the chickens of unrestricted quantitative easing come home to roost, driving surging inflation and cost of living across the Western world.

Ultimately, if we’re going to be capable of true, meaningful deterrence, we are going to have to bring the Australian public along on this journey, and particularly for young Australians, provide them with the incentives to support this national endeavour.

First and foremost, it is about the bottom line and everyone’s bottom line is their wallet and for young Australians in particular, those that will inherit the world and the domestic and geopolitical environment we build today, we’re leaving them vulnerable to being coerced and influenced, effectively circumventing any defence acquisition plans.

This is particularly important for young Australians who, like many of their Western counterparts, are facing the uncomfortable reality that they will be the first generation in centuries to not be better off than their predecessors, hardly a deterring factor if your adversaries’ populace is uninvested in the future of the order.

Expanding and enhancing the opportunities available to Australians while building critical economic resilience, and as a result, deterrence to economic coercion, should be the core focus of the government because only when our economy is strong can we ensure that we can deter aggression towards the nation or our interests.

All of these factors combined provide Australia with a capacity for escalation and for proportionality without effectively bluffing our way through the upcoming decades of competition, tension, and potential hostility simmering on the horizon.

As a nation, Australia is at a precipice and both the Australian public and the nation’s political and strategic leaders need to decide what they want the nation to be: do they want the nation to become an economic, political, and strategic backwater caught between two competing great empires and a growing cluster of periphery great powers?

Or does Australia and do the Australian people roll-up their sleeves and “have a crack” to actively establish ourselves as a regional great power with all the benefits it entails?

Final thoughts

There seems to be an undercurrent belief that Australia will be facing down any future threat alone or that our primary strategic benefactor will be there at our beck and call.

As with everything, the truth is somewhere in the middle and the reality is that Australia may have to face down a great power competitor on its own at certain points and be required to win. Accordingly, we need to be able to deter them from seeking to coerce or attack us directly or our interests, and we need to do so with the full confidence of the Australian people.

This can only be achieved by putting ourselves first, after all, the old saying goes, “Charity begins at home”, and if we don’t put our interests first, both those of today and those of tomorrow, how can we expect anyone else to put our interests first?

Only a united people, invested in and believing in the promise of the nation, can be a truly effective deterrent and sadly, no shiny pieces of kit can make up for a public that is uninterested and uninvested in the future.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..