Australian society as a fundamental input to defence capability (Part 2)

By its very nature, competition is a social activity and hence is undertaken by societies. The arguments presented to this point are underpinned by a far more fundamental reality: competition is a social affair, enabled by society.

The uncomfortable truth is that militaries do not fight wars: nations do. War “is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but a social activity that involves the entire nation”. The very existence of a military arm of government is a demonstration that, both morally and philosophically, society supports the use of force to achieve national objectives.

Society’s enabling of the military is further demonstrated by the concept of a “social contract” which requires individuals to surrender some of their natural freedoms in exchange for an authority’s protection of their remaining rights. Such protection includes, arguably above all else, that against supra-societal aggressors (i.e., other nation states), which is the express domain of the military.

A useful reframing of the social contract in the context of this paper is that members of society have an obligation to enable military capability for the purposes of their own protection. In other words, society has the right to a military, but it also holds a responsibility for its effectiveness. Not only should the ADF identify society as an FIC to best draw on society as an input, members of society are obliged by the social contract to act as a fundamental input to military capability.

For any given circumstance, military operations are only possible when society provides a social licence for the ADF to operate. Military effectiveness is underpinned by a society’s culture and social structure, both of which shape how a society views its military.

The history of societies in both peace and war repeatedly illustrates military capability is weakened when society’s support for its use declines. This demonstrates the fundamental nature of society’s input to military capability in moral and philosophical terms: where a social license is not given, a military cannot operate effectively, if at all.

The social license provided by society is maintained through trust, and trust is impossible without familiarity. Identifying society as an FIC will build greater and more durable levels of familiarity and trust, and hence strengthen society’s social license, by enabling the ADF to engage more often and in better ways to draw out societal inputs, and also by allowing society to engage with the ADF more frequently through delivery of those inputs.

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In the first part of this series, Group Captain David Hood established the understanding of “society” as a concept in relation to a fundamental input to capability and the logic behind recognising and embracing society as an FIC.

Confronting potential risks

Identifying society as an FIC is not an attempt to militarise the nation. Some commentators have claimed evidence of a long history of Australian militarism. However, asking society to provide greater inputs into defence capabilities, even in peacetime, is not a step towards militarising the state. The ADF is already heavily engaging with society through industry as an FIC.

Thousands of contractors play important roles in the design, development, test, maintenance, engineering and operation of the vast majority of defence capabilities, and there is little credible evidence that an Australian military–industrial complex has emerged. Engaging society to provide greater input to capability through a new range of activities would not therefore resemble any form of militarisation.

This paper espouses opportunities that are deliberately non-militaristic and far less fundamental in nature to the existing inputs already provided by society: funding, human resources and a social license to operate. If a “military–societal complex” does not already exist, it is unlikely to emerge on the basis that society is identified as an FIC.

Further, because engaging society as an FIC contributes to defence capability, it should be viewed not as a means of mobilising for war but as a mechanism through which an increased deterrence posture can be demonstrated, thereby reducing the chance of conflict occurring. Significantly, the ADF’s engagement of society as an FIC also does nothing to alter the ministerial and executive control of the military, enshrined in the Australian constitution.

Identifying society as an FIC will further militarise the military, not militarise the state.

Our next FIC is still out there

An alternative perspective to the argument presented in this paper is that military organisations are an FIC for society, insofar as the military is drawn from society to protect it, as society sees fit. While this conventional argument has merit, it is, in truth, only half the story.

The ADF’s current list of FIC is incomplete, being too inwardly focused on what the ADF can exert direct control over. The ADF widened its perspective somewhat with the inclusion of industry as an FIC, however, the aperture should be expanded further to include Australian society.

Doing so will not credibly risk militarising society itself. It reaffirms the societal obligation implicit in the Australian social contract, and ensures the ADF can leverage the widest range of inputs to deliver the best capability from what is ultimately a relatively small societal base.

The current strategic environment places even more significance on the need to identify society as an FIC, to ensure capability is delivered in minimum time. General Sir John Hackett famously observed that society gets, in its armed forces, exactly what it asks for, “no more and no less”.

The reverse is also true: the military gets from “its” society what it seeks. The ADF is not seeking enough. In failing to recognise society as an FIC, the ADF is not systematically engaging Australian society and the fundamental inputs that it can provide to defence capability.

This was republished with the author’s approval, with the full version previously published by the Air and Space Power Centre.

Group Captain David Hood is an aeronautical engineer working for the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a master of gas turbine technology (Cranfield, UK) and a master of military and defence studies (Australian National University).