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The time for the rubber to hit the road is now fast approaching for the Albanese government, as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) budget report details a “holding pattern” for capability delivery at a time when we can least afford it.
Since the concept of “strategic warning time” was first introduced in the 1987 Defence White Paper and the supporting Dibb Report, Australia’s political and military leadership have been shielded from the consequences of poor policy and decision making by our “10-year warning time”.
Today, every major strategic policy, defence planning or force posture document has essentially poured cold water on the concept of our protective cocoon that is the “10-year warning time”.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles highlighted this during his speech launching the 2024 National Defence Strategy and supporting the Integrated Investment Program, where he stated: “Australia no longer has the luxury of a 10-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.
“The National Defence Strategy observes that the combined effect of this has seen our strategic environment deteriorate over the last 12 months. Against this strategic backdrop, the National Defence Strategy emphasises the need for impactful projection that can enable a strategy of denial, which, in turn, is capable of deterring a potential adversary from projecting force against Australia. This includes the capability to hold the military assets of an adversary at risk at greater distance from our shores.”
However, despite the rhetoric and, let’s be fair, that has been in the public consciousness since at least the 2016 Defence White Paper and was reinforced in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan, little appears to have changed when it comes to the development of Australia’s defence capabilities.
Now, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), its executive director, Justin Bassi, and director – defence strategy and national security, Bec Shrimpton, have launched a scathing attack on the government’s commitment and urgency in delivering much-needed defence capability amid mounting regional tensions.
Launching this attack, Bassi stated: “Australia needs to spend more on defence – and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations, and it is only going to intensify.”
Going further, Bassi added: “But the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly.”
Reinforcing these points, Dr Shrimpton added: “This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time.
“We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation.”
We need to course correct, urgently
Taking the deteriorating strategic environment and successive government rhetoric into account, it is clear that we need to course correct and urgently, especially if any number of powder kegs across Australia’s area of primary interest explodes.
Highlighting this, Bassi detailed: “If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade.
“Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s.”
It is not hyperbole to say that this leaves Australia with arguably the worst-prepared military in its history, at a time when the nation can ill afford to be so ill equipped and ill prepared in such a precarious environment.
Both Bassi and Shrimpton detailed that while the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program are a step in the right direction, the limited amount of funding over the forward estimates of $5.7 billion, alongside the other longer-term funding pathways leaves the nation dangerously exposed.
“The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines; the next fleet of surface warships; and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two-thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027–28.
“The relatively impressive longer-term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year,” the pair said.
In order to course correct, they believe “the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long-term capabilities”.
A two-pronged strategy
But what exactly is proposed as part of this “two-pronged strategy”?
Innovation and novel operating concepts are at the heart of this “two-pronged strategy”, particularly as Australia will need to embrace some form of asymmetric strategy when confronting a larger adversary.
To this end, Bassi and Shrimpton articulate the need to rapidly embrace this approach, stating: “Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly – such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies.
“We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage – playing to your strengths and using them to overcome your adversaries’ strengths – yet lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today. Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve.
“The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War II.”
There is, however, a glaring gap. They believe in the nation’s approach to enhancing our defence capability, while not entirely forgoing our investment in “traditional defence platforms” and maximising industrial opportunities at the same time.
Bassi said: “But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare: drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and war fighting.”
However, none of this can be achieved without adequate engagement with and buy-in from the Australian public, something that both Bassi and Shrimpton reinforce is of critical importance, saying: “As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and, hence, averting it.
“Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that only military investment can deter war or best prepare nations for it. The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict.”
Final thoughts
Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “peace dividends” and the “end of history” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.
Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.
But it isn’t too late if we pivot and accept the realities we now face both globally and closer to home in the Indo-Pacific; we just have to have to, as the US Marines say, “embrace the suck”.
Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.
Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost may very well be too devastating to comprehend.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
