Post-crisis force: A larger, smarter and more lethal Navy (Part 1)

As the largest island continent on the planet with a maritime jurisdiction of in excess of 8 million square kilometres, Australia, as a nation and a people, is defined by its relationship with the ocean.

Beyond the social and cultural aspects, our relationship with the ocean and our maritime approaches has ranged from angst to anxiety through to hostility and outright apathy as a result of our “tyranny of distance”.

This “tyranny of distance” is rapidly being replaced by a “predicament of proximity” given the nation’s geographic location at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the economic, political, ideological, and strategic competition of the 21st century.

This has only become more front of mind since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the Red Sea, which is responsible for constraining waterways responsible for US$1 trillion (AU$1.5 trillion) worth of maritime trade every year, never mind China’s ongoing brinkmanship and antagonism in the South China Sea putting at risk more than US$5.3 trillion (AU$7.83 trillion) of maritime trade every year.

Yet for much of our history, we have enjoyed the free and unhindered access to the global maritime commons, secured initially by the British Empire and the might of the Royal Navy and now secured since the end of the Second World War in part by ourselves, but at a global level by the United States.

This benevolence and security provided Australia with the opportunity to trade with the world, opening up the vast and unrivalled mineral wealth of the nation and unlocking our agricultural promise to the benefit of millions at home and hundreds of millions abroad.

While Australia was far from alone in benefiting from the post-Second World War peace and security, as a nation, Australia has disproportionally benefited in many ways, buoyed by the voracious appetite of nations across the world, but in particular, right on our doorstep in the Indo-Pacific.

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Indeed, as Australian Strategic Policy Institute Senior Fellow David Uren explained in his recent report, The trade routes vital to Australia’s economic security, “A recurrent theme in Australia’s defence strategy has been our reliance on and need to defend Australia’s trade routes in a globalised world. The vulnerability of Australia’s limited stockpiles of critical goods and its concentrated sources of supply have driven military capability and planning for decades and remain a justification for strategic investments.”

This longstanding consideration has formed the basis of Australia’s strategic posture, defence policy and force structure planning as far back as the immediate years following the end of the Second World War and, more recently, has driven the government’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review and supporting Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet which stressed the importance for an increased Australian capacity to control and secure the critical sea lines of communication and maritime that the nation depends upon.

Yet in the aftermath of a great power conflict and crisis closer to home, we are left wondering if the proposals outlined by the government, including the vaunted acquisition of the nation’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines are enough to truly preserve and protect Australia’s interests in an era of unrestricted multipolar competition.

So in a similar manner to our discussion around a post-crisis Army, what does a post-crisis force look like for Navy as we confront said challenges?

Utilising our most precious resource

As has long been established, Australia needs to do a far better job of utilising its most precious and finite resource, namely its personnel, with Navy in particular facing major challenges to recruitment and retention rates that will only become more pronounced if not rectified rapidly.

Currently, the Royal Australian Navy, according to its own website, consists of “nearly 50 commissioned vessels” but actually operates a fleet of 41 “major warships” against “over 16,000 personnel”, bringing together a fleet of advanced combatants in the three Hobart Class (180 crew) air warfare destroyers; the venerable, but seven ageing Anzac Class (177 crew) guided missile frigates; the two Canberra Class landing helicopter docks; two Supply Class auxiliary oilers; and six Collins Class (48 crew) submarines.

For comparison, the Royal Canadian Navy operates a fleet of 68 commissioned vessels against a full-time, active personnel workforce of approximately 8,400 personnel, albeit with a far more, consolidated and “rationalised” fleet of 12 Halifax Class (225 crew) guided missile frigates; 12 Kingston Class (47 crew) maritime coastal defence vessels; four of eight Harry DeWolf Class (65 crew) arctic offshore patrol vessels; and four Victoria Class (53 crew) submarines.

Yes, some will say, but Canada doesn’t operate the “big amphibious ships” like Australia’s Canberra Class, our Supply Class auxiliary replenishment ships, and the single, HMAS Choules and that is a fair statement. For reference, a single Canberra Class has a crew of 358 while a single Supply Class has a crew of 122 and HMAS Choules with a crew of 158, respectively.

Even to a lay person with limited understanding of naval capabilities and personnel management, Australia seems to have over-capitalised in personnel for less combat capability at sea, something recent decisions around Australia’s contribution to RIMPAC and following a US request to contribute a warship to the Red Sea which were effectively declined by the government seem to reinforce.

It becomes a reasonable question then if we have all of these people but struggle to deploy a single frigate or destroyer to support our “great and powerful friend” and primary security benefactor, what the hell are we doing?

The ‘central pillar’ platforms

As it stands, Australia’s Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships, HMAS Choules and, to a lesser extent, the two Supply Class auxiliary serve as the lynchpin or central pillars of the Royal Australian Navy and its transition to delivering “impactful projection” and deterrence capabilities as part of an “integrated, focused” and “balanced force” in the post-crisis world.

Accordingly, these platforms, or more likely their replacements, will remain the “central pillar” of our national naval capability, despite the rhetoric around Australia’s future fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines being our new “capital ships”, the reality is far different.

Now, of course, we will have to consider the trends emerging among both our partners and adversaries, either revealed or potential, as well as learn the lessons of the crisis scenarios and any number of alternatives to inform the optimal capability mix in order to form the broader “integrated, focused” and “balanced force”.

While many analysts have advocated for the position that the advent of reliable and mass producible anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles make large surface vessels like aircraft carriers and large amphibious warfare ships obsolete for contemporary peer or near-peer conflict.

Now that isn’t entirely true, as the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) scenario revealed, while there is a heavy toll on large surface combatants, this comes as a result largely on the lack of defensive measures, namely missile magazine depth or a lack thereof, particularly in the Australian context.

Equally, there is an assumption held by Australia’s strategic planners and decisionmakers that Australia will always be able to call upon an American or, at a stretch, British or maybe Japanese or South Korea aircraft carrier to provide reliable and credible fleet air cover and support at extended ranges beyond the Australian mainland.

So that presents two factors worth serious contemplation and raises an old question, does Australia need a fixed-wing naval aviation capability?

The answer is actually quite simple – yes. Particularly in a post-crisis world where our access to the cover provided by an allied carrier capability maybe limited at best or non-existent at worst. This only becomes more apparent as potential adversaries develop their own carrier capabilities or our neighbours may deny or restrict Australian access to airfields throughout the region to avoid being dragged into a further conflict.

This is also, by no means, advocacy for a supercarrier, that would be counterproductive, but rather an opportunity for Australia to further enhance our relationship with key allies via a common platform developed in conjunction with either or both Japan and South Korea in order to maximise the value proposition while also aggregating capability among like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific.

The real question now becomes about the number of ships, the size of the platform and airwing capacity and if there are any structures already in service that we can modify and emulate to suit Australia’s operational structures, requirement and environment.

As a base concept, we would need to field an optimal number of three, allowing for coverage of the east, west and north coasts of the mainland, allowing for a vessel on deployment or exercise, a high readiness vessel and one in its maintenance cycle.

In order to maximise the strategic impact of the ships, the base design would need to sit in the weight class of the Italian Navy’s new large deck amphibious warfare ship Trieste at 38,000–40,000 tonnes, with a similar crew complement, while also allowing for reasonable growth margins and power generation capacity, supporting a fixed-wing airwing of 24 aircraft and 16 support helicopters and uncrewed systems.

Importantly, none of these ships would have an organic amphibious warfare capability, they will be purely focused on projecting Australian airpower and fleet aircover abroad but should – like the UK’s HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales – be capable of providing sizeable follow-on ground forces via air assault should it be required in support of amphibious operations.

Finally, in order to mitigate the inter-service rivalry and concern over “capability theft” over a return to fixed-wing naval aviation, borrowing the hybrid model utilised by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force provides invaluable lessons for Australia to learn from and emulate with “Australian characteristics” while also ensuring that the surface Navy provides invaluable tactical and strategic options for decisionmakers.

Equally important is the nation’s at-sea replenishment capability or as it stands at the moment, seriously limited capacity despite the “brand new” nature of both HMA Ships Supply and Stalwart which face a range of serious and well-documented issues. These invaluable vessels provide the Australian Navy and our allies, for that matter, with the capacity to sustain operations at range for protracted periods of time and, as such, are vital components of our strategic capability.

So getting this right should be paramount. These ships further hinder Australian naval capability as a result of their large crewing requirements and limited self-defence capabilities, issues that need to be rectified or should never have been issues to begin with, for that matter. That is not to say that we scrap the two Supply Class vessels, it is now more a case of repurposing them (but more on that later).

In their place, we have the opportunity to consolidate and expand the nation’s auxiliary fleet while leveraging existing supply chains, working with allies in both the United Kingdom and South Korea to field updated variants of the AEGIR-18A initially proposed by a conglomerate during the original tendering phase for SEA 1654 Phase 3.

These ships provide enhanced range (10,000 nautical miles versus 6,000 nautical miles), a smaller crew complement (63 standard embarked crew versus 122 standard embarked crew, while the Norwegian variant of the AEGIR-18A has a smaller crew again at 43 standard complement), albeit with a significant increase in size of the vessel affording greater store capacity (19,000 m³ for diesel oil, aviation fuel versus a combined total of 10,505m³ for liquid fuel stocks).

The Royal Navy’s Fleet Auxiliary currently uses the larger AEGIR-26 as the basis for their four (although one is extended reserve readiness) Tide Class tanker fleet, built partially in South Korea and serves as the basis for the Fleet Auxiliary’s Fleet Solid Support Ship program of three ships to be built in Belfast, Northern Ireland, so Australia could theoretically work with both the UK or South Korea (including providing steel) to field a well-rounded, highly capable and manpower-appropriate level of capability.

Recognising that even with a smaller crew complement, Australia can only field a limited number of auxiliary vessels, so balancing the design to maximise both liquid fuel and solid store capacity will be paramount, so again collaborating with either or both the United Kingdom and South Korea will provide an optimal pathway to delivering a sizeable expansion of the capability (from two ships, to six) in a timely and cost-effective manner.

Post-crisis surface combatant fleet

Bringing us to the future of Australia’s surface combatant fleet, which as outlined by the government’s review into the future of the major surface combatants is slated to expand in size, being broken into two tiers of combatants, with the nation’s three Hobart Class destroyers and six Hunter Class destroyers (I am going to begin referring to them as destroyers because on size metrics, that is what they are) serving as our “Tier One” combatants with a fleet of optimally 11 “Tier Two” general purpose frigates.

These surface combatants will be supported by a fleet of six, Aegis combat system equipped “large optionally crewed surface vessels” (LOSVs) to be armed with 32 vertical launching system cells (the same “standard” vertical launch system loadout as the Hunter Class destroyers which have seen frequent criticism for being underarmed and use the Aegis Baseline 9 system.

In a post-crisis world, it remains to be seen if the surface combatant fleet outlined in the surface combatant review is sufficient to respond to the challenges, and many would argue it isn’t – I am one of them. I am also not sure the proposed major surface combatant fleet composition is optimal either.

Again, what am I proposing? First and foremost, increase the missile capacity of the Hunter Class from ship one, spending billions of dollars on a leading-edge warship with the billion-dollar Aegis combat system only to equip them with the naval equivalent of a cap gun-level of missile capacity is pure insanity.

Second, accelerate the build process to bring the fleet into service quicker as well as accelerate the design and development of the Hobart Class replacement program to begin construction at the launch of ship four of the Hunter Class, with an emphasis on deep missile magazine capacity, heavy automation to mitigate crew requirements, increased power generation, and next-generation self-defence capabilities.

As it comes to numbers of particular units, it is clear that the government’s preference for LOSVs (which are still unproven and in development) is an attempt at sleight of hand and begs questions around why we would spend billions on a suboptimal platform? Rather, we need to maximise the capability of the platforms we already have in the pipeline, not pursue science projects.

But to answer the numbers question, optimally, we would see the Hunter Class fleet returned to nine, with the follow-on Hobart Class replacements to be an equal number of hulls, again allowing equal coverage of our three major coastlines with high capability “Tier one” surface combatants capable of performing a range of duties, including, and perhaps most importantly, escort duties for our “central pillar” platforms.

If not a viable option, the planned acquisition of six Hunter Class destroyers, must be complemented by the acquisition of an equal number of the follow-on Hobart Class replacements.

Bringing us to the “Tier Two” general purpose frigates, proposed by the government as a mechanism for expanding the nation’s naval capability in a rapid, cost-effective manner by leveraging an “off-the-shelf” design with either the German MEKO A200/A210 or Japan’s Mogami Class frigate seemingly the frontrunners for the multi-billion program.

The seemingly “firming” number of 11 frigates is equally an odd choice, when a firm number of 12 would allow Australia to forward deploy a squadron of three in the region, operating out of a shared facility in Singapore or other “like minded” nation to help maintain regional peace and stability through projected presence and strength.

Now how do we make these surface combatants “smarter”? Well, we already have the keys to success here through innovative Australian platforms like the Ocius Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) which provide cost-effective persistent, long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to establish a wide-reaching web of sensors linked to effectors across the region and mainland Australia.

This surface combatant fleet would be further enhanced by the fielding of advanced large, uncrewed underwater systems, namely the Ghost Shark along with a scaled system-of-systems approach to autonomous aerial systems to effectively extend the eyes and ears and reach of the fleet. These sensor nodes would also feed effectively into the nation’s integrated battle management system being developed under AIR 6500, serving to enhance the protective shield provided by the sea-based leg of air and missile defence capabilities.

Final thoughts

Our post-crisis Navy has proven to be a bigger beast than I initially expected, so I will be covering the remaining components of our naval capability (including the Coast Guard) in a second part of this series before moving on to the Royal Australian Air Force, Special Operations Command along with the national economy and industrial base and, finally, our diplomatic pathways for ways to “harden” ourselves and prepare for a challenge we all pray never comes.

Importantly, to do this and deliver such outcomes, Australia will need to have an honest conversation about how we view ourselves and what our own ambitions are. Is it reasonable for Australia to position itself as a “middle” or “regional” power in this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment?

Equally, if we are going to brand ourselves as such, shouldn’t we aim for the top tier to ensure we get the best deal for ourselves and our future generations?

If we are going to emerge as a prosperous, secure, and free nation in the new era of great power competition, it is clear we will need break the shackles of short-termism and begin to think far more long term, to the benefit of current and future generations of Australians.