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In many ways, the contemporary Royal Australian Air Force is an “enabling” body for the rest of the Australian Defence Force, but in a post-crisis era, this role, while important, will play second fiddle to an increased focus on developing an integrated, lethal peer-focused force.
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Air power evolved rapidly since World War I, progressing from simple aircraft to supersonic jets all within 50 years. During World War II, air power became crucial, with advancements in air support, air superiority, and strategic bombing.
As the world descended into the Cold War, technology transformed the scale, scope, and delivery of airpower to incorporate the final frontier and leverage the “ultimate high ground” to knit together combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strike and lift capabilities into a single, cohesive web of sensors and effectors.
This technology-driven transformation gave rise to the concept of a “fifth-generation” force, with Australia’s first foray into this “network-centric” way of war beginning with the arrival of Australia’s first F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which also began the nation’s long-awaited modernisation and force recapitalisation.
As part of this transformation, we have seen the fielding and maturation of truly world-leading capabilities like the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning, command and control aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft and a range of other platforms alongside the planned acquisition of new strike capabilities, including the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range (AARGM-ER).
Yet in a post-crisis world, our “boutique” air force would, despite the best intentions and rhetoric, struggle to generate the range, scale, lethality or mobility desired by the government’s own plans outlined in the 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program, both of which are designed to emphasise “expeditionary air operations”.
So, how do we optimise the Royal Australian Air Force for a post-crisis world and build a force capable of maintaining and expanding its technological edge over adversaries, while building the requisite mass to defend and promote Australia’s national security and interests in a post-crisis Indo-Pacific?
Expanding the fast-jet fleet
First things first, the core of the nation’s air combat capability is our fast-jet fleet, which fundamentally hasn’t changed in size or disposition since the early-1980s, if not earlier, with the modern fleet made up of the fifth-generation 72 F-35A Lightning II, 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and 12 E/A18G Growlers, all of which are expected to remain in service thanks to through-life upgrades.
However, it would seem at the moment that our options to expand the size of the fast-jet fleet are, at best, limited with only the F-35 and its variants – the only viable crewed option for Australian consideration (sorry F-15EX lovies, it won’t happen) at least for the time being. Now the US is actively working on the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and F/A-XX programs, respectively, but it remains to be seen what they will yield and whether the US will be open to export options.
This leaves a single viable option to add extra teeth to the fast-jet force, the F-35. Australia does have an existing option to acquire a fourth squadron of aircraft that would bring the nation’s F-35 fleet up to 96 (with two “combat squadrons” based at Tindal and Williamtown, respectively, and the operational conversion unit also based at Williamtown). This third “combat squadron” would allow for the permanent basing of a fast-jet squadron on the nation’s west coast.
Bringing us to the joint UK, Japan, and Italian development of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) as a follow-on replacement for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and potentially E/A-18G Growler aircraft. The GCAP is designed to be a sixth-generation platform and is expected to incorporate a host of revolutionary technologies including directed energy weapons, an augmented reality cockpit, real time biometric and psycho-analytical monitoring, artificial intelligence, and the capacity to partner with loyal wingman platforms.
Critically, the collaborative development program also provides industrial opportunities for Australia, with the program currently supporting approximately 9,000 jobs and more than 1,000 suppliers worldwide (but more on that bit in a later piece), so early participation in the program seems to be a win-win for the nation and Air Force.
So easily expanding the fast-jet fleet seems pretty easy right? Well, not really. It takes some time, especially with the global order book for the F-35 rapidly growing, but in the meantime, Australia does have an ace up its sleeve in the MQ-28A Ghost Bat Loyal Wingman and one that can be scaled up in the medium-term to deliver additional mass to the nation’s fast-jet fleet.
While still developmental in many ways, Ghost Bat is being designed to support the crewed fast-jet fleet and add critical mass while also taking away some of the more mundane roles, including combat air patrols and air interdictions and a host of other critical combat roles. Equally important is the next generation of modular, integrated, low-observable armed, tactical autonomous systems like the General Atomics Gambit and Avenger family of systems.
But what does a post-crisis fast-jet fleet look like?
First and foremost, we would see an increase in the nation’s F-35A fleet to 96 as originally planned (with Air Force to also provide the pilots and ground crew for Navy’s new F-35-based fixed-wing naval aviation capability (I know some will say it will detract from Air Force capability, but in a post-crisis world, all bets are off), with Australia also to partner with the UK, Japan, and Italy on a similarly sized fleet of the GCAP aircraft.
To add further mass, we see the MQ-28A Ghost Bat and associated specialised variants enter mass production and attached to the crewed combat squadrons alongside the introduction of a family of tactical armed autonomous systems in part of a broader, system-of-systems approach (more on that bit shortly) to establish a broader tactical and strategic network of sensors and effectors.
Bringing us to Air Force’s strategic, force multiplying capabilities.
Long-range strike, C4ISR, Comms and EW
Long-range strike has traditionally been the responsibility and domain of the Royal Australian Air Force going as far back as the immediate aftermath of the Second World War when the nation operated a truly immense strategic bomber fleet, which has, as technology developed, been scaled back to now be non-existent.
Now yes, while the advent and introduction of a host of long-range air-launched strike weapons like the aforementioned LRASM, JASSM-ER, and potentially the Joint Strike Missile gives Australia’s limited fast-jet fleet some range, it is only effective at the tactical level, with the changing regional and global dynamics of a post-crisis world necessitating the development of a strategic, long-range strike capability.
Many an analyst, including myself, have advocated from time to time for an Australian fleet of B-21 Raider strategic bombers to supplement and then complement the long-range strike and deterrence capability provided by the nation’s future conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet; however, it may prove to be an unnecessary step should we strike early and strike fast (no pun intended) in the autonomous system space.
Again, I refer to modular systems like the General Atomics Gambit system and evolutions of the Northrop Grumman RQ-180 “Shikaka” platform to meet the requirements for an air-based leg of the strategic long-range strike dyad, importantly, as I have discussed previously, collaborating with the US and the UK in this space provides cost and schedule-saving mechanisms while ensuring that we have access to a formidable strategic long-range strike capacity.
Importantly, the base design of the RQ-180 has also been optimised for long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions over heavily defended airspace filling the pointy end of our ISR gap, creating further cost-savings benefits through common platforms.
Once again serving as a critical sensor node in a network feeding back to the nation’s fleet of six (scaled back from seven) MQ-4C Tritons, (now 9) E-7A Wedgetails and small, mass producible, solar-powered, pseudo-satellite aircraft like the BAE PHASA-35 or Airbus’ Zephyr.
This distributed network of advanced, integrated sensors would be further enhanced through integration into the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), the high-end communications capability from the constellation of two satellites to be delivered by Lockheed Martin under JP 9102. However, this high-end sensor web needs to be made more resilient with increased redundancy through the development and fielding of a web of sovereign designed, built, and operated nano-satellites over our area of strategic priority.
In the electronic warfare space, Australia’s fleet of MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare and signals intelligence aircraft, when coupled with the E/A-18G Growlers and should the Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) pods prove compatible, a small fleet of additional NGJ-equipped F-35s will provide a world-leading airborne electronic warfare capability serving as a fundamental overmatch.
Knitting all of this together is, of course, AIR 6500, which is designed to provide the whole “integrated, focused force” with a comprehensive and game-changing command and control capability, by providing in real time intelligence and data to inform decisionmakers and provide decision superiority in an increasingly complex threat environment.
Air lift and strategic mobility
By virtue of our geographic location, the size of the continent, and our isolation from our “great and powerful friend”, air lift and strategic air mobility will play an increasingly important role in a post-crisis air force.
It goes without saying that in order to account for an increased aircraft inventory, the nation’s fleet of seven (yes, seven) KC-30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft is insufficient to provide the necessary tactical and strategic mobility a post-crisis air force will require to secure the nation’s interests.
Two of these aircraft were reconfigured commercial airliners from Qantas and industry partners like Northrop Grumman, so surely, there is scope here for the Air Force to work with Qantas to repurpose their retiring fleet of 28 A330s (both -200 and -300 variants, respectively), upon which the KC-30A is based to meet this capability gap and, if they play their cards right, could also generate some revenue out of it, by modifying some to serve as “civilian” tankers similar to the business model established by Omega Aerial Refueling.
Bringing us to the strategic airlift fleet, made up of eight Boeing C-17 Globemasters and two dozen Lockheed Martin C-130-30J Super Hercules, with the deteriorating geopolitical and strategic environment will necessitate growing these numbers (even if it is buying second-hand C-17s as they’re no longer in production) to better support the nation’s strategic air lift capabilities.
Interestingly, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) saw the formalised cancellation of a $2–3 billion allocation first identified in the 2016 IIP for “long-range combat search and rescue aircraft”, which was also removed from the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan, respectively. We have also seen the limited roles designated for the C-27J Spartan battlefield lift aircraft and the necessity for an adequate aircraft to fill that role.
Addressing this key capability gap will require novel thinking and engaging both industry and our international partners to increase the nation’s strategic airlift capability and rapidly to better support the greater tactical and strategic mass the “integrated” and “focused, balanced force” will be expected to deliver in a post-crisis Indo-Pacific.
Final thoughts
I will take a break from this series to break-up the material and to avoid reader fatigue, but I will return soon with pieces focusing on establishing Special Operations Command as its own “branch” of the “integrated” and “focused, balanced force”, along with the national economy and industrial base and, finally, our diplomatic pathways for ways to “harden” ourselves and prepare for a challenge we all pray never comes.
Importantly, to do this and deliver such outcomes, Australia will need to have an honest conversation about how we view ourselves and what our own ambitions are. Is it reasonable for Australia to position itself as a “middle” or “regional” power in this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment?
Equally, if we are going to brand ourselves as such, shouldn’t we aim for the top tier to ensure we get the best deal for ourselves and our future generations?
If we are going to emerge as a prosperous, secure, and free nation in the new era of great power competition, it is clear we will need break the shackles of short-termism and begin to think far more long term, to the benefit of current and future generations of Australians.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
