Post-crisis force: Sharpening the tip of the spear with a new-look Special Operations Command

From the deserts of north Africa to the jungles of south-east Asia and, more recently, across the Middle East and parts of central Asia, Australia’s special forces proved to be early pioneers in the burgeoning, clandestine field of special operations.

Among them, the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), the two Commando Regiments, the Special Operations Engineer Regiment, the Navy’s Clearance Diving Teams and the most recent addition, the Air Force’s Joint Terminal/Close Combat Attack Controller teams provide a robust and highly capable “tip of the spear”, but disparate force capable of responding to a host of contingencies at home and abroad.

However, the conflicts of the past three decades that have predominately focused on counter-insurgency against militant groups will be fundamentally different to those of a post-crisis era, where we will be competing against peer or near-peer competitors capable of countering a number of our traditional advantages.

As with the broader Australian military in a post-crisis world, the rise of peer and near-peer competitors across the Indo-Pacific will require a fundamental rethink and restructuring of the nation’s special operations forces to maximise our advantages and introduction of new technologies and capabilities while offsetting any adversarial advantages.

This isn’t to say we throw the baby out with the bathwater as it were; rather, it is about playing to our strengths while leveraging proven models and the series of new, game-changing capabilities to be integrated into the future force.

I would like to clarify and preface that what is being proposed is very firmly with in the context of the broader hypothetical thought experiment that is the bedrock of this series.

The fourth service – Joint Capabilities Command

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As part of the broader tactical and strategic realignment proposed as part of the restructuring and reprioritisation of the Australian armed forces in the aftermath of a major power conflagration in our region, establishing Special Operations Command as its own unique “branch” and provides the organisation with the agency and scope to establish itself as a truly multi-domain “force multiplier”.

This marked shift would see Special Operations Command move out of the “big Army” where it currently sits with an equivalent status of Army Forces Command, Commander Australian Fleet and RAAF Air Command towards a singular focus to raise, train and retain special operations forces drawn from across Army, Navy and Air Force (as is currently the case) to conduct special operations across the respective domains.

In simple terms, this would see the Navy’s Clearance Diving Teams and Air Force’s Joint Attack/Close Combat Air Controllers under No. 4 Squadron folded into the broader “joint command” organisational structure that would become the new Special Operations Command, with the special operations commander Australia to report to chief of joint capabilities (in a newly elevated role comparable to the other service chiefs) while rounding out Australia’s Defence staff in a similar manner to our British counterparts.

This formalisation of Joint Capabilities Command and the relocation of Special Operations Command within this organisation is just part of the broader realignment of the nation’s special operations forces designed to maximise the capability and range of options presented to Australian policymakers in an era of great power competition and multipolarity.

A new-look force – focused on the future and specialties

Importantly, as previously stated, this isn’t about throwing the baby out with the bathwater, with the Army’s existing special operations forces, namely the SASR, Commando regiments and Special Operations Engineer Regiment to remain as is within the broader command structure of Special Operations Command and the broader Joint Capabilities Command.

Army’s special operations forces would see an expansion to incorporate the creation of new Raider regiments designed with a singular focus: to be inserted behind enemy lines and cause utter chaos for peer and near-peer competitors. These forces would complement the role provided by SASR and a slight reimagining of the Commando regiments towards a hybrid of the roles conducted by the US Army’s Green Berets and the US Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment.

For the Navy’s special operations forces, the Clearance Diver Teams, split between the East and West Coast, respectively, this broader realignment would see a major restructuring and reorientation of the unit, to transform the Clearance Diver Teams into Australia’s Special Boat Service, combining the existing specialisations in maritime tactical operations (including maritime sabotage), mine countermeasures and underwater battle repair into a single force.

This restructuring and refocus would serve to provide Australia with a specialised maritime-focused special operations force, a critical capability the nation will need as a maritime-focused nation (particularly during wartime) when support for large-scale amphibious operations, along with maritime security operations for commercial shipping operations.

However, by far the largest realignment and restructuring of Australia’s special operations forces will directly impact the components provided by the Royal Australian Air Force, namely the Joint Attack/Close Combat Air Controllers attached to No. 4 Squadron.

While the Air Force would retain the responsibility for raising and training Joint Attack/Close Combat Air Controllers capability, these would be drawn from each of the forces across the restructured Special Operations Command and returned to their respective units once the specialised training had been completed. This would then result in No. 4 Squadron being reshaped into a Special Tactics Squadron dedicated to special operations aeromedical support akin to the US Air Force’s Pararescue Jumpers.

Pararescue Jumpers proved to be invaluable during the recent conflicts in the Middle East and central Asia, even in areas with some element of integrated air defence system and would provide decision-makers with the confidence that the tip of Australia’s spear could remain in the fight for protracted periods of time across the Indo-Pacific.

The second major realignment of the Air Force’s contribution to the nation’s special operations capability is the consolidation and expansion of the 171st and 173rd Special Operations Aviation Squadrons to provide all of the aviation and airlift operations for the nation’s special forces capabilities, including rotary and fixed-wing airlift and close air support.

Special Operations unique aviation requirements necessitate an indigenous airlift capability designed and equipped to fulfil the specialised and often clandestine roles at the core of the special operations mission set without detracting from the broader airlift mission and capabilities of the “big Air Force” and would serve to fundamentally enhance the holistic national response to a range of regional and domestic contingencies.

Finally, rounding out this shift and consolidation in critical warfighting capability would be an expansion of the existing Special Operations Logistic Squadron into a Special Operations Support Squadron to serve as the organ responsible for the recruiting, training and support of specialist logistics, signals, intelligence, electronic and cyber warfare support capacity for the entirety of the new-look “integrated, focused force” Special Operations Command.

Final thoughts

This part wraps up the final part of the emphasis on the “traditional” components of the nation’s “hard, kinetic” power in its armed forces, in the next instalment, we will take a look at the policies and stratagems needed to fundamentally transform the nation’s economy, diversify its export markets while also serving to create a globally competitive and secure industrial base.

Finally, we will take a look at some suggestions for Australia’s response to the post-crisis diplomatic situation and mechanisms for enhancing our “soft power” across the Indo-Pacific while still ensuring that there are quantifiable “hard power” returns on Australia’s investment.

I must reiterate that it is important to remember that all of these proposals are based on the aftermath of a great power conflict in the Indo-Pacific with an indecisive outcome, but have significantly impacted the capacity of the United States to act as the global hegemon, while Australia’s economic and strategic relationship with the People’s Republic of China is in tatters.

The vacuum of power created by the fallout of this conflict would fundamentally serve to upend both the regional and global order and balance of power, resulting in Australia being forced to shift our priorities from what is often called “luxury items” towards developing true national resilience, security and competitiveness in an era of multipolarity and potential for more significant conflict between established and emerging great powers.

Importantly, to do this and deliver such outcomes, Australia will need to have an honest conversation about how we view ourselves and what our own ambitions are. Is it reasonable for Australia to position itself as a “middle” or “regional” power in this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..