Experts warn Australia is rapidly becoming a ‘strategic liability’ for the United States

The past two years have been monumental for the nation’s defence and national security landscape, with the release of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program and, of course, the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet all combining to deliver a new plan for the nation’s defence capabilities.

Many have been quick to point out that if the nation’s defence depended solely on reviews, Australia would be the safest nation on earth with the most highly capable military in the world, yet we know that isn’t the case.

The major driving force for this national realignment is the rapidly deteriorating state of regional and global security affairs which have increasingly brought the realities of our new, multipolar world home to Australia’s policymakers, even if the Australian public aren’t quite there just yet.

Yet despite the rhetoric and the reviews for some, we are still dragging our feet, leaving us increasingly exposed at a time when we can ill-afford to be so vulnerable.

This “slowly, slowly” approach, ultimately, also has major impacts on our regional and global partnerships and, most importantly, our primary security relationship with the United States upon whom our strategic security is utterly dependent.

Highlighting this is former Chief of Army LTGEN (Ret’d) Peter Leahy and American Special Forces officer John Powers in a piece titled Defence flaws make Australia a ‘strategic liability for The Australian, where they detail the truly dangerous position in which we find ourselves.

Are we ready? Are we prepared?

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Beginning their scathing broadside, Leahy and Powers ask a poignant and timely question for consideration by both our nation’s policymakers and the public, particularly in the aftermath of ongoing challenges in the Middle East, Russia’s continued war in Ukraine, and mounting antagonism and hostility in the western Pacific and South China Sea by the People’s Republic of China.

The pair ask, “Are we ready? Will we be seen as a valued partner or perhaps an impediment or strategic liability as we prepare for future battlefields? Will we be ready to deal with independent national tasks or will we be reliant on US capabilities to defend ourselves. Where has self-reliance gone? What sort of contribution could we make to a multinational force?”

These are all important questions worth asking and deeper consideration and conversation in the open as part of a broader national conversation about the future of the nation in the era of multipolarity and great power competition.

The pair state that while Australia has long played a prominent role in helping to maintain and expand the post-Second World War economic, political, and strategic order built by the United States, our growing complacency and lacklustre response, arguably as far back as 2009, ultimately risk the investment the United States will have in our own security.

“But fighting spirit can only take you so far. To win in battle you need real capabilities designed and prepared for the task at hand. They must overmatch enemy capabilities, be prepared to fight at short notice, have the stock levels for sustained operations and ability to absorb battlefield losses. All forces must be trained to operate as an independent national force or as part of a larger joint and combined task group,” Leahy and Powers stated.

Bringing us back in a roundabout way to the suite of reviews that the government has commissioned and now form the basis of the nation’s response to the geopolitical and strategic challenges and the force we will be left with following the complete implementation of these proposals.

Significant strategic risk

Leahy and Powers unpacked this further, saying, “To win on the battlefield, the force must dominate and defeat the enemy. Yes, we can fight smart and be prepared for new battles in grey zones, cyber and space. But in the end, war is about combat power, where air, ground and naval forces seek out an enemy and kill or capture him, seize and hold ground and repel attacks.

“Much of the criticism of the immediate state of the ADF is well founded and points to a force that is not fit for immediate combat and won’t be in better shape for some time. This is a significant strategic risk,” they explained.

These two points contrast starkly with the rhetoric in each of the government’s strategic documents, namely, the long-term emphasis on building a force capable of “deterring any adversary” without the support of the United States and the snail’s pace delivery of major programs like the comically under-gunned and overpriced Hunter Class frigates, little-to-no progress in the way of sustainable long-range, strategically relevant fires or no measurable increase in the mass of the Australian Defence Force.

Leahy and Powers unpacked this contradiction, stating, “...Defence Minister Richard Marles indicated short-term improvements to the ADF are now considered less pressing, declaring ‘Australia’s challenge lies in the future’, with investments being focused on the ADF’s next-generation capabilities and needs. You can’t have it both ways, especially when strategic guidance indicates our previous notion of ‘warning time’ has been reduced...

“Testimony from the recent Defence estimates hearings revealed that Australia’s military has a lack of long-range fire systems, armoured vehicles, a paucity of live-fire training, insufficient maintenance funding, personnel and ammunition shortages, supply-chain fissures and a massive infrastructure backlog,” the pair explained further.

This ultimately results in major capability shortfalls and the dangerous predicament we now face, with Leahy and Powers explaining, “Our ADF is stretched too thin and not fully equipped to meet all future potential missions. There was a time our ‘niche’ defence force was structured and equipped for regional and disaster relief contingencies – those days are gone. To be a viable force today, the ADF must be a robust and capable force. Regrettably, those days have passed. We are a liability to ourselves and a strategic liability to our allies.”

Correcting this predicament requires a dramatic shift in the government and the public’s attitude and response to these challenges, with Leahy and Powers issuing a call to action for the Australian government and the public, with the pair stating, “Government must restore the ADF’s combat readiness to deter and defend us now rather than putting it off into the future. If it does not, we will remain a strategic liability to ourselves and our allies – possibly losing not just the first battles but the war.”

Final thoughts

The reality is, Australia has always had to balance its roles as a “loyal deputy” whether to the British Empire or, more recently, with the United States with its own national interests in remaining and maintaining its role and capacity as an “anchor nation” to maintain the regional balance of power and stability.

Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “Peace Dividends” and the “End of History” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.

Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker, and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.

But it isn’t too late if we pivot now and accept the reality of the world and the region as it is, rather than how we would wish it to be, or as the US Marines say, “embrace the suck”.

Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy and it will require the whole-of-nation effort to put its shoulder behind the effort, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.

Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost will be too devastating to comprehend.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..