Australia, extended US deterrence and the nuclear question

The advent of the atomic age in the dying days of the Second World War radically and irrevocably reshaped the global balance and understanding of power, where once “Old World” European empires could call on the vast manpower resources of their colonial holdings, America, itself a former colonial asset, stood unrivalled as the world’s only nuclear power.

While we know that reality would ultimately unravel following the successful Soviet test of a nuclear weapon in 1949, followed in quick succession by the United Kingdom, France and eventually, the People’s Republic of China, India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons, for all their devastating potential, managed to keep the peace.

Thanks in large part to the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” or MAD, the Cold War that followed the horrors of the Second World War would be largely kept below the threshold of direct kinetic conflict between the liberal democratic and capitalist Western world, led by the United States and the Marxist-Leninist communist bloc led by the Soviet Union.

While the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union would be marked by a period of peace, prosperity, and stability across the globe, nuclear disarmament really didn’t quite catch on and far from the “End of History” we were promised, we now confront a hotly contested and volatile geopolitical and strategic environment.

For Australia, the “extended” US nuclear umbrella, provided by the three legs of America’s nuclear triad made up of submarine and land-based ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable bomber aircraft, has served as the unwritten backbone of the nation’s security guarantee and continues to provide Australia with protection under this strategic umbrella.

However, it isn’t all sunshine and roses, with growing concerns about not only the commitment of the United States to maintaining the global order but also its capacity to maintain it in an era of mounting domestic and international challenges, least of all, continuing concerns about a prospective second Trump administration.

Reigniting this debate is The Sydney Morning Herald’s political and international editor, Peter Hartcher, in a piece provocatively titled If Trump returns to the White House, Australia may need its own nukes which echoes shifting trends identified by polling conducted by the Lowy Institute in 2010 and again in 2022, highlighting a growing shift in Australian public perception and attitude towards Australian nuclear weapons.

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Setting the scene, Hartcher stated, “We very rarely talk about it, but Australia has lived under the protection of the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ since the 1960s. The umbrella, however, has developed big holes. Behind the scenes, Australian and US officials quietly have started talking about the problem, and should again next week when Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong and Defence Minister Richard Marles meet their US counterparts for the annual AUSMIN consultations.”

Our ’little known’ strategic foundation

As Hartcher established, America’s nuclear arsenal, along with the vast array of conventional capabilities the United States can call to bear, is at the very foundation of Australia’s enduring national security doctrine and has been since the Fall of Singapore in 1942 when Australia looked across the Pacific to America for support during the height of the Second World War in the Pacific.

Yet for the central role America’s extended nuclear umbrella plays in Australia’s defence and national security, few Australians outside of small circles in the political, academic, and military classes are aware or acknowledge the importance of the strategic deterrent.

Hartcher highlighted this, quoting Kelsey Hartigan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, who states, “Australia is unique among US allies in that it has largely preferred not to discuss US extended nuclear deterrence commitments publicly.”

While the public conversation has shifted in recent years, particularly following the announcement of Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom as part of the AUKUS trilateral agreement, few Australians truly seem to comprehend the guarantee provided by the US, with potentially devastating consequences.

Hartcher is, of course, referring to the possibility of a second Trump presidency and the ensuing impact Trump’s trademark “transactional” approach to alliances and strategic partnerships could have on Australia’s national security and defence capabilities, particularly in light of recent comments made by former Chief of Army Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Peter Leahy AC who highlighted that Australia is fast becoming a “strategic liability” to the United States.

“We’d rather not even think about it, but as the world grows more dangerously uncertain, is the umbrella still extended protectively over Australia? Some of the foremost US experts today say it’s not. This includes some of the people who’d potentially be advising a future president on how to act in the event of a crisis,” Hartcher posited.

This goes back to an age-old strategic calculation that can be best summarised by asking, for American decisionmakers, is Sydney worth New York or Los Angeles, particularly when no major US city or government, for that matter, is actively preparing for the possibility of nuclear exchange? A similar question British, French, and others asked during the Cold War, ultimately resulting in them pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs or nuclear sharing programs to secure their national interests.

Quoting Elbridge Colby, Hartcher stated, “This observation has a commonsense quality. No US city is preparing for possible nuclear attack. So the US is not contemplating taking the risk involved in defending its allies ... Could it be there is no real risk of nuclear strike on any US ally? It’s actually a time of greater risk than at any since the end of the Cold War...

"China has built 300 new nuclear silos in the past few years and the Pentagon estimates that, at its current rate, it could have 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030. And Russia is developing entirely new nuclear weapons systems,” Hartcher stated further.

Ultimately, this raises some important questions for both Australia and regional partners like Japan and South Korea, regardless of who wins the US election in November as the US itself faces a host of domestic challenges that only compound the pile on of the deteriorating geopolitical situation.

Fears that the US umbrella is ‘no longer enough’

This question ultimately also increases strategic and tactical anxiety among US partner nations that depend on the US nuclear umbrella as the foundation for their own national security.

Whether in Europe or in the Indo-Pacific, the growing risk of confrontation, coupled with increasing rates of nuclear weapons expansion and modernisation in revisionist powers including the People’s Republic of China, Russia and North Korea, only serves to reinforce this reality and for Australians in particular, ramp up the long held and ingrained sense of strategic anxiety that has dominated our policy making since the earliest days of the nation.

Hartcher stated, “They fear the current American umbrella is no longer enough; they are seeking more protection. And all of this is happening with a conventional US president in the White House. Joe Biden has been firm in supporting US allies worldwide.

“In the event of a return of the doctrine of ‘America First’ with a recrudescent Trump, uncertainties for US allies would only escalate. Would anyone seriously expect a president operating under the rubric of ‘America First’ to risk sacrificing New York for Berlin, or San Francisco for Seoul, or Miami for Melbourne?” he asked.

While I will leave Biden’s pointed warning to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the weekend where he warned that Israel should not expect the US to bail them out of any conflict in the Middle East, it is worth at least mentioning in passing and asking, why not apply the same analysis to the Biden administration given the rhetoric around the “adults” once again being in charge?

Hartcher does articulate the impact of this growing strategic anxiety, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, stating, “Among US allies in the Indo-Pacific, South Korea is most immediately exposed because of a bellicose North Korea. Japan is next most vulnerable; its air force scrambles to intercept Chinese air force intrusions at an average rate of every second day. Tokyo has announced a doubling of its defence budget but has no nuclear capability of its own.”

Bringing us to some detailed analysis conducted by The Lowy Institute in 2010 and 2022 which highlighted a slow but continued shift in the thinking of the Australian public’s attitudes towards Australian nuclear weapons.

Lowy’s question asked in 2010, “If some of Australia’s near neighbours were to begin to develop nuclear weapons, would you then be personally in favour or against Australia also developing nuclear weapons?”

To which nearly 65 per cent of respondents were “strongly against” Australia pursuing nuclear weapons, while 21 per cent were “somewhat against”, meanwhile, 12 per cent considered themselves “somewhat in favour” and 4 per cent were “strongly in favour” of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, just 12 years later, when asked “Thinking now about Australia’s defence. Would you be in favour or against Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future?” in 2022, just 39 per cent of those asked were “strongly against” Australia acquiring nuclear weapons, while 24 per cent were “somewhat against”.

Most interestingly, 25 per cent were “somewhat in favour” while 11 per cent were “strongly in favour” of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons.

It would be interesting to see how this trend has changed today and the attitudes of the Australian public towards acquiring, or at the least having a nuclear weapons sharing program similar to some NATO members with the United States, the United Kingdom or other partner nation.

Equally, it raises questions about the expansion of AUKUS to include a nuclear weapons sharing arrangement or the joint fielding of nuclear weapons in Australia as a means of providing our own “nuclear umbrella” in the event of limited US capacity.

Final thoughts

While much emphasis and stock has been placed in the “strategic deterrence” capability to be delivered by the AUKUS submarines, Australia risks putting all of our eggs in a single basket and the same would be true for a credible nuclear deterrent.

As a nation, we seem to be forgetting or perhaps overlooking that in order to secure our own interests, regardless of the status of our “great and powerful” friend/s, we need to have a scalable and balanced approach to, as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Males described, “deter any nation” against hostile actions against Australia or her interests.

Ultimately, this means investing more, not only in our defence capabilities but our capacity for self-reliance and resilience as a nation to ensure that we have the industrial, economic, and political capital necessary to defend our nation against a host of potential adversaries, ranging from state-based actors through to more asymmetric threats.

Only by enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power in the Indo-Pacific through the incorporation of great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic, and military capability can we be assured that our interests are secure.

To do so, we will need to shift the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “she’ll be right” and “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” to capitalise on the unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation and secure our future to the benefit of all Australians.