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If you’re a tinpot dictatorship looking for a security guarantee from Iran or Russia, you might be reconsidering your choices. With Israeli strikes on Iranian-aligned terrorist leaders, and Ukrainian troops inside Russia, a bad start to the month for a handful of the world’s dictators is only getting worse.
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“Remember to fill up your car,” Defence Connect’s government affairs manager Steve Kuper texted me. Logical advice, given that Israel killed Hamas’ chairman inside of Iran. Surely, chaos in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz would resume once again.
After all, the killing came hours after Israel targeted a Hezbollah commander inside of Lebanon. Not only would Iran be forced to retaliate in response to a violation of its borders (that is - if it still wants to be perceived as a regional power), but it would have to respond as a security guarantor for Lebanon, Syria, and the remnants of the Hamas-led government in Gaza.
Western markets braced for impact. Oil prices jumped US$2 a barrel assuming a resumption of Iranian-Israeli hostilities, but it never came.
Conventional international relations theories would dictate that Iran needed to respond to maintain its place in the global order. Often, as was the case during the United States during the Cold War, an actor would engage in conflict to maintain military credibility among its allies. After all, when their credibility erodes too far, nations – both allied and otherwise – stop abiding by the guarantor’s rules.
With silence from Tehran, Iran’s credibility among its allies has been eroded. Traditional scholarship in this field has identified that the primary concern of a nation at risk of war is alliance abandonment, a feeling no doubt top of mind for Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar al-Assad. Platitudes and overtures of shared interests are not enough to alleviate the concerns of an ally worried about war.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that Iran won’t respond. Though if previous responses are an accurate measurement of Iranian military capability such as the use of Shahed drones to attack Israel (which are slow enough to be shot down with small-arms fire), Iran’s response will be seen by their allies as toothless and performative.
When a security guarantor’s credibility dips, they lose control of their backyard. To see this in action, Western observers need look no further than Russia’s waning influence and the state of affairs within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Border hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia have increased in frequency since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with the Azeris incessantly goading the Russian-backed Armenian military. Meanwhile, two CSTO nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, had a series of border clashes in 2022.
Russia’s ability to uphold stability for its allies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia will only continue to fall, as it has been revealed that Ukrainian troops are 30 kilometres deep into the Kursk region with tens of thousands of Russian citizens being evacuated.
Looking further afield, in Venezuela, opposition groups have continued to protest the re-election of Chavez successor Nicolas Maduro. While Maduro claimed an election victory with 51 per cent of the vote, opposition groups led by Edmundo González Urrutia produced evidence of a resounding opposition victory, producing evidence of till receipts and voting totals. The US has reportedly offered Maduro amnesty in exchange for stepping down.
Doomsdayers, anti-Semites and Russophilic extremists will disagree – but it’s been a bad month for the world’s dictators, and we’re only two weeks in. The international relations markers are there for a continued and rapid decline in the influence of Russia and Iran. And with such rapidly declining military credibility, fewer and fewer nations will care to tiptoe and play by their rules in the Middle East, Central Asia and South America.
