No guarantee: US warned access to airbases may be limited, but they have options, we don’t

The advent of offensive and defensive air power in the waning days of the First World War would kick-off a technological arms’ race that, in less than 50 years, would see military aircraft evolve from simple wood and canvas constructs to become supersonic and stratospheric-scraping technological marvels.

Not content with an array of land-based aircraft, man, in his ever-present desire to push the boundaries, developed ship-based aircraft designed to extend the range and reach of combat airpower across the world’s oceans.

Meanwhile, airpower, as a tactical and strategic doctrine, really came into its own during the Second World War as close air support, air superiority, and strategic bombing emerged, driving the rapid evolution of aircraft and operational concepts through which they would operate, continuing to this day in many ways unchanged despite the progress of technology.

For Australia, an early adopter of airpower during the First World War, the contemporary Royal Australian Air Force has become a lean, integrated, and networked “fifth-generation” fighting force – combining stealth and non-stealth combat aircraft, powerful early warning and intelligence gathering aircraft, and long-range airlift – providing the nation with the core of what the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and supporting Integrated Investment Program (IIP) described as “expeditionary air operations”.

However, for Australia and its “great and powerful friend”, the United States, the rapid shift away from a monopolar world towards a highly competitive, multipolar world presents peer and near-peer competitors and a growing number of nations less willing to host foreign airpower in the event of conflict.

Highlighting this uncomfortable reality, Major General Christopher Niemi, commander of the USAF Warfare Center said, “As an air force, we are learning that we are all going to be on the front lines ... The USAF no longer has the luxury of projecting power from sanctuary bases.”

Where the United States differs from Australia, however, is the US Navy. What I hear some of you ask, how is the US Navy relevant here? Well, two words: aircraft carriers.

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Aircraft carriers provide American decisionmakers with a host of platforms, deployed across the globe that can project airpower at a moment’s notice to protect and promote America’s interests and, by extension, global security in a world where access to established airbase and airport infrastructure maybe limited or completely denied.

How can we have expeditionary air operations with no access to basing?

Despite this, Australia’s National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program have emphasised the nation’s push to develop and implement “expeditionary air operations” across the region.

At the core of this shift in doctrine and strategy is our fleet of 72 F-35A, 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and 12 E/A-18G Growler aircraft, supported by our 6 E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and command aircraft and 7 (potentially 9) KC-30A multirole tanker transport aircraft to form the basis of delivering “expeditionary air operations”.

Limited number of platforms aside (we’re still waiting to see whether the remaining 28 F-35s to be procured as part of AIR 600 will come to fruition), the geographic size and complexity of Australia’s operating environment, coupled with the limited amount of airbase infrastructure across northern Australia, presents a significant barrier to sustainable air combat operations in the Indo-Pacific.

Indeed the IIP stated, “Modernisation of airpower capabilities across the region has resulted in a need for more survivable and potent air domain capabilities that can operate at longer ranges ... The Integrated Investment Program includes investment of AU$28–$33 billion (US$18.72–22.06 billion) in capabilities that will enable Air Force to undertake expeditionary air operations to project force into our primary area of military interest.”

Further to the air platforms responsible for the core of this combat airpower, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles told media and industry leaders at the National Press Club: “The Royal Australian Air Force will acquire longer range missiles for the Joint Strike Fighters, the Super Hornets and the Growlers. These will variously include: the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile – Extended Range. Work will also continue on the development of hypersonic air-launched weapons for employment on the Super Hornets.”

Yet despite these factors, the Australian government (and successive ones at that) continue to emphasise and prioritise a strategy that we can’t hope to fully implement with any great effect, even with the host of advanced, long-range munitions expected to be fielded (in small numbers) in coming years.

This also raises the question about the capacity of the Royal Australian Air Force to provide meaningful and sustained combat air operations in support of Australian land and naval assets operating in the region and away from the protective air umbrella of mainland Australia, and that provided by US Air Force assets deployed throughout the region.

Rather, it depends on the belief that the US Navy, and to an extent the US Marine Corps, will be able to provide such air combat capability simultaneously to both US and Australian forces, should it be required.

In essence, we are asking for everything, while delivering marginal benefits at best. If it sounds like wishful thinking, don’t worry, you’re not the only one.

So how do we solve this problem?

We all know the answer, we just don’t want to admit it

If people were expecting my answer to that last question to be aircraft carriers, you’d be right, straight to the top of the class.

Before the anti-carrier crowd sound off with the cries of cost, time to delivering capability, personnel restrictions and implications, and detracting from the range of other capabilities we are rolling out under the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, here are some important historical facts.

Australia is one of only four nations to deploy an aircraft carrier to conflict. Australia rapidly stood up an aircraft carrier capability (including two aircraft carriers HMAS Sydney and HMAS Melbourne) in five years and has, in plain sight, been quietly building capability, even through osmosis and even if we don’t have a “carrier” of our own.

Don’t believe me? Throughout the recent Exercise Pitch Black 2024, Italy’s deployment of their aircraft carrier ITS Cavour provided Australian observers with a real-world capacity to watch and learn carrier operations on a vessel broadly the same size as Australia’s own Canberra Class LHDs.

This is but one example.

Bringing us to the next example, of Australia working with the United States Marine Corps to build and maximise “interchangeability” between the respective F-35 fleets of both parties.

US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel and commanding officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 214 Robert Guyette stressed the importance of interchangeability, saying, “Interoperability is two different organisations figuring out ways to work together; interchangeability means the entire allied F-35 force can pool parts, maintainers, weapons, tactics – and now pilots and aircraft – to accomplish any mission.”

It is this last part, particularly the “pilots and aircraft” point that raises questions about just how “behind” the curve Australia actually would be in terms of standing up an F-35B capability.

LTCOL Guyette and his executive officer, Major John Rose, added, “Our formations are completely blended, and our pilots pull the same lessons learned from this incredibly realistic training. When the XO and I flew in the RAAF F-35As, we spent zero time briefing procedural differences in execution, because we have been adhering to the same standards as the RAAF from day one.”

Meanwhile, Wing Commander Andrew Nilson, commanding officer of No. 75 Squadron added, “The most impressive aspect of the exercise has been the depth of interoperability and interchangeability between our two nations. It was a further demonstration of our cooperation that Marine Corps pilots were able to fly RAAF F-35A aircraft during the exercise, allowing the RAAF to share and learn tactics, techniques and procedures at a level of complexity that has truly tested the F-35’s capability."

WGCDR Nilson expanded on this, saying, “RAAF and USMC crews have conducted cross-platform maintenance work and the aircrew have conducted complex training sorties using the most contemporary shared tactics in mixed RAAF and USMC formations of F-35A and F-35B aircraft”, effectively debunking the costs and complexity arguments often cited by opponents to Australia operating both the F-35A and F-35B variant.

So it begs the question, is it worth Australia working with the US Marines and the UK Royal Navy to accelerate the training and initial cross-decking of allied F-35Bs on Australia’s own upgraded Canberra Class vessels and across the US Navy fleet to build a clearly needed Australian capability before we need it and can’t stand it up quickly?

Final thoughts

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the sociopolitical and economic impact such rationing would have on Australia’s standard and quality of life.

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically, and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

At the forefront of this is the nation’s seemingly declining capacity to defend itself both independently and in concert with our regional and global partners, raising an important question worth asking: If we don’t take our own defence seriously, how can we expect anyone else to?

Ultimately, this comes back to the government’s shift away from a “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force” as championed in the Defence Strategic Review and the foundational problem that is our lack of clearly defined role and objectives for our own Defence capabilities.

In the maritime domain, this is of paramount importance as identified by David Uren, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, that “two-thirds of Australia’s exports by value and a little over 40 per cent of its imports by value travelling through the Indonesian archipelago. About 6 per cent of exports go east across the Pacific Ocean to New Zealand, the Pacific islands and North or South America, while about 13 per cent of imports come from the east”.

Uren added, “Only about 4 per cent of Australia’s maritime trade travels west across the Indian Ocean without going through Indonesian waters, bound for India, the Middle East or the Suez Canal. Of the Australian exports that enter Indonesian waters, about 73 per cent are headed for North Asia (principally iron ore and LNG), while 17 per cent have destinations in Southeast Asia, and 10 per cent are en route for India, the Middle East or Europe. Among the imports coming through the Indonesian straits, about 11 per cent come from North Asia, and a little over 40 per cent from each of Southeast Asia and Europe.”

Importantly, no one has said that defending the nation in this era of renewed and increasingly capable great power competition will be cheap or easy and we have to accept that uncomfortable reality, because the alternative outcome is infinitely worse.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..