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Though Israel has managed to moot the response of its regional adversaries in Lebanon and Iran, the risk of multi-theatre ground operations remains too high for the manpower constrained 9-million-person country. In Australia, it prompts the question, when does reliance on qualitative superiority become a risk?
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Over the weekend, more than 100 Israeli jets struck Hezbollah positions in Lebanon after receiving information that the group was preparing to launch strikes against intelligence and military sites in Israel.
Hezbollah responded to the pre-emptive strike with 320 rockets and guided munitions of its own, publicly praising that the “first phase” of its military operation had been a resounding success.
Though, Israeli sources have hinted that the number of drones and rockets fired at Israel was closer to 200 – and claimed that it had not suffered any substantial military losses: “In contradiction of the claims by Hezbollah, there was no damage to IDF bases, not in the north and not in the centre,” IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said.
The seemingly mooted response comes less than a month after Israel killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh at an apartment in Tehran with what has been speculated as a smuggled explosive device. Despite prompt vows of “harsh punishment” from the Iranian regime, the world continues to nervously wait and see.
Perhaps it was the failure of the 300 drones and missiles launched towards Israel earlier this year in retaliation for the strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that has stayed the hand of the Ayatollah this month, or even the threat of mutually assured destruction.
Though, what has been clear is that the IDF still maintains a qualitative advantage over its adversaries. Though can a small, 9-million-person nation protect their borders ad infinitum through technological innovation alone?
Given limited manpower, IDF General Itzhak Brik is pessimistic over Israel’s ability to not only to protect its borders from hostile neighbours, but even secure victory just in the isolated Gaza strip.
“Halevi did not address the ground forces or plan to expand it after the reduction of six divisions over the past 20 years. The lack of such an order of battle will not enable victory in Gaza,” he wrote in a recent opinion piece for The Jerusalem Post.
“What will happen in a regional war where ground forces will have to fight in six areas simultaneously? The next pogrom awaits us in Judea and Samaria, where there will inevitably be a spillover into Israel.”
Manpower is an often-cited concern among Israel’s national security thinkers. For Dr Eado Hecht and Professor Eitan Shamir in the Algemeiner, “The continuing inability of the IDF to realise the goals of the current war is mainly the result of a lack of ready and available manoeuvring units, a lack that military technology cannot compensate for no matter how good it is.”
No matter how good it is
Australia and Israel are different countries. Israel’s strategic reality since 1948 is that it has faced regular existential crises at the hand of its neighbours. Though, both are wealthy and have relatively small populations.
Australia cannot fall into the trap that assumes technology can replace manpower. As is clear in Gaza, there is no technological alternative that can be deployed to maintain effective control over large population centres or technology that is as adaptable or versatile as the human.
There is a risk that qualitative advantage can breed complacence, and Australia must avoid it at all costs.
