Did we really ‘lose’ our 10-year warning time? Or did we waste it?

For much of Australia’s history, our relationship with the strategic reality of the Indo-Pacific has been viewed through two distinct lenses, the first being our relationship with a strategic benefactor in a larger, “great and powerful friend” and the second being our independent capacity to defend ourselves until said friend could arrive to help.

After the dust had settled following the end of the Second World War in the Pacific, Australia recognised that it would need to take a grand hand in defending and promoting its own interests, lest we once again find ourselves “abandoned” by an overstretched, under-resourced security benefactor.

With the stinging memory of the British routing at Singapore in early-1942 still ringing in the ears of both the nation’s leaders and the Australian public alike, the nation shifted towards a policy of “Forward Defence”, embracing a more proactive approach to engaging with and being present in the region, with much of the focus on Southeast Asia.

Embracing this policy of “Forward Defence” saw the nation take an active role in seeking to stem the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia, engaging in the Konfrontasi, the United Nations mission in Korea and ultimately, the US-led Vietnam conflict which would bring about the end of “Forward Defence” as waves of Australians protested what was widely perceived to be a war of “US imperialism”.

As Gough Whitlam delivered his campaign promise to bring Australian troops home, the nation’s defence policy was largely left in a state of disarray, that is until Paul Dibb’s 1986 review of the nation’s defence capabilities, culminating in The 1987 Defence of Australia Defence White Paper, which would continue to shape the nation’s defence posture and capabilities well into the 21st century.

The 1987 Defence White Paper saw a number of key priorities emerge as the nation shifted its priorities away from sustained presence, power projection and “Forward Defence” towards a continental focused strategy designed to secure the “Sea-Air Gap” across our northern approaches and an increased focus on building Australian defence industry to deliver capability outcomes for the Australian Defence Force.

Each of these factors, however, could only exist as a result of the proposal of a 10-year “warning window” in which the nation could develop sufficient capability to deter and defeat an attack against the nation’s interests. So powerful was this concept of a 10-year “warning window” that even current Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has frequently cited the fact that this “warning time” no longer exists.

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To best summarise it, Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith explained in an analysis for ASPI, titled Deterrence through denial: A strategy for an era of reduced warning time, “The concept had its origins in the Strategic Basis documents of the early 1970s, which noted that it would take many years for any regional country to develop the substantial military capabilities required to sustain major operations against Australia. Within our region, no nation had ‘the ships, aircraft and transportable forces that would be necessary to launch and sustain an effective assault upon Australia’.”

But if our warning time “no longer exists”, as we have been warned, and the Australian Defence Force is in the atrocious shape it currently is in – with the oldest Navy surface fleet in its history, a boutique, short-range Air Force and an Army that is too small to fully capitalise on the wealth of new capabilities it is in the middle of integrating – did we actually “lose” our warning time, or did we waste it?

A little trip down memory lane

If we were to look back 10 years to 2014, the world and the strategic environment in which we found ourselves was still largely dominated by the ongoing Global War on Terror with operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria the central focus points for Australian strategic policymakers.

However, that is not to say that the rise of Beijing and its increasingly assertive actions and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea, weren’t beginning to draw the attention in strategic policy circles and arguably, Beijing’s rise was ringing alarm bells even earlier with the 2009 Defence White Paper in particular, highlighting the mounting challenges of renewed great power competition.

Indeed, in the then minister Joel Fitzgibbon’s foreword, he stated, “The biggest changes to our outlook over the period have been the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar moment; the almost two decade-long period in which the pre-eminence of our principal ally, the United States, was without question.”

This recognition by the minister was further supported in the white paper which goes on to explain the strategic implications of China’s rise and the broader realignment of the monopolar world order into a multipolar one, stating, “We will, however, see changed strategic power relativities and an increasingly ’multipolar’ global order, driven by changing patterns of underlying economic power and political influence. Our long-term planning will have to recognise that the range of even moderately likely strategic futures is wide...

“There are likely to be tensions between the major powers of the region, where the interests of the United States, China, Japan, India and Russia intersect. As other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change ... The management of the relationship between Washington and Beijing will be of paramount importance for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region ... China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation will be increasingly characterised by the development of power projection capabilities,” the 2009 White Paper articulated.

Seeking to hedge against this potential shift in global power dynamics, the white paper called for an expansion of the nation’s defence capabilities, with Navy in particular to benefit with the planned acquisition of nine anti-submarine warfare frigates (Hunter Class), the acquisition of 12 submarines to replace the Collins Class, along with the continued acquisition of the Hobart and Canberra Class, respectively.

Air Force would continue with the acquisition of the F-35 fleet, along with the planned acquisition of the new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, Triton autonomous high-altitude, long endurance patrol aircraft, along with the troubled C-27J Spartans and two additional C-130J Super Hercules.

Finally, Army would undergo a major restructuring under Plan Beersheba to create three independent brigades, along with the acquisition of up to 1,100 light armoured vehicles (the Thales Hawkei), new self-propelled howitzers (K-9 Huntsman) and the acquisition of new Ch-47F Chinook helicopters among other capabilities.

Bar a few tweaks across the three branches, all of this sounds reasonably familiar, yet 15 years on, the Australian Defence Force has received a fraction of what was proposed as being the “minimum viable capability” necessary to defend Australia and our interests in what was largely predicted to be a continuation of the post-Cold War, “End of History”.

These capabilities were subsequently recommitted to in every subsequent Defence White Paper, Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan, with announcements following on such as the Hunter Class frigate decision in 2018, the Attack Class submarine decision in 2016, along with the Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle in 2018, the Huntsman self-propelled howitzer and Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicle in 2023.

Bringing us to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, supporting 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program which involve some tinkering around the edges as part of a broader “reprioritisation” for the Australian Defence Force, but ultimately deliver little in the way of actual material capability, not merely a handful of platforms until the early-2030s (at least).

Looking at the timelines (recent decision to accelerate capability aside – it remains to be seen if this will be the new norm) to material capability, it becomes very clear that we didn’t lose our warning time, we squandered it.

On that basis, we the Australian people deserve better, far better.

Final thoughts

Despite the rhetoric, Australians seem reluctant at best or, indeed, even oblivious at worst that the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar” and our own home, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.

Declining economic opportunity, coupled with the rapidly deteriorating global and regional balance of power and the increased politicisation of every aspect of contemporary life, only serves to exacerbate the very reality of disconnection, apathy, and helplessness felt by many Australians.

This attitude is only serving to be compounded and creates a growing sentiment that we are speeding towards a predestined outcome, thus disempowering the Australian people and, to a lesser extent, policymakers as we futilely confront seemingly insurmountable challenges with little-to-no benefit and at a high-risk/reward calculation.

Taking into account the costs and implications, it is therefore easy to understand why so many Australians, both in the general public and within our decision-making circles, seem to have checked out and are quite happy to allow the nation to continue to limp along in mediocrity because, well, it is easier than having lofty ambitions.

If both Australian policymakers and the Australian public don’t snap out of the comforting security blanket that is the belief in the “End of History”, the nation will continue to rapidly face an uncomfortable and increasingly dangerous new reality, where we truly are no longer the masters of our own destiny.

All of this combines to form a rather confronting and disconcerting outcome for our long-term national security and one that requires remedying immediately if Australia is to be positioned to capitalise on the truly epoch-defining industrial, economic, political, and strategic shifts currently underway across the globe.

After all, how can we ask and reasonably expect Australians, particularly young Australians, to put the national interest ahead of their own when the nation doesn’t seem to account for their own interests, particularly when taken to the end of its logical extension, the national interest is at its core, the individual’s interest?

Ultimately, Australia and Australians face these two concurrent yet interconnected challenges, which stand as the greatest challenges of our age, so which way, Australia?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..