Questions about the UK’s ‘great power’ status begs the question, where do we rank?

No matter the context, clear and consistent definitions are important, and on the global geopolitical stage, definitions play a central role in understanding the hierarchy or “weight classes” of power that separate the world’s nations.

The relevance of understanding these rather abstract concepts becomes increasingly important when one recognises that in many ways, the post-Second World War order, dominated by the United States and supported by the former imperial European powers, was an extension of the European-centric order of the preceding three to four centuries.

However, far from the promised “End of History”" following the end of the Cold War, over the past two decades, we have borne witness to the birth of a multipolar world characterised by multiple centres of economic, political, and strategic gravity.

Front and centre of this global shift is the rise of the Indo-Pacific, driven in large part by the meteoric rise of the world’s two emerging superpowers, the People’s Republic of China and India, coupled with the emerging power of a growing number of global and regional great powers, ranging from Indonesia to Brazil.

The emergence of this new, competitive world order is serving to dramatically reshape the global balance of power and the traditional definitions of power and hierarchy on the international stage, particularly for once global “great powers” like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and others.

For the United Kingdom in particular, formerly first among equals on the global stage, this transition, or perhaps slide down, from the global power hierarchy in the aftermath of the Second World War has been the hardest to grapple with, despite a number of attempts in recent years to reorientate, reassert and rebuild the United Kingdom’s position on the global stage as a truly “Global Britain”, backed by a reinvigorated economic, cultural and military great power, with varying degrees of success.

In the Australian context, this global and regional realignment, coupled with questions about the continuing “great power” status of our oldest economic, political and security partner, raises important questions about Australia’s own position and status in this new paradigm.

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Highlighting these questions and the intricacies surrounding the debate is a piece for Council on Geostrategy’s Britain’s World, titled To what extent is Britain still a great power? by Ben Coxon, in which he asks a number of strategic and foreign policy experts from around the world that poignant question.

Setting the scene for the question, Coxon stated, “Over the last 30 years, the world has changed drastically with the rise of new revisionist powers which threaten the free and open international order. In this new era of geopolitical confrontation it is important for the United Kingdom (UK) to protect its national interests, but British economic, technological, diplomatic and military strength is not the same as it once was.”

Brass tacks: Is the UK still a ‘great power’?

Despite its long and storied history as a “great power”, the modern conceptualisation of what constitutes a “great power” leaves a little to be desired when using that term to describe the contemporary status and position of the United Kingdom.

This definition only becomes more convoluted and difficult to pin down given the United Kingdom’s status as a recognised nuclear power, a member of the G8 group of nations, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a cultural powerhouse.

However, no nation can rest on its laurels and the historic precedent, something the first respondent to Coxon’s question, Evie Aspinall, director, British Foreign Policy Group, highlighted, saying, “If a ‘great power’ is defined as the five most influential nations in the world, then Britain is no longer a great power. If it’s defined as the top 10, then maybe the UK still remains a great power for now – but is unlikely to hold on to this position by mid-century.

“However, this is not to say Britain doesn’t remain a hugely influential global actor. The UK consistently ranks among the top in the world for soft power and the impact of institutions such as the Premier League, the Royal Family and its world-class universities have on how Britain is perceived, and how much influence the UK has internationally, should not be underestimated.”

Unpacking the declining position of the United Kingdom further is Benedict Baxendale-Smith, a researcher, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, who is quite blunt in his assessment of the UK’s position, saying, “Britain is no longer a great power, at least not in the historical sense. The intensification of global security competition has arguably redefined what it actually means to exercise influence. Where Britain was once touted as a ‘soft power superpower’ by the 2021 Integrated Review, hostile aggression and hard power capabilities actively erode the ideational framework which underpins the UK’s global influence.”

Detailing the declining contributing pillars that underpin the United Kingdom’s declining global status, Baxendale-Smith stated, “Despite Britain’s ability to project soft influence, overall standing is hampered by the myriad issues facing the armed forces, including those in force-generation, funding and sustainment. As a result, the UK may struggle to credibly deter adversaries, which is arguably the ultimate measure of influence.”

Conversely, William Freer, research fellow on national security, Council on Geostrategy, pushed back against these “decline”-focused narratives and analysis of the United Kingdom’s status as a “great power”, well, at least in part.

Freer stated, “Defining what makes a great power is notoriously difficult, open to various interpretations of national power and the character of the international system ... Individually the UK’s nuclear arsenal, its economy, the level of expenditure on and capabilities of its armed forces, its scientific/technological edge, and other elements often grouped together as ‘soft power’ may not be the third best globally, but a strong case could be made that the sum of the parts firmly places Britain as a great power.”

However, Freer isn’t without an element of doom and gloom in his analysis, saying, “The UK still possesses a potent power base with which it can maintain its position as a great power; solving some of the seemingly intractable economic problems facing Britain will be key. But this will require political leadership with fresh energy and ideas in place of what has seemed to be an approach for some time of overseeing managed decline.”

But what implications does this have in the Indo-Pacific context given the shift towards a “Global Britain”, its status as a “great power” and what it means for Australia’s position relative to our regional and global neighbours?

A ‘great power’ mindset and the Indo-Pacific context

With these points in mind, it is critical to evaluate the impact on our region, the Indo-Pacific, which requires a specific “mindset” – the “mindset“ of a “great power” and the way in which it conducts itself in the international community.

This departure from the previous explanation is something explained by John Hemmings, senior adviser at the Pacific Forum, who, in responding to Coxon’s question, stated, “Being a great power is not only an account of capability, but also includes having a geopolitical mindset. This mindset involves a willingness to defend one’s interests over the global system’s norms and rules.”

Hemmings’ definition presents a significant departure from the traditional conceptualisation of a “great power” and explains how this shapes the United Kingdom’s engagement with the world, saying, “The UK’s willingness to project power globally in defence of the free and open international order can be seen in its long-term defence of the freedom of the seas, even in the far-flung South China Sea: Britain clearly still thinks like a great power. It does not simply accept the dictates of other great powers, but rather seeks to mould the rules and shape the norms which govern the international system.”

Interestingly, taking Hemmings’ definition to its logical conclusion, Australia, with its rather paltry economic, cultural and strategic capabilities (the traditional domains of measuring a nations’ power status), could be considered a “great power” given its active attempts to project power in the region, shape the international order (albeit in a minor capacity) while actively promoting the international order, but we all know such a suggestion is ludicrous.

Bringing me to the comments made by Australia’s own Jennifer Parker, expert associate, National Security College, Australian National University, who stated, “The term ‘great power’ is increasingly tenuous in a multipolar world, and by definition is wholly subjective ... In an increasingly multipolar world, the term ‘great power’ is unhelpful in assisting nations define their place in the world.”

Going further, Parker stated, “Perhaps the question should be, what is the level of influence the UK holds in moulding the geopolitical landscape. From a security perspective, Britain’s influence remains significant. It is one of the nine nuclear-weapon states, and one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council.”

However, it isn’t without its very real limitations, particularly as a result of declining economic performance, industrial capacity and its impact on the nation, something Parker hinted at, saying, “Similarly to Australia, the UK’s investment in its military capability has not kept pace with the rising threat levels in the Euro-Atlantic, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

“This has clearly put existing capabilities under stress. However, Britain wields significant force projection capability. This is evident by its persistent Indo-Pacific presence, while providing significant support to Ukraine against Russia’s illegal invasion and undertaking operations in the Middle East.”

Building on this analysis is James Rogers, co-founder and director of research, Council on Geostrategy, who took a more esoteric look at the United Kingdom and claims both for and against its status as a “great power”, in particular he highlighted “Where the UK is weak is in terms of self-belief. Like never before, British history and the British state is questioned from within. Unless this problem is overcome, the UK will not punch at its true weight, even if it is able to deter threats to its vital interests.”

Rogers’ statement poses an important question worthy of further Australian consideration, namely the lack of self-belief inherent in Australia and perhaps best encapsulated by the nation’s “she’ll be right” attitude towards every aspect of the nation’s future, particularly in an era where the paradigm we have known is about to be upended.

Equally, the entirety of the analysis provided by the quoted experts also presents a unique challenge proposition for Australian consideration and it is something I have asked before, are Australians content with the current managed decline of the nation, or do they want something more, something better and bigger to bequeath to their children?

Because one requires a whole lot of effort for a whole lot of reward and the other requires us to continue in this direction of travel.

Final thoughts

Despite the rhetoric, Australians seem reluctant at best or, indeed, even oblivious at worst that the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar” and our own home, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.

Declining economic opportunity, coupled with the rapidly deteriorating global and regional balance of power and the increased politicisation of every aspect of contemporary life, only serves to exacerbate the very reality of disconnection, apathy, and helplessness felt by many Australians.

This attitude is only serving to be compounded and creates a growing sentiment that we are speeding towards a predestined outcome, thus disempowering the Australian people and, to a lesser extent, policymakers, as we futilely confront seemingly insurmountable challenges with little-to-no benefit and at a high-risk/reward calculation.

Taking into account the costs and implications, it is therefore easy to understand why so many Australians, both in the general public and within our decision-making circles, seem to have checked out and are quite happy to allow the nation to continue to limp along in mediocrity because, well, it is easier than having lofty ambitions.

If both Australian policymakers and the Australian public don’t snap out of the comforting security blanket that is the belief in the “End of History”, the nation will continue to rapidly face an uncomfortable and increasingly dangerous new reality, where we truly are no longer the masters of our own destiny.

All of this combines to form a rather confronting and disconcerting outcome for our long-term national security and one that requires remedying immediately if Australia is to be positioned to capitalise on the truly epoch-defining industrial, economic, political, and strategic shifts currently underway across the globe.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..