Taiwan and fallout should be our focus, warns strategic policy expert

Depending on who you ask, the world is torn between three individual flashpoints, each with the potential to plunge their respective regions into a wider, devastating conflict, but arguably, only the Taiwan flashpoint has the potential to cause the outbreak of the Third World War.

For Beijing, the renegade island democracy is a powerful and humiliating reminder of the rising superpower’s troubled and “embarrassing” history during the 19th and early-20th century, where it was the playground of foreign empires eager to exploit the wealth and prestige of the East, eventually culminating in the victory of Mao’s Revolution in 1949.

The survival and expulsion of Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek’s routed forces to the island of Taiwan, under the tacit protection of the United States, is the last embarrassing slap in the face for the Middle Kingdom following the end of the “Century of Humiliation”.

In stark contrast to the Chinese experience, for the United States, the enduring support for the self-governing Taiwanese people stands out as one of the last remaining ideological battlegrounds of the Cold War between Marxist Communism and liberal capitalist democracy although with significantly less visceral investment when compared to the Chinese experience.

Nevertheless, the enduring support for Taiwan’s sovereignty by the US serves as a major test about the enduring willingness and capacity of the United States to defend its post-Second World War global order along with the enduring legitimacy of the US as the world’s superpower of choice.

More broadly, for Australia and US allies both in the Indo-Pacific and more broadly across the globe, the potential for a Chinese annexation of Taiwan and the ensuing fallout (no pun intended) for the global “rules-based order”, as built and maintained by the United States, heralds a potentially catastrophic reality few are able to comprehend.

Despite the stakes associated with the potential conflict over the island nation, much of the media emphasis has focused (some would say rightfully so) upon the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, leaving little in the way of knowledge access for the average Australian to understand the stakes in play.

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Raising the alarm once again is the father of the “Defence of Australia” policy, Paul Dibb, in a piece for The Strategist titled As important as Ukraine is, a Taiwan war must be Australia’s biggest worry, in which he warns, “Australia must worry about either of those wars [Ukraine and the Middle East], but ultimately it’s the possible loss of Taiwan to China that could be the front-and-centre issue for our national security.”

We shouldn’t overlook the impacts of broader global conflict, but

Central to Dibb’s thesis is the reality that Australia cannot and must not view itself in isolation from the broader global events, event those as far away as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Levant, as the second order effects, namely supply chain impacts and attacks by asymmetric threats like the Houthis in and around the Red Sea and Horn of Africa have so eloquently revealed.

Rather, Dibb’s thesis is that while these are important and should be factored in, they should serve as secondary contingencies to the threats far closer to home and most directly exposed to our national economic, political and strategic interests, namely, Taiwan.

Dibb stated, “This brings us to the crucial issue of all-out military contingencies involving the survival of both countries and their differing strategic implications for Australia. In the case of Ukraine, the big question is what Australia would do if Russia’s war with Ukraine escalated into a full-blown military confrontation between Russia and NATO ... But Ukraine is not in our region of broader strategic concern in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Moreover, if the war in Europe were to escalate to include Russian attacks on neighbouring NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, it would involve high intensity land-based military conflict for which the Australian Defence Force is not structured. We could make no more than a limited military contribution.”

But what does this mean for the Taiwan scenario in the Australian context?

Well, it is the possibility for further escalation in Europe or the Middle East that presents the most significant challenge for enduring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and particularly in and around Taiwan, for the greater the distraction for the United States, the greater the incentive and enticement for Chinese President Xi to decide the risk/reward calculation now favours him.

Dibb detailed this uncomfortable and often unspoken reality, saying, “Escalated European war might create an opportunity for China to attack Taiwan. China could perhaps attack Taiwan at the same time as Russia expanded its war to neighbouring NATO countries. Although Taiwan itself is not in Australia’s area of immediate strategic interest (Southeast Asia and the South Pacific) a successful conquest of Taiwan and defeat of America by China would raise potentially first-order strategic threats to Australia, and our own survival as a fully independent state.”

While I do reject Dibb’s and, by extension, the broader status quo’s over-emphasised concern regarding the South Pacific and China’s moves in the area, instead being far more realistic about our “area of immediate strategic interest” encompassing the area between the east coast of Africa to America Samoa and then up to the southernmost islands of Japan, his point, more broadly, is well made.

This, in turn, raises significant questions about the ensuing fallout of a successful Chinese invasion and occupation of Taiwan.

The ’unmentionable’ fallout

Of particular concern for Australia is the uncomfortable and unmentionable implications of a decisive defeat of the United States should it decide to intervene and protect Taiwan’s sovereignty, something Dibb is quick to highlight.

“First, if China decisively defeated the United States in such a war, then there might be nothing to stop China from expanding southwards and establishing military bases in our immediate vicinity. And a beaten US might retract into one of its historic phases of isolationism. Australia would then be strategically isolated and without a protector. Southeast Asia and the South Pacific would effectively come into China’s sphere of influence," Dibb said.

This dramatic fallout would have devastating consequences for Australia’s economic, political and strategic security, stability and, indeed, prosperity as we confront a world radically different to that in which the majority of our population and our political leaders have ever faced.

A collapse in the US-led regional and global order would have broader impacts on the threads of regional alliance networks and stability, as the US has, for a large part, held together the globe and prevented the underlying ethnic, religious and cultural tensions that coloured the multipolar world prior to the advent of the post-World War Two era.

This reality figures prominently in Dibb’s thinking, which he explained, saying, “Second, such a shock defeat of the US would have grave consequences for Japan and South Korea. It would involve them conceding sea and air control of the East China Sea and the South China Sea to China.

“A China commanding the island of Taiwan would have military dominance over the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. A new China-centric geopolitical order would then most likely prevail throughout East Asia. Such a crisis might reasonably drive Japan and South Korea into acquiring a reliable retaliatory nuclear strike capability of their own.”

In confronting this reality, Dibb raised a troubling, and dare I say it, unmentionable impact on Australia with an equally troubling question at its core, “Australia would have to consider where its future lied under the jackboot of a dominant Beijing. Without the US alliance and our critical access to American intelligence, surveillance, targeting, weapon systems and world-beating military platforms, we would no longer have credible military capabilities. Would we then retreat into a neutral posture with only the pathetic remains of a credible military force?”

Dibb’s final question leaves us with a number of questions, not least of all, are our plans, as they stand, really designed to secure our own interests, or do we need to step up our game? Equally, does Australia capitulate in the face of rising China and reposition itself as a “loyalty deputy” to the new regional hegemon, or do we do the hard yards now and guarantee ourselves a position of economic, political and strategic security and prominence regardless of the outcome of a Taiwan conflict?

Final thoughts

Australia’s uncomfortable reality has always been dominated by its need to balance its position as a “loyal deputy” whether to the British Empire or, more recently, with the United States, with its own national interests in remaining and maintaining its role and capacity as an “anchor nation” to maintain the regional balance of power and stability.

Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “Peace Dividends” and the “End of History” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.

Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker, and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.

But it isn’t too late if we pivot now and accept the reality of the world and the region as it is, rather than how we would wish it to be, or as the US Marines say, “embrace the suck”.

Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy and it will require the whole-of-nation effort to put its shoulder behind the effort, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.

Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost will be too devastating to comprehend.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..