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Unfit for purpose: UK House of Lords committee warns of lacking in British military capability in aftermath of Ukraine

A RAF Chinook from No. 27 Squadron picks up RAF Regiment personnel from No. 51 Squadron in Scotland to carry out training as part of Exercise Tartan Tusker designed to test the Chinook Force’s ability to deploy personnel and aircraft to an unfamiliar operating area within the UK. (Source: UK Defence Image Library)

Lord de Mauley, chair of the UK House of Lords’ International Relations and Defence Committee, has launched a scathing attack following a report into the state of the British Armed Forces amid growing concerns of great power conflict.

Lord de Mauley, chair of the UK House of Lords’ International Relations and Defence Committee, has launched a scathing attack following a report into the state of the British Armed Forces amid growing concerns of great power conflict.

The United Kingdom, like many nations across the Western world, was just beginning to regain some semblance of stability following the chaos of the Brexit vote, the economic impact of the COVID-19 and a period of unprecedented domestic political chaos when Russia began its invasion of Ukraine.

For the British Armed Forces in particular, Russia’s invasion and subsequent waves of US and UK-led financial and military aid couldn’t have come at a worse time.

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This is despite a series of ambitious plans for the modernisation and restructuring of the British Armed Forces by former prime minister Boris Johnson and his “Global Britain” push, which aimed to focus the nation’s attention towards the rapidly developing multipolar world order, particularly in eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Britain’s radical approach echoed comments made by former UK defence secretary Gavin Williamson in early 2019, when he promised a “major departure and reorientation” and the first major shift in UK defence policy for the first time since the introduction of the “East of Suez” doctrine in the 1960s.

At the time, Williamson described the post-Brexit era as “our biggest moment as a nation since the end of the Second World War, when we can recast ourselves in a different way, we can actually play the role on the world stage that the world expects us to play”.

These lofty ambitions appear to have run aground, with rather disastrous results for the British Armed Forces, prompting the newly elected Starmer government to launch a Strategic Defence Review designed to conduct a “root and branch” review of the British Armed Forces to better position it to face the challenges posed by the rise of the global multipolar world.

Indeed, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said at the time, “We live in a more dangerous and volatile world. My government will forge a new clear-eyed approach to our national defences, equipping us to tackle international threats head-on while keeping the British people safe and secure...

“That’s why one of my first acts since taking office is to launch our Strategic Defence Review. We will make sure our hollowed out armed forces are bolstered and respected, that defence spending is responsibly increased, and that our country has the capabilities needed to ensure the UK’s resilience for the long term.”

Expanding on these comments was the new UK Secretary of State for Defence John Healey, who said, “At the start of a new era for Britain, we need a new era for defence. Hollowed-out armed forces, procurement waste and neglected morale cannot continue ... In response, our armed forces need to be better ready to fight, more integrated and more innovative. We need clearer accountability, faster delivery, less waste and better value for money.”

While that review has some time to run, retired Lieutenant Colonel and member of the House of Lords Lord de Mauley, chair of the UK House of Lords’ International Relations and Defence Committee, following the completion of a report into the state of the British Armed Forces titled Ukraine: a wake-up call, has revealed a startling state of affairs.

Lord de Mauley set the scene, saying, “In February 2024, two years after Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the committee launched an inquiry to draw interim lessons from the conflict and assess its implications for the UK. We identified two key lessons. First, our deterrence strategy towards Russia clearly failed. If we are to restore the credibility of NATO’s nuclear and conventional deterrence posture towards Putin, we must develop a clearer understanding of the reasons for this failure.

“Secondly, the invasion exposed significant weaknesses in both the UK’s and NATO’s military strength, and the UK’s ability to sustain large-scale warfare. Successive governments have attempted to maintain the notion of the UK as a global power, but the war in Ukraine has been a wake-up call, laying bare the gap between that ambition and reality.”

This has been a long time coming...

Compounding these issues is the revelation by a senior US general who had a pointed warning for the United Kingdoms former defence secretary, Ben Wallace: “Bottom line ... its an entire service unable to protect the UK and our allies for a decade.” This was further compounded by a series of concerning details outlined about the state of readiness of the British Armed Forces, namely:

  • The British Armed Forces would run out of ammunition “in a few days” if called upon to fight.
  • The Royal Air Force lacks the ability to defend its skies against the level of missile and drone strikes that Ukraine is enduring.
  • It would take five to 10 years for the Army to be able to field a warfighting division of some 25,000 to 30,000 troops backed by the required tanks, artillery and helicopters.
  • Thirty per cent of the UKs forces on high readiness are reservists who are unable to mobilise within NATO timelines.
  • The majority of the Armys fleet of armoured vehicles, including tanks, was built between 30 to 60 years ago and full replacements are not due for years.

Perhaps the most concerning part of this warning, the US general reportedly told Wallace, “You haven’t got a tier one [force]. It’s barely tier two [force].” This is particularly concerning for the United Kingdom when the US, Russia, China, and France are ranked as “tier one” powers, while Germany and Italy are examples of “tier two” powers.

So what exactly has the House of Lords report revealed?

Building mass and strengthening partnerships

One of the core lessons learned by all sides of the ongoing Ukrainian conflict and, even to a degree, the ongoing war in the Middle East, is the importance of mass, both in terms of personnel, material and expendable munitions in high-intensity, peer or near-peer conflict.

For the British Army in particular, these lessons do however appear to have fallen on deaf ears, at least for the time being, given the continued decline in the strength of the British Army, which, despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hovers around the 73,000 personnel mark, in stark contrast to calls by former UK Chief of the General Staff Sir Patrick Sanders who called for the British Army to grow to 120,000 personnel “within three years”.

A major contributing factor, particularly for Western nations like the United Kingdom and Australia, is the deference to high-technology platforms as a mechanism for offsetting declining personnel availability, something Australia’s own military is increasingly having to grapple with.

The House of Lords report highlighted these factors, saying, “The argument is often made that, because of the UK’s geography, the size of its land forces should be seen in the context of NATO land forces as a whole and that, in a conflict with Russia, ground forces would be provided mainly by Germany, Poland and Finland. However, Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, expressed doubts about the British Army’s ability to meet existing NATO obligations to be able to field a heavy war-fighting division within a reasonable time...

“Additionally, the use of advanced technology has at times been used to justify smaller troop numbers. The war in Ukraine, however, has shown that in a conflict between two technologically capable states, technology is not a magic bullet that can swiftly end a war. Advantages gained are often temporary as both sides engage in a game of technological one-upmanship, leading to attrition. We therefore agree with Mr Joshi’s conclusion that “technology is essential but, if both sides have it and are employing it, it does not mean that you can have small, lean, boutique forces because they will get chewed up over time’,” the report detailed further.

Lord de Mauley added further detail to these points, stating, “All in all, the evidence we heard points to the current size of the British Army being inadequate. While size is not the only measure of capability, we are concerned that the Army cannot, as currently constituted, make the expected troop contribution to NATO. We therefore question whether the British Army is prepared to meet the growing threat posed by Russia to European security.”

A central component of the United Kingdom’s strategic power, particularly in the European theatre, is its partnerships that serve to add strategic mass and an aggregate of capability across the continent that can be used to offset Russia’s traditional strength of “mass”.

These relationships also provide additional support through the combination of industrial and innovation bases that are proving increasingly critical to national security and sovereignty and the undergirding supply chains that are now coming into stark focus for many national leaders.

The report unpacked this, stating, “A resilient industrial base underpins Defence’s credibility as a fighting force. Our evidence consistently showed that the UK’s defence industry is unprepared for high-intensity, prolonged conflict due to decades of budget cuts and reduced industrial capacity since the end of the Cold War. Our witnesses strongly emphasised the role that the government should play in reversing this process.

“There is a significant trust deficit between the defence industry and the government. The defence industry has expressed the need for clear, long-term commitments to effectively increase production and meet wartime demands. The MOD needs to transition from a traditional customer-supplier relationship to one that ensures sustained collaboration, consistent follow-through on commitments, and which fosters early and transparent engagement.”

Finally, rounding out the importance of alliances and partnerships, the House of Lords report detailed, “The war in Ukraine has thrown the role of alliances at a time of war into the spotlight. Following the invasion, Russia is attempting to offset its decline in relations with the West by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key Global South countries, including India. This has allowed Russia to undermine the effectiveness of Western sanctions and avoid international isolation, while also increasing its strategic depth.”

Air superiority still critical to the fight

Despite a longstanding narrative to the contrary, particularly stemming from the environment following the end of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, the Ukrainian conflict has revealed that air superiority remains critical, particularly in the context of peer and near-peer conflict.

Recognising this, the House of Lords report articulated a growing need for the British military to take the requirement for air superiority more seriously, with the report stating, “The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of air superiority, with air defences critical to avoiding an attritional ground conflict. Under-investment has led to substantial vulnerabilities in the UK’s (and Europe’s) ability to defend itself from airborne threats. In the context of a worsening security environment, this is deeply concerning, and the new government should pay greater attention to homeland defence.”

This only becomes increasingly important given the rapid proliferation of commercially available, mass produceable autonomous and unmanned systems and loitering munitions that can be scaled from initial development in garage’s to fielding on the battlefield in months.

The House of Lords detailed, “The war in Ukraine has exposed the sheer variety of possible drone threats in a conflict scenario, ranging from disposable and commercially available drones to high-end, sophisticated ones. The UK should invest in research and development to maintain a strategic edge in drone technology (including amphibious drones), and support the rapid development of new technologies that can compete in contested environments.

“Given the pace of technological adaptations on and off the battlefield, UK Defence should place greater emphasis on spiral development and modularity to support continuous adaptation.”

Lord de Mauley rounded out the findings, saying, “Given the perilous threat environment ... the government must not miss this chance and must commit to spending more on defence and spending better.”

Final thoughts

Many of these findings seem like commonsense when set against the backdrop of mounting kinetic conflict and the potential for said conflict between the world’s great powers only serves to reinforce these realities.

In the British context, a nation with a claim to being a “major” global power, these findings must also be balanced against the growing domestic economic, political, cultural and ethnic challenges that have come to a head in recent months.

Unfortunately, the findings of the House of Lords report only serves to raise more questions than answers, while also complicating the Starmer government’s Strategic Defence Review and the individual priorities of each of the British Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, in the Australian context, we have to accept that many of the technological, doctrinal, personnel and, indeed, capability challenges are not unique to Australia, rather, they are shared often among many of our allies, in this case, like the United Kingdom.

If we are collectively to maintain the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order, we’re going to have to put our heads together to see how we can solve some of these problems in partnership with one another, rather than in a stovepipe.

Importantly, if both Australian policymakers and the Australian public don’t snap out of the comforting security blanket that is the belief in the “End of History”, the nation will continue to rapidly face an uncomfortable and increasingly dangerous new reality, where we truly are no longer the masters of our own destiny.

All of this combines to form a rather confronting and disconcerting outcome for our long-term national security and one that requires remedying immediately if Australia is to be positioned to capitalise on the truly epoch-defining industrial, economic, political, and strategic shifts currently underway across the globe.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

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