The Finnish model? Learning lessons from Europe’s ‘other’ front line

There is no escaping the reality that Russia’s ongoing and devastating invasion of Ukraine has shattered many long-held, post-Cold War myths that continue to dominate contemporary Western thinking, particularly for Europe.

This was perhaps perfectly embodied by the era of unrestricted liberalisation and “globalisation” of the global economy, resulting in a hollowing out of national economic and industrial bases, the hubristic belief that liberal democracy had once and for all triumphed over the archaic models of autocratic governance, ultimately culminating in the “End of History” as championed by US-based academic Francis Fukuyama.

Fast forward to today and we now know that the heady days of optimism and hubris have been shattered, with autocratic nations on the march across the globe and the post-Second World War economic, political, and strategic order in retreat, with the world’s formerly great imperial powers not far behind.

Across Europe, whether in the major powers of the United Kingdom, France, Germany or Italy or even the smaller yet equally consequential nations like Estonia, Latvia, Spain, Denmark, Finland or Sweden, the increasingly contested and multipolar nature of the world is presenting major challenges to the security of the European continent.

While much of the emphasis has been firmly on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine (and rightfully so), there have been efforts by the continent to confront and contain a new era of Russian aggression. Historically, there has been more than a single front to achieve this.

Front and centre of this effort is the Nordic country of Finland, which has fought a number of wars with Russia and its historic predecessor, the Soviet Union, often holding the superpower to a bloody standstill, decisively demonstrating that even a smaller, well-resourced and prepared nation can hobble a superpower.

But what lessons does a largely landlocked nation – much of which falls within the Arctic Circle – with a population a fifth the size of Australia, have to teach us and the way in which we confront our own emerging superpower and great power challengers in the Indo-Pacific?

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According to Grant Wyeth, columnist for The Diplomat and editor at Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D), writing for the Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter in a piece titled Does Finland’s “total defence” doctrine hold lessons for Australia?, the answer is quite a number.

Whole of nation v Total Defence

Recent shifts in Australia’s own defence and strategic planning have seen a dramatic pivot away from defence being siloed off from the rest of the national policy-making apparatus, where often it was viewed in isolation or a vacuum with little to no direct impact on the broader public policy making of the nation.

However, the resurgence of great power competition, namely between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, but also the increasingly “multipolar” nature of the regional and global environment has prompted many nations, including Australia, to take a far more holistic view of the intersections between defence and broader public policy making.

This, in many ways, is responsible for the shift in our defence policy beginning with the 2023 Defence Strategic Review which highlighted the importance of both "whole-of-nation" and "whole-of-government" approaches to Australia’s national security, which were subsequently reinforced by the 2024 National Defence Strategy and supporting 2024 Integrated Investment Program.

Wyeth detailed this shift, saying, “Although Australia is far from the front line of any hot war, recently Canberra has promoted an approach to security and foreign policy that, in theory at least, attempts to embody similar principles. Government rhetoric has included phrases such as “whole-of-government”, “whole-of-nation”, and using “all tools of statecraft” in the hope of developing a more effective approach to advancing Australia’s interests.”

Bringing us to the Finnish model of “Total Defence” which Wyeth summarised by describing the Finnish nation as a “nation of preppers”, resulting in a nation and a people focused on national security, saying, “This awareness motivates the country to develop plans for every foreseeable scenario. Each element of the country – from government and the private sector to civil society groups and individual citizens – is tasked with a role to play.”

This doctrine has a major impact across every aspect of the nation and population, which Wyeth detailed further, saying, “With a strong focus on the security of supply, critical sectors all have mandated contingencies to maintain vital infrastructure, the supply of energy, food and pharmaceuticals, and the country’s financial capabilities. Four times a year, politicians, business leaders and civil society organisations meet for crisis simulations.”

If this sounds familiar, that is because it does seem to have informed elements of Australia’s reinvigorated emphasis on building our national resilience, including reinforcing our supply chain vulnerabilities, dependence on foreign manufacturing and export markets and a host of other key vulnerabilities that could singularly impact the economic, political and strategic stability of the nation, let alone the impact of these vulnerabilities when combined.

Where the two nations diverge, perhaps most significantly, is in the realms of the hardening of the nation’s physical infrastructure and the mobilisation, or perhaps activation is the better term for the nation’s populace.

Wyeth said, “Public facilities such as car parks, metro stations, swimming pools and ice rinks double as bunkers and evacuation shelters. These facilities are connected to a series of tunnels that traverse subterranean Helsinki, which also allow the Finns to move military equipment undetected. Civil defence shelters are requirements of the country’s building code – and Finland currently has bunkers that can accommodate 4.8 million people (close to 90 per cent of the population).”

When it comes to mobilising the Finnish people, the nation has a well-documented and long-standing policy of national service, an issue that in Australia is often met with opinions ranging from strident support to violent opposition as typified when the Australian public vehemently opposed historic attempts to introduce conscription during the First World War and then during the contentious Vietnam War.

Wyeth said, “Finland also has mandatory military service for all men at age 18. This includes a minimum of six months of basic training – more depending on the designated role for each individual. Following this training, each man is placed in a reserve unit until they are 50 years old, or 60 for those of a higher rank. Throughout these years, men are obligated to undertake refresher exercises of at least 40 days to maintain their skills. National service is voluntary for women, but a record number are participating since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In total, close to one-third of Finland’s population can be called upon at short notice.”

This policy has very real, tangible benefits in the form of available, trained and competent personnel. It also has a more ethereal impact on the nation and its people through the creation and strengthening of a culture of national unity, pride and common direction, something Wyeth detailed further, saying, “Alongside manpower, Finland’s national service also instils a strong public sense of duty and responsibility, built on individual recognition of the stakes. It has developed a culture where personal integrity is important, good faith is intrinsic, and service is not scoffed at. The country’s national character – embodied by the term sisu – is one of stoic determination and an action-oriented mindset. It is no coincidence that the Finns consistently rank as the world’s happiest people.”

Yet at a cursory glance, it is abundantly clear that Australia is falling dramatically short of the level of preparedness and, indeed, cultural seriousness similar nations like Finland place upon the trend towards great power competition and multipolarity.

Australia’s culture of complacency

I have long argued that Australia as a nation and a people are characterised by a culture of complacency when it comes to the future of our nation, the economic, political and strategic stability and prosperity of Australia and our role in the multipolar global and regional orders, respectively.

This complacency plays out in virtually every aspect of Australian public policy making and has been our de facto cause célèbre for generations of Australians who have coasted along on the immense resource and agricultural wealth of the continent, backed by the strategic benevolence of the international order provided first by the British Empire and now by the United States.

As a result, Australia has been incredibly lucky to avoid the impact of the 20th century’s conflagrations and has effectively lulled many within the nation’s policy-making circles and the Australian public into a false sense of security, one where our policy makers have been dangerously slow and woefully unprepared to confront.

Wyeth hinted at this, saying, “While the government may have sharpened its recognition of these threats, a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to this broader concept of security still requires greater substance and conviction. Australia coasts on its natural security advantages, and a culture of complacency has flowed from this. There’s a reluctance to ask what Australians can do for their country. Or a fear of having few takers.”

This cultural malaise has only been further impacted and shaped by the growing disconnect and, indeed, despair generations of younger Australians feel about their place and opportunity in the future of the nation, raising questions about why they would willingly volunteer or step forward to defend a system they themselves feel has failed them.

Getting this cultural shift is a central part of responding to these very real challenges, as is addressing the very real concerns of generations of Australians who feel let down by successive governments that have presided over the apparent stagnation and decline of our nation and its future in the Indo-Pacific in favour of the easiest path to economic prosperity.

Wyeth hinted at this in his closing sentence, saying, “Finns consider being a Finnish citizen a compact that one must commit to and tend to. While this may seem illiberal to some in Australia, the Finns have understood that liberal democracy doesn’t defend itself. Liberalism is not freedom from responsibility, it is the freedom to be responsible.”

Final thoughts

Australia’s uncomfortable reality has always been dominated by its need to balance its position as a “loyal deputy”, whether to the British Empire or, more recently, with the United States, with its own national interests in remaining and maintaining its role and capacity as an “anchor nation” to maintain the regional balance of power and stability.

Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “Peace Dividends” and the “End of History” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.

Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker, and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.

But it isn’t too late if we pivot now and accept the reality of the world and the region as it is, rather than how we would wish it to be, or as the US Marines say, “Embrace the suck”.

Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy and it will require the whole-of-nation effort to put its shoulder behind the effort, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.

Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost will be too devastating to comprehend.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..