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Australia, as a nation, has long been caught in a Gordian knot of sorts, torn between its location in the Indo-Pacific and as a “European” nation in Asia and its status as a “loyal deputy” to both the US and Britain with challenges to this day. But what if there is a third way?
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For the entirety of much of our history, Australia’s relationship with the strategic reality of the Indo-Pacific has been viewed through two distinct, yet competing lens.
The first being our relationship with a strategic benefactor in a larger, “great and powerful friend”, historically the British Empire and more recently, the United States; and the second, the realisation that we are a comparatively small fish in a big pond.
This predicament presents the nation, its public and policymakers with a Gordian knot, in that the tension between these two realities continues to dominate the frame of reference and the solutions to the challenges we face.
In many ways, this began following the collapse of British power in the East, following Japan’s blitzkrieg-like campaign through Malaya, culminating in the surrender of Singapore in 1942, which shattered the widely-held Australian belief in British invincibility and had wide-reaching fallout that resonates to this day.
Australia’s resulting strategic anxiety levels were subsequently ramped up to 11 as it scrambled to recall its deployed troops from North Africa to defend the mainland from the rampaging Japanese war machine.
In response, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Curtin, made an impassioned plea to the Australian people to remain stalwart and defiant in the face of the coming horrors and across the vast expanse of the Pacific to the United States of America in search of a new “great and powerful friend”.
Prime Minister Curtin said in his speech to America, “On the great waters of the Pacific Ocean war now breathes its bloody steam. From the skies of the Pacific pours down a deathly hail. In the countless islands of the Pacific the tide of war flows madly. For you in America; for us in Australia, it is flowing badly. Let me then address you as comrades in this war and tell you a little of Australia...
“We looked to America, among other things, for counsel and advice, and therefore it was our wish that the Pacific War Council should be located at Washington ... But I give you this warning: Australia is the last bastion between the West Coast of America and the Japanese. If Australia goes, the Americas are wide open. It is said that the Japanese will bypass Australia and that they can be met and routed in India. I say to you that the saving of Australia is the saving of America’s west coast. If you believe anything to the contrary then you delude yourselves.”
Yet for a brief period, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Australia took a more assertive, “forward leaning” approach to its strategic posture and doctrine in the region, embracing a policy of “Forward Defence”.
While this would ultimately fall by the wayside and into the dustbin of history following the nation’s disastrous participation in the Vietnam conflict, being replaced with an emphasis on continental defence in the form of the “Defence of Australia” doctrine, the Gordian knot continued to get tighter.
Even today, despite the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program and the formalisation of our new “Strategy of Denial”, we continue to see the tension between the two factors pull the knot ever tighter.
Highlighting this reality is chancellor of the University of Queensland and a former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Varghese, in a piece for The Australian Financial Review, titled The unresolved tension at the core of Australia’s strategic policy in which he established, “The central strategic axis of the Indo-Pacific region is – and for the foreseeable future, will remain – bipolar: a competition for primacy between the US and China...
“While Australia has chosen where it sits, most of the region is determined not to choose either. They do not buy the line that they have to choose, and they certainly do not buy the line that we are engaged in an epic struggle between democracy and autocracy.”
A region at an immense cross-roads
While for some, Australia’s continued investment and commitment to continued US primacy in the Indo-Pacific is considered “premature”, in many ways, it is a continuation of our historic approach to strategic policy and posture, that being one of deference to a “great and powerful friend”.
Yet, for Varghese, this approach conflicts directly with the nation’s shift in foreign policy, which has seen a marked shift towards an acceptance of not only a multipolar global order but a multipolar regional order, seemingly at odds with the approach of our defence planners.
Varghese explained this phenomenon, saying, “There is currently an unresolved tension at the core of Australian strategic policy. On the one hand, our foreign policy embraces a multipolar future where no country dominates. Our defence policy, on the other hand, quietly conflates US leadership and US primacy, and is increasingly fixed around doing what we can to ensure the retention of US strategic primacy. That includes, it would seem, aligning our force posture to fit into the overarching US strategic objective, which is to deny China primacy by doubling down on US primacy.”
If you’re confused by this approach, don’t worry, you’re not the only one.
However, I am reminded of an old joke about the American Army during the Second World War, being best summarised as a case of, “If we don’t know what we’re doing, how can our enemy possibly know what we’re doing?”
For Varghese, this diplomatic shift towards seeking security “in Asia”, which in many ways conflicts with the defence emphasis on seeking to maintain US primacy in the region, needs, in many ways, to be far more pragmatic, saying, “But finding security in Asia was never premised on an expectation that all the countries in Asia would find common strategic ground, or that Asia could become a region devoid of competing strategic ambitions.
“Rather, finding security in Asia means finding the structures and strategic logic to create a stable and sustainable balance of power in the region. For Australia, that means finding the best means of constraining China’s ambition to recreate, at least in East Asia and the Western Pacific, the old Middle Kingdom where hierarchy was harmony, China sat at the top and other countries pre-emptively conceded the primacy of China’s interests.”
Yet perhaps most confusingly, this doesn’t mean that the future of the region’s strategic and diplomatic security and stability will develop in isolation of the broader US–China competition for primacy.
Rather, Varghese detailed that this would help shape a dramatically different region, saying, “A new strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific region is likely to take an organic form rather than the two fixed and competing alliance systems that characterised the Cold War. And while the competition for primacy between the US and China will shape its contours, a stable balance does not require any one power to hold primacy. Indeed it may well work best if no single power holds primacy.”
Further complicating this, Varghese added a further layer of complexity, saying, “There is a difference between US leadership and US primacy. US leadership signals a powerful United States that remains engaged in the region and that is the lead balancer of China. Without the US there can be no effective balancing of China.”
However, for former Department of Home Affairs secretary Mike Pezzullo, Varghese’s belief is misguided, with Pezzullo telling Defence Connect, “Where I disagree is in relation to the idea that somehow a regional security order will emerge in Asia that will constrain China’s ambitions in territorial and other respects – without that order being underpinned by US strategic primacy which means forward deployed US military capability, its lattice network of alliances and partnerships, and an effective capacity to deny and, if necessary, defeat Chinese aggression.”
This comes in large part as a result of a growing belief that while important, the US position of primacy and dominance cannot stomach a competitor, let alone a competitor that can, both on the global and regional level, actively compete with the United States, leading us back to the aforementioned policy of balancing, something, Varghese highlighted, saying, “US primacy, however, goes beyond leadership and balance. Its starting point is that the US cannot tolerate a peer competitor and its ensuing logic is that the US will therefore do whatever it takes to prevent such a competitor emerging. US global primacy is now deeply embedded in the strategic culture and national identity of the US.”
Pezzullo pushed back, saying, “I don’t understand the distinction that he makes between US leadership and US primacy. They look the same to me in functional terms. Moreover, the US is seeking to stare down the emergence of a global (not regional) competitor which potentially could become the hegemon of Eurasia through BRI, an alliance with Russia, and long-term European fecklessness. This has broader geopolitical dynamics, including in the economic security realm, where the US will continue to decouple parts of its economy [especially in sensitive supply chains] from China’s.”
Perhaps, most shockingly, is Varghese’s belief that any loss of US primacy, while “regrettable”, “does not pose an existential threat to Australia” despite the well-stated and blatant acts of aggression, hostility, economic and political coercion not only of regional partners, but also to Australia by the People’s Republic of China, based on a misguided belief that all parties seek to avoid conflict.
Contrasting this, Pezzullo added, “Make no mistake – this is a struggle for geopolitical mastery. Balance will be achieved by the extent to which crises are avoided and fault lines don’t rupture. Balance is not a steady state. It’s a turbulent one.”
Australia seems reluctant to learn from the lessons of history, after all, we’ve been here before, in the lead-up to the First and Second World Wars where well-meaning leaders believed, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo wanted peace and weren’t willing to use force to achieve their various objectives.
Cutting the Gordian knot
For those unaware, the story of the Gordian knot comes from antiquity and was tied (no pun intended) to a belief that anyone who could successfully untangle said knot was destined to “rule all of Asia”, only to come face-to-face with one of history’s greatest conquerors, Alexander the Great, who swiftly cut the knot, seemingly cementing his status as a godlike leader.
So how does Australia, in this instance, cut its own Gordian knot?
Pezzullo believes it is for Australia to play its well-established role as a trusted adviser within the broader US alliance structure, and, as he said, “If we wish to avoid being handcuffed to the US’ strategic imperative to retain primacy, we should do a better job of influencing US policy by actively engaging with it on how best to achieve the key outcome – preventing China’s emergence as the hegemon of Eurasia.”
In seeming opposition to this position, Varghese believes that Australia needs to play a larger part in shaping the organic development of the broader regional “balancing” mechanisms, without providing any form of guidance for what Australia should do with its military posture.
Bringing me back to my original point: is our third way taking a leaf out of Alexander’s book and cutting the Gordian knot to take a far more Australian-centric view of our position and role in the Indo-Pacific?
Importantly, such an approach doesn’t mean abandoning our long-standing relationship with the United States and the post-Second World War order, nor does it mean completely tying ourselves to Asia, rather it is accepting our unique position in the region and embracing it.
Doing so, however, requires a more ambitious economic, diplomatic and strategic policy where we unapologetically put our interests first and not only actively promote them, but actively commit to defending them regardless the costs.
Final thoughts
Despite the rhetoric, Australians seem reluctant at best or, indeed, even oblivious at worst that the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar” and our own home, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.
Declining economic opportunity, coupled with the rapidly deteriorating global and regional balance of power and the increased politicisation of every aspect of contemporary life, only serves to exacerbate the very reality of disconnection, apathy, and helplessness felt by many Australians.
This attitude is only serving to be compounded and creates a growing sentiment that we are speeding towards a predestined outcome, thus disempowering the Australian people and, to a lesser extent, policymakers as we futilely confront seemingly insurmountable challenges with little-to-no benefit and at a high-risk/reward calculation.
Taking into account the costs and implications, it is therefore easy to understand why so many Australians, both in the general public and within our decision-making circles, seem to have checked out and are quite happy to allow the nation to continue to limp along in mediocrity because, well, it is easier than having lofty ambitions.
If both Australian policymakers and the Australian public don’t snap out of the comforting security blanket that is the belief in the “End of History”, the nation will continue to rapidly face an uncomfortable and increasingly dangerous new reality, where we truly are no longer the masters of our own destiny.
All of this combines to form a rather confronting and disconcerting outcome for our long-term national security and one that requires remedying immediately if Australia is to be positioned to capitalise on the truly epoch-defining industrial, economic, political, and strategic shifts currently underway across the globe.
After all, how can we ask and reasonably expect Australians, particularly young Australians, to put the national interest ahead of their own when the nation doesn’t seem to account for their own interests, particularly when taken to the end of its logical extension, the national interest is at its core, the individual’s interest?
Ultimately, Australia and Australians face these two concurrent yet interconnected challenges, which stand as the greatest challenges of our age, so which way, Australia?
Do we want to be competitive, consequential and thriving, or do we want to be “steady and sturdy” in our managed decline?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
