Rewriting the rule book: Trumpism v the old world order

Human history is littered with the bones of once mighty empires that have – through conflict, disease, natural disaster or political strife – risen and fallen across the globe.

From Persia and Egypt, to Rome, France and more recently, the British Empire and the Soviet Union, the rise and fall of great powers and their regional or global empires have characterised the nature of international relations and strategic affairs since time immemorial.

It is an indisputable fact that much of the peace, prosperity, and stability of the post-Second World War paradigm came as a direct result of the US-led global order and the multilateral organisations that formed the foundation of this order.

By putting an end to the often ancient rivalries between competing imperial powers, the United States, through its post-war economic and strategic might, coupled with immense political capital, guaranteed the freedom of the seas and promoted an explosion of free trade across the globe, paving the way for the modern, interconnected global economy and period of innovation we enjoy today.

While the United States ultimately emerged as the victor over the 20th century’s other great totalitarian doctrine and regime, the Soviet Union in the early-1990s we now know would be far from the “End of History” we were promised.

Today, however, as the world has rapidly become an increasingly competitive and multipolar place, the United States is facing multiple concurrent conflicts and scenarios that are stretching the “indispensable nation” and its capacity to maintain stability across the globe.

In particular, the resurgence of Russian aggression in Europe, the ongoing conflict between Israel, Iran and its proxies, and finally, Beijing and Pyongyang’s increasing belligerence in the Indo-Pacific following recent ballistic missile tests and Beijing’s increasing provocations towards Taiwan and other Asian nations, all combine with the potential to stretch the United States to breaking point, leaving allied nations like Australia dangerously exposed and hilariously unprepared for the multipolar world.

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Adding further fuel to the fire, the disruptive nature of President-elect Donald Trump has set a proverbial cat among the pigeons, with many across the post-Second World War economic, political and geostrategic establishment catastrophising the potential impact of this second Trump administration on the global stage.

Highlighting this is former secretary of the Department of Home Affairs Mike Pezzullo in a piece titled Why Trumpism will reshape international strategic culture for The Australian.

Beginning his analysis, Pezzullo set the scene with a seemingly concerning reality, stating, “In his second term, Donald Trump will be determined to pursue a foreign policy that more closely resembles how the US engaged with the world for the first 170 years of the republic – pursuing abundance at home and selective engagement abroad.”

At first glance, this statement will undoubtedly wring alarm bells for leaders across the Western World, particularly nations that have grown increasingly dependent on the strategic benevolence of the United States and its willingness to unilaterally defend the post-war order.

Don’t be fooled, the US isn’t weak

Central to Pezzullo’s thesis is the belief that this reprioritisation and reorientation of America’s strategy of engagement on the global stage is not as a result of growing weakness and decline in the United States, rather it is quite the opposite.

Pezzullo said, “He will do so not because the US is weak and in decline but because it is powerful. Its power is a function of its economic size, military superiority, cultural influence, energy security, business innovation and productivity, labour flexibility, growing population, deep capital markets and immense private wealth, and the omnipresence of the US dollar and US Treasury bonds. US power will give Trump greater freedom to act, including by asking more of allies and partners who seek to benefit from the application or deterrent effect of that power.”

That isn’t to say that relative to the rising group of peer and near-peer powers emerging across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Europe and even South America, that US power is declining, but rather in aggregate when compared to this cluster of rival nations.

Pezzullo is realistic in his analysis of this, explaining, “True, US power faces several structural challenges. Compared with the Cold War era, America’s industrial base is weaker, as evidenced by its current inability to build nuclear-powered attack submarines at a fast enough replacement rate, which will likely compromise Australia’s ability to acquire Virginia Class submarines in the 2030s.”

Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the United States will abrogate or forgo its responsibility and role on the global stage.

Highlighting this, Pezzullo said, “By virtue of its power, the US is able to shape world order to an extent no other actor is able to – China included. Trump is a power politician. He understands that foreign relationships and transactions are an unsentimental function of power relativities and not abstract global rules that seek to fetter the exercise of sovereign power by nation-states. (On this, his speeches to the UN General Assembly are worth re-reading.)”

Where this second Trump administration will differ, however, is the application of its power on the global stage, with Pezzullo adding, “Trump will be prepared to continue to extend US security to those who are prepared to do more to defend themselves, so long as doing so is also in the interest of the US. Those who spend less on defence than the US [at least 3 per cent of GDP] will have to lift their spending or make commensurate in-kind contributions to their own security.”

Not all bad news, but we will have to step up our efforts

It should be said that this expectation is a reflection of long-standing US policy, dating back to the Cold War, and one that came more into the fore following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and subsequent invasion of the Donbas in 2014 which saw repeated failures from both the Bush and Obama administrations to force a step-up in allied defence spending.

For Australia, this, in particular, will become a major challenge, with the nation’s defence spending hovering around the 1.99–2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) mark, despite the deteriorating regional and global geopolitical and strategic environment.

Pezzullo added that while “Australia is well placed to make or extend mutually beneficial deals with the second Trump administration, especially in relation to critical minerals, the production of nuclear-powered attack submarines at a faster rate, advanced military technology and further access to our geographically crucial facilities and infrastructure”, it isn’t necessarily smooth sailing.

Unpacking this reality further, Pezzullo added, “However, our weak levels of defence spending will become a point of contention if it is judged that we are not doing more to ensure the self-reliant defence of Australia.”

It is, however, important to articulate that for all the rhetoric surrounding Trump’s second administration and the collapse of the US-led world order, that doesn’t mean a return to the inter-war years of US isolationism.

Pezzullo explained that this will undoubtedly mean a more focused, more committed US, just under significantly different circumstances to the world we have known.

“We should not assume, however, that a return to this older style of US foreign policy will result in a withdrawn and isolated US. The world is today too interconnected and closer than was the case in the early 1940s, when isolationists held significant sway in US politics. On the contrary, the US is likely to remain very active in the world, but under different terms and in pursuit of more focused objectives. When it is in the US national interest, Trump will take resolute action – as he did in his first term against Iran, including by way of imposing oppressive sanctions, withdrawing from the Obama-era nuclear deal and ordering the assassination of Qassem Soleimani,” he said.

This is ultimately good news, as it will require allies of the United States, including, but especially Australia, to step up its own efforts to build a capacity of self-reliance and thus benefiting from the economic opportunities that fall out of such development.

As part of this focused “new look” US presence on the global stage, Pezzullo does have some sage advice, saying, “The US will be a powerful actor under and after Trump. For it to be great again, there is one challenge it will have to meet. Trump will have to intensify efforts to ensure that China does not establish itself as the hegemon of Eurasia.”

Explaining further, “Were it to do so, across time, it would gain dominance over the resources, markets and economic power of the world’s strategic heartland. This would undercut the strategic and commercial interests of the US.”

In order to deliver this capacity in the Australian context will be the necessity of embracing a degree of “self-interest” in a similar manner to that which is now cause du jour for the second Trump administration.

While this will no doubt trigger prominent backlash from certain segments of the political, economic and strategic establishments at home, it will no doubt place Australia in a far more competitive, resilient and sovereign position than the continued dependence on a global order in its final death throes.

Pezzullo summarised this perfectly, saying, “There is a prospect of a golden age of American power, where a self-interested US, working with equally self-interested allies and partners, and not embarrassed to wield that power, accomplishes a world-changing quadrella: to thwart China, flip Russia, contain Iran and isolate North Korea. If it can accomplish this sweep of the grand chessboard of Eurasia, the US will be not just powerful but great again.”

Unpacking this further, Pezzullo added, “Motivated by ‘America first’ instincts that are deeply rooted in US strategic culture, Trump has the opportunity to bring about a transformation of the world order that would rival the earlier achievements of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan at the bookends of the Cold War.”

Again, Australia’s leaders will be required to conduct a realistic analysis of this new paradigm and respond accordingly in a world that no longer exists.

Final thoughts

Australia’s uncomfortable reality has always been dominated by its need to balance its position as a “loyal deputy”, whether to the British Empire or, more recently, with the United States, with its own national interests in remaining and maintaining its role and capacity as an “anchor nation” to maintain the regional balance of power and stability.

Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “Peace Dividends” and the “End of History” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.

Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker, and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.

As I have said many times before, it isn’t too late if we pivot now and accept the reality of the world and the region as it is, rather than how we would wish it to be, or as the US Marines say, “embrace the suck”.

Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy and it will require the whole-of-nation effort to put its shoulder behind the effort, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.

Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost will be too devastating to comprehend.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at Stephen.kuper@momentummedia.com.au or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..au.