It is now more a question of can America defend Taiwan, not will it

It is not hyperbole to say that the United States dodged a bullet in the aftermath of the recent election – there was no major outbreak of civil unrest and no collapse of the American republic.

Equally, it is safe to say that the world dodged a bullet at the same time, as any potential US civil unrest would have had truly global ramifications, particularly for key geopolitical and strategic flashpoints like the Middle East and Eastern Europe, particularly holding their breath.

However, by far, the most pivotal flashpoint to impact the future peace, prosperity and stability of the global environment and most consequential for Australia’s own enduring peace and security is the Taiwanese flashpoint.

In recognising this, many policymakers, strategic thinkers and historians have raised major concerns about America’s resolve, particularly in the new Trump era, to defend the island democracy of Taiwan.

Most recently, Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey, in a piece for The Weekend Australian titled The US has the strongest incentive to prevent Taiwan from being captured by China, focused on the important question about the enduring US will in the new world.

Blainey began his analysis, stating, “China and the United States are said to be on the verge of another cold war which, this time, might boil over into a hot war. More likely – and such is the theme of a new book – is a lesser war fought around the island of Taiwan and rewarding a victorious China with virtual supremacy in the vastness of the western Pacific and its shores.”

This scene-setting statement may be a case of little new information for those of us who have been paying attention to the evolution of the regional and global geopolitical, economic and strategic order, bringing it closer to home, Blainey added, “Even Australia might find itself in this new Chinese sphere of influence, a sphere at present dominated by the US.”

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For many, this statement may come as a shock, particularly given the overwhelming belief held by vast swathes of the Australian public that the capability of the United States to maintain the global and regional security, or the ’Pax Americana’ order is limitless.

Confronting a conflicting reality

The conflicting nature of reality versus public perception leaves Australia at immense risk of being unprepared and exposed to any major geopolitical shock that may erupt in our region, with America’s enduring commitment to defend Taiwan front and centre.

Blainey detailed the rapid transformation of Beijing as the main antagonist of this new era of great power competition, saying, “It was inconceivable, half a century ago, that China would become strong enough to threaten the US. In 1974, China was still weakened by the cultural revolution and the last years of stumbling Chairman Mao. It did not yet have a seat in the United Nations; its main foreign friend was little Albania; and though it was at last a nuclear power, its naval and air forces were relatively weak.”

Unpacking this evolution further, he stated, “Then came the Chinese miracle. With visible and invisible help from the US, it enjoyed one of the major transformations in the history of the world; and judged by that longtime indicator of industrial progress – the annual output of iron and steel – it raced far ahead of every rival. A similar military ‘rejuvenation’ – one of Xi’s favourite words – was also tackled vigorously by China.”

This reality, while well known, needs to be contrasted against the stagnant levels of defence spending in the United States and the broadly declining level of defence spending among its key allies across the globe, with Australia maintaining at or around the sacrosanct 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) mandated for NATO membership.

For many of America’s allies, this strategic weakness is further compounded by declining economic and industrial capacity and competitiveness and mounting domestic political division and polarisation exacerbated by a host of issues, including the declining job market, housing affordability, cost-of-living pressures and immigration.

These factors have only served to weaken the broader US alliance structure and its capability to defend the global, post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order, placing an increasingly disproportionate burden on the American purse and public, which are now showing their own signs of buckling under the strain.

However, Blainey doesn’t necessarily see it that way, saying, “The US is still the world’s wealthiest nation, and its standard of living is far above China’s. Defence, however, is not its high ­priority. In the era of President Ronald Reagan, when the Cold War was almost over, the US spent 6.8 per cent of its GDP on defence. Today it spends just over 3 per cent … In the past year, the US defence budget went backwards in real terms. Most of America’s major allies spend an even smaller percentage. What a boost to the confidence of President Xi – as if that all-powerful ruler needed one.”

This has only become more enticing for revisionist powers like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, seeking to capitalise on a sclerotic Western world too mired in its own political division, economic suicide and strategic negligence to materially push back.

In large part, this reality isn’t something new, with successive European administrations embracing this attitude, defaulting to the never-ending benevolence and will of the American people, not just their government to play the world’s policeman, that era is no more.

This reality now finds itself increasingly at odds with the perceived reality of both Australia’s own policymakers and those of our like-minded partners across Europe, in particular, with little more than an expectation that the US must step up its game and do more to carry the rest of the Western World, while Australia, Europe and others continue to contribute, boutique, brittle capabilities.

Bringing us to the Taiwan situation.

America’s resolve versus America’s capacity

While the preferred specific scenario that unfolds in and around Taiwan remains to be seen, the two most likely options to be pursued by Xi’s China firmly remains either a direct invasion via a combined amphibious and air assault, which would see increased international pressure and expectations that the United States to intervene, or a blockade which would limit America’s response.

In pursuing an invasion, Beijing would undoubtedly galvanise the Western World against its efforts, in a similar manner to the way in which the Western World has, at least rhetorically, supported Ukraine post the 2022 invasion by Russia.

Meanwhile, a blockade, while illegal under international law, would serve as a major provocation; it would be far below the threshold needed to prompt a US military intervention, nevertheless, we cannot understate the moral, economic, political and strategic importance of Taiwan in the global order.

Blainey explained, “Taiwan is just over half the size of Tasmania. The narrow seaway separating communist China from democratic Taiwan resembles our own Bass Strait, though our strait has rougher seas in a typical month. In calm weather, a small Chinese rowing boat can easily cross the strait to Taiwan...”

He explained further, “Small on the world map, it is not so by European standards: in area it is larger than Belgium and Macedonia. Nor is Taiwan’s population of 24 million so small by world standards: indeed it is almost equal to Australia’s. Notable too is Taiwan’s rising standard of living, now comparable to Japan’s. Above all, it is a young and thriving democracy.”

The plight of this seemingly similar nation places increased strain on Australia to step up its own game and avoid the pitfalls of wishful thinking that have come to dominate our national policy making, public thinking and preparedness, which has only become increasingly important in light of the shift in US domestic politics and it’s foreign policy.

Blainey builds on this, raising important questions, “Would the US negotiate or would it retaliate by launching missiles on the Chinese ports and industrial towns opposite Taiwan? Or would the American navy prove superior and quickly end a Chinese blockade or invasion? We are told the American attack submarines, each carrying more than 20 massive torpedoes, “are the foundation of US dominance in undersea ­warfare”.

However, while important questions remain about America’s resolve, Blainey misses the most important question, that being: Can America actually defend Taiwan if push comes to shove?

This question only becomes more important when one considers the increasingly distracted, dispersed and consuming nature of America’s global responsibilities, which leave it exposed to exploitation by a single or group of committed peer and near-peer competitors.

Final thoughts

Australia’s uncomfortable reality has always been dominated by its need to balance its position as a “loyal deputy”, whether to the British Empire or, more recently, with the United States, with its own national interests in remaining and maintaining its role and capacity as an “anchor nation” to maintain the regional balance of power and stability.

Regardless of whether we are in a “pre-war” or traditional “Cold War” environment, it is clear that successive generations of Australian leaders have let the country down, too entranced and seduced by the promise of “Peace Dividends” and the “End of History” to recognise the cold reality of the world, particularly developing concurrently with the “Clash of Civilisations” during the Global War on Terror.

Equally, many an academic, strategic thinker, and policymaker were seduced by the march of hyper-globalisation and the ultimate triumph of liberal democratic values that either naively overlooked the importance of historical context, religion, ethnic loyalty and rivalry and ideology that has left Australia dangerously exposed and unprepared for the challenges we now face.

As I have said many times before, it isn’t too late if we pivot now and accept the reality of the world and the region as it is, rather than how we would wish it to be, or as the US Marines say, “embrace the suck”.

Responding to the challenges arrayed won’t be easy and it will require the whole-of-nation effort to put its shoulder behind the effort, but if we can engage the Australian public and industry early and bring them along, I promise it will be worth it in the long run.

Because if we don’t, when it comes to paying the bill, the cost will be too devastating to comprehend.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..