Better the devil you know? Post-civil war Syria raises serious questions

Beginning in 2011, the Syrian Civil War represented just the latest part of the broader wave of Arab Spring uprisings, which has since evolved into one of the most devastating and complex conflicts of the 21st century.

Triggered by the peaceful protests against the authoritarian rule of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian uprising quickly spiralled into a brutal civil war due to the government’s violent crackdown on dissent and the radicalisation of opposition groups.

Over the years, the war has drawn in numerous domestic and international actors, creating a patchwork of alliances and enmities that have prolonged the conflict and led to widespread human suffering.

Initially, the rebellion was characterised by the emergence of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a coalition of defected military personnel and civilians committed to toppling al-Assad’s regime.

However, as the conflict dragged on, extremist factions like the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), began to dominate the opposition landscape. This shift not only alienated segments of the population but also deterred international support for the rebels, complicating the global response to the crisis.

Among the key figures to emerge during this period was Saudi-born Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra. Initially a shadowy figure, al-Jolani gained prominence as a militant leader adept at navigating the complex dynamics of the Syrian rebellion.

Under his leadership, Jabhat al-Nusra sought to present itself as a disciplined alternative to the chaos and brutality of ISIS, earning grudging acceptance in certain regions of Syria despite its extremist roots.

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As the war progressed, al-Jolani and his group undertook a series of strategic transformations, in 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra formally severed ties with Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in an effort to gain broader legitimacy and distance itself from the global jihadist network.

This shift marked the beginning of a long-term moderation strategy that saw the group further evolve into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Islamist factions that positioned itself as a quasi-state actor governing large swaths of north-western Syria, particularly in Idlib province.

Concurrently, the al-Assad regime, backed by allies like Russia and Iran, waged a relentless campaign to reclaim territory; however, by 2023, al-Assad’s grip on power began to falter due to economic collapse, dwindling support from distracted allies, and mounting pressure from Turkish and American-backed opposition groups.

Al-Jolani capitalised on the weakness that increasingly appeared terminal for the al-Assad regime, leveraging HTS’ relatively stable governance in Idlib and his pragmatic alliances with local and international actors to position himself as a political leader rather than a militant insurgent, setting the scene for broader rebalancing of the regional balance of power and serious questions about the future of Syria as a nation.

However, as the old saying goes, a leopard doesn’t change its spots, begging questions about the future of Syria under a potential al-Jolani regime as the world comes to terms with the rapid collapse of the al-Assad regime and his escape to Russia.

Better the devil you know?

By now we have a pretty good idea of al-Jolani’s history and “transformation” from a violent extremist into a seemingly pragmatic and shrewd political operator under the guise of what is referred to as a “moderate jihad” strategy, first implemented in 2017 – by far the most consequential shift towards greater international legitimacy.

This push towards greater international legitimacy saw both regional and great powers starting to play the latest round of the “great game” in Syria, with Russia and Iran backing al-Assad, and the United States and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey backing individual rebel groups. Meanwhile, ever watchful Israel has been quick to snap up elements of a formal buffer zone in the Golan Heights to provide the nation with a greater sense of and capacity for defence in depth.

Turkey’s long-standing financial, military and political support for the Syrian National Army (SNA) has largely been designed to fulfil two critical objectives, the first being to crack down on and limit the fighting efficacy of the Kurdish YPG militia, an organisation that Turkey has long suspected of supporting the domestic efforts of an outlawed Kurdish militia group in Turkey.

Second, and arguably the most important, is the subtle, or perhaps not so subtle efforts of Erdogan to re-establish the Ottoman Empire and its territorial and political standing on the world stage, a long-term ambition of Turkish strongman Erdogan and his ambitions of grandeur.

This has brought the Turkish-backed SNA into conflict and competition with the US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance, nevertheless, the Turkish-backed forces and Turkish troops themselves have rapidly acquired vast swathes of territory in northern Syria along the Turkish border, and in the chaos that followed, the fall of al-Assad has seen these forces openly in conflict with one another.

Bringing us to Russia and its long-standing relationship with the al-Assad regime, that has, since the invasion of Ukraine, been floundering in its support for the beleaguered Syrian autocrat and ultimately, paved the way for HTS, the SNA and SDF to launch their assault and eventually, their successful overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Finally, there is the morass that is America’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, going back to the Obama administration and its efforts to combat Islamic State (IS), which saw the US and allied special operations and airpower deployed to combat the threat of the IS and to support the rebels seeking to topple al-Assad, as had been achieved in Libya and Iraq, with little regard for the fallout of those “regime change” efforts.

If you thought that the US backed only a single side in this fight, you’d be sorely mistaken, as that wasn’t to be the case with rebel forces financed and supported by the Pentagon, directly coming into conflict with rebel forces financed and supported by the CIA particularly around the Turkish border (no it isn’t a joke).

So if this leaves you feeling a little confused as to just who is best placed to lead Syria, don’t worry, I am confused as well, considering the various factions that will now unquestioningly set to turn on one another as they all jockey for ultimate control in Syria.

In doing so, this creates the perfect hotbed for further extremism even by the apparently “pragmatic” and now “moderate” leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, as he seeks to consolidate his control and grip on power, or, we could see a wave of Turkish and Turkish-backed forces sweep in from the north to claim the rump of the country, bringing Erdogan one step closer to achieving his goals.

One thing is for certain, both the US and Russia will be distracted by their other responsibilities and priorities in the rapidly developing multipolar world, with the incoming Trump administration no doubt seeking to end the costly US involvement in the Syrian conflict and extract itself from this ancient ethnic, cultural and religious blood feud playing out.

Ultimately, this leaves me asking, was the devil we knew in al-Assad a far more optimal outcome than what will undoubtedly continue to be a bloody conflict at the expense of the Syrian people?

Final thoughts

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and his family’s half-century long regime signals the latest contest in the rise of the new, competitive multipolar regional and global order, where the ramifications will not just be felt in the immediate Middle East, but will expand to have significant impacts on the broader global balance of power.

In the Australian context, while the fallout might not be immediate, the aftershocks will no doubt reach us in our once-isolated part of the world and we had best be prepared to face the increasingly complex and contested global and regional environment.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..