As we close in on a new year, we also mark the midway point of the 2020s with a region and a world characterised by growing instability, multipolarity and great power competition, so what can we expect?
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Australia’s defence policy and strategy have undergone significant transformation since 2020, driven by rapid regional and global shifts in power dynamics. The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a central focus for strategic competition, with China’s rise as a military and economic power reshaping the security landscape.
Meanwhile, the rules-based international order, which has long underpinned Australia’s security, is increasingly challenged by a combination of state and non-state actors, this has driven Australia to adapt and evolve its defence posture, seeking to safeguard national interests, bolster regional stability, and align with its key allies.
China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, growing military capabilities, and economic coercion have intensified Australia’s concerns about regional stability. Additionally, tensions between the United States and China have amplified strategic uncertainty.
As a long-standing US ally, Australia has faced growing expectations to play a more active role in maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. These developments have led to a recalibration of Australia’s defence strategy, exemplified by the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU).
The DSU marked a decisive shift from focusing on distant global conflicts to prioritising the defence of Australia’s immediate region, the DSU and its supporting 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) underscored the need for enhanced self-reliance, rapid force expansion, and greater investment in a suite of advanced capabilities.
In part building on the DSU and FSP, the 2023 Defence Strategic Review identified key priorities for adapting to the changing threat landscape and emphasised the importance of integrated deterrence, the acceleration of capability development, and the need for a more agile and responsive force structure, while leveraging advances in a technologies across the space and cyber domains.
Meanwhile, the release of the 2024 National Defence Strategy and a "reprioritised" Integrated Investment Program provided a comprehensive framework for aligning Australia’s defence objectives with its changing strategic environment.
Complementing this, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program detailed an unprecedented level of defence spending, with investments in advanced missile systems, autonomous technologies, and expanded naval capabilities, including the procurement of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS. The geopolitical shifts have also coincided with emerging challenges in the cyber domain and grey-zone tactics—activities that fall below the threshold of armed conflict but undermine national security.
To bolster its defence posture, Australia has strengthened its partnerships with like-minded nations. The formation of AUKUS in 2021, a trilateral security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom, reflects a deepening commitment to technological and strategic cooperation. AUKUS will deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, enhancing its deterrence capabilities and ensuring it can operate effectively across the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Australia’s active engagement in the Quad (with the US, India, and Japan) underscores its intention to contribute to a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific.
Domestically, Australia has faced the challenge of balancing its economic ties with China against its strategic concerns. As its largest trading partner, China remains integral to Australia’s economy, yet deteriorating diplomatic relations have necessitated diversification of trade and investment. This dual approach reflects Australia’s broader effort to navigate a complex and often contradictory strategic environment.
In summary, Australia’s shifting defence policy and strategy since 2020 illustrate its proactive response to the evolving regional and global power dynamics. By prioritising regional security, enhancing military capabilities, and fostering strategic alliances, Australia aims to safeguard its sovereignty and contribute to a stable Indo-Pacific amidst growing uncertainty.
But what does 2025, as the midway point for this decade have in store for us and what does it mean for the rest of the 2020s? Well we asked the Defence and National Security team at Momentum Media team for their insights and predictions.
Steve Kuper, Senior Analyst
I can't believe we're almost in 2025! It seems like just yesterday we we celebrating Christmas under the spectre of COVID and elements of the Australian economy were navigating the challenges presented by sanctions put on it by China and the US had just been through a turbulent election. Now heading into the downward slope of the 2020s the world and Australia have both changed a lot, but equally, in many ways is not a whole lot is different, so what do I expect for 2025 and the years that follow?
Well 2025 will be a big year for defence, particularly as we head into an election year, I am expecting that early in the new year we will see a surprise announcement about the successful design for the Royal Australian Navy's general purpose frigate program (my money is on the Japanese evolved Mogami class) and I look forward to welcoming both of the nation's new Supply class tankers back into the fleet.
Army is set to receive the first of it's new AH-64E Apache and more of its UH-60M Black Hawks, I am also tipping an early delivery of Australia's first HIMARS systems and production of our Redback IFVs to swing into high gear. I am also looking forward to see the nation's production run of the first GLMRS missiles begin in earnest.
Air Force will probably see the smallest amount of change, but I do hope to see the first of the MC-55A Peregrine's take to the sky and the delivery of the nation's first LRASM and JASM-ER missiles to begin providing the Air Force with a significant increase in strike capacity.
On the policy front, we will really see the rubber hit the road for the delivery of the NDS, IIP and DIDS proper, hopefully with meaningful change to come for the procurement process, helping to ease the burden on SMEs in particular, but strengthening defence industry as a whole, but I will hold any significant predictions on this until we see the real delivery begin.
Finally, on the geopolitical front, expect to see dramatic shifts in Europe, as the incoming Trump Administration gets to work on peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. In the Middle East, I am anticipating that the Trump Administration will continue to support Israel's efforts to dislodge Hamas, while also seeking to bring about an end to the conflict.
It is in our region that I expect to see the most action, with Beijing to increase its coercion against Taiwan through increasing numbers of drills in and around the island, while also seeking to actively antagonise and coerce its neighbours in the and around the South China Sea, increasing the risk of miscalculation and potential conflict closer to home.
Rob Dougherty, Senior Journalist
As we bid a somewhat fond farewell to the year of 2024 I’m reminded of the critical importance of moving forward with Australia’s historically stagnated defence policy.
This year has really pulled the wool from the eyes of the political leaders and the Australian public (hopefully) to make rapid and meaningful improvement to the country’s military assets as the dangers of
military confrontation loom ever closer in our Indo-Pacific region.
Among our political leaders this year, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles has traversed the globe almost non-stop to discuss and move forward with elements of AUKUS, commitment to the USA, support for Ukraine and long-term pledges to our Indo-Pacific allies. Next year will likely show us the either tangible or underwhelming fruits of those efforts.
In my opinion although the Deputy PM started strong as the outgoing face of defence policy development he has largely replaced at the coalface by the initially reserved leadership of Minister for Defence Industry and Capability Delivery, Pat Conroy, who has succeeding in stepping from the shadows to become a go-to and on-the-ground figurehead for the Australian defence industry.
On the domestic front we can expect to see an upswing in defence industry handshakes, proposed funding and political wrangling as the Federal Government approaches its next election and tries to buy some votes off key electorates.
Speaking of elections, the newly appointed US Administration headlined by returning US president Donald Trump is ready to march back into power in the US early in 2025. We can expect a raft of geopolitical and policy changes (daily, maybe even hourly via social media) throughout the initial weeks of the changeover.
Many countries are hoping to stay off Trump’s ‘radar’ and fly under expected tariffs, deals and policy decisions – this is forecast to be one of the worst strategies of dealing with the new administration. It’s impossible to confirm what changes we will see, however expect sparks to fly.
In the Australian Defence Force capability stakes, our troops will be putting the new Abrams Sepv3 main battle tank through its paces across the country, as the government folds to media pressure and sends their former M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks as a gift to Ukraine on the other side of the world (instead of equipping reserve armour units back home).
We will likely see further decommissioning of Royal Australian Navy ships and the evolved Mogami class is a shoo-in to be selected to replace them under the newly announced general purpose frigate program (Japan is organising committees for this outcome, committing to more military exercises and have the tailwind of being an Indo-Pacific ally behind them).
The Royal Australian Air Force lumbers along without the fanfare of many media photo shoots and government funding announcements in 2024. However, we are expected to welcome a trio of RAAF Block 2 variants ofthe MQ-28 Ghost Bat completed by the end of 2025 - let’s all pray that they have some future envisioned strike capability.
David Hollingworth, Deputy Editor, Cyber
Cyberspace will continue to be contested in low-level, greyzone conflict, particularly the world continues to be riven by ongoing conflict in the Middle East, Ukraine, and throughout Africa. Hacktivists and state-sponsored threat actors will target any organisation with a lack of proper security, with the ‘low hanging fruit’ of small businesses and under-resourced government agencies a particularly ripe target for distributed denial of service and defacement attacks.
We’re already seeing hacktivist groups – both pro-Russian and pro-Palestinian – targeting Australian businesses not based on what they do, but because they’re lack of cyber-resilience makes them an easy target. This will only accelerate into the New Year, particularly as they get co-opted by state organisms and become more resourced in return.
More broadly, Chinese threat actors will continue to lurk in Western networks, maintaining persistence in critical infrastructure entities and telecommunications hubs. US authorities have already warned that it is “impossible” to say when these actors will be ejected from the shadows of cyberspace; it’s only a matter of time until a virtual trigger is pulled and their presence becomes more obvious, with disruptions to critical infrastructure, communications, and instances of civil disturbance based on misinformation and fear.
Russia and North Korea will continue to rely on non-traditional forms of revenue to get around sanctions, with both ransomware operations and outright cyber-theft bringing in significant amounts of cryptocurrency to both regimes. Iran may have taken a hit due to the fall of an ally in the form of the Assad regime in Syria, and ongoing attempts by Israel to dismantle both Hezbollah and Hamas, but it too will continue its attempts to destabilise opponents in the West, particularly when it comes to influence operations and election interference.
And given that 2025 is an election year for Australia, we can expect to be right in the crosshairs of just such an operation.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at