iscover
It is no secret that the world is undergoing the mid-stages of labour – the contractions have well and truly kicked in and birth is near – bringing with it an equally disruptive “new normal” dominated by multipolarity and great power competition, though with yet another expert warning, Australia seems to be lagging behind in its preparations.
While it might seem like a strange metaphor for the current birth pains experienced across both the Indo-Pacific and more broadly across the global stage, the evidence is there for all to witness.
For those who have gone through the birth experience – either as an active participant or as an awestruck witness – yes, the miracle of life is amazing, but pretty quickly, the heightened excitement gives way to a new world of chaotic sleep cycles, juggling different feeding patterns for mum and bub, and a general sense of disruption best described as “drinking through the firehose”, regardless of whether you’ve encountered the “new normal” before.
If this sounds somewhat familiar, welcome to the next decade at least, as the world and the Indo-Pacific settle into the disruptive, new world order characterised by increasing multipolarity, the unrestricted rise of ancient powers, the relative slide into obscurity of recently great powers and an Indo-Pacific that is at the epicentre of global economic, political, strategic and technological disruption.
For Australia, a nation that has long embraced its identity as the “Lucky Country”, endowed with abundant resources and opportunities while benefiting from geographic isolation from the power centres that fuelled the devastating conflicts of the 20th century, the world we face today is profoundly different.
The global balance of power has gradually shifted from Europe and North America towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific, driven primarily by the resurgence of China and, to a lesser extent, India – two ancient civilizations revitalised by explosive economic growth. This shift is further supported by the rapid rise of regional players like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Pakistan.
For Australia, three decades of economic growth, fuelled largely by the insatiable demand from these neighbors, has provided a buffer from global challenges, reinforcing its so-called “Long holiday from history”.
The region’s appetite for Australia’s mineral and agricultural wealth, alongside its services sector and booming real estate market, shielded the country from the worst effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and even to some extent, the global economic disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yet, as Australia adapted to this period of relative economic stability, China’s ambitions began to reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics. The People’s Republic of China has increasingly asserted itself, often skirting the edge of direct armed conflict while challenging the post-World War II international order.
In recent years, China’s growing hostility and ambitions have become more evident, compelling nations across the Indo-Pacific to confront the reality that the long-held sacrosanct, post-Cold War idea of the “End of History” is far from assured.
Entering the conversation is David Kilcullen, former Australian Army soldier and senior counter-insurgency adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq and special adviser for counter-insurgency to secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, in a piece for The Australian titled We need to brace for impact in a disrupted world.
At the core of Kilcullen’s thesis is four trends he anticipates will become central factors that will not only shape the direction of travel for 2025, but will, in many ways, set the stage for the era of disruption that will increasingly characterise the remainder of the 2020s and well into the next few decades of the 21st century.
A jumping off point for the remainder of the 21st century
The 2020s definitely kicked off with a bang, or perhaps sneeze is a more apt description, and in many ways set the scene for what was to be a rerun of the original “roaring 20s” a century earlier.
Once again, a global pandemic ravaged the world, laying both developed and developing economies across the world low, as the world slowly began its ongoing recovery in the aftermath of COVID-19 as great power competition and open, kinetic conflict reared their heads across Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and into the Indo-Pacific, becoming commonplace.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early-2022 served to shatter the long-held myth that is the “End of History”, that it is little more than idealistic and wishful thinking, which has now left Australia, like many a Western nation, woefully unprepared for the new norm of disruption.
Highlighting this, Kilcullen said, “Four trends appear to be driving today’s surface chaos: a global transition to multipolarity; a collapse of confidence in elites, experts and institutions; a bottom-up technological transformation of warfare; and the resulting emergence of new domains, means and methods of conflict. This is not the only way to make sense of things, but it offers a baseline for understanding events in 2025.”
Shifting focus to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Kilcullen drew on his experience with the Australian Army and at the upper echelons of US military and political statecraft to provide a clear-eyed analysis of the circumstances on the ground, in an effort to foreshadow the fallout of a similar conflict in our region, say over the island democracy of Taiwan.
Kilcullen said, “In a war of attrition, population size, national mobilisation and industrial production are key. Despite its staggering losses, Russia’s military is almost 1.7 times larger than at the start of the war, while its military-industrial production has expanded, showing resilience and mobilisation capacity. Even at the outset, Ukraine, with a pre-war population of 41 million, was only one-quarter Russia’s size. It has since lost 20 per cent of that population through battle casualties and a refugee exodus.”
However, this predicament isn’t without it’s upside, as Kilcullen said, “On the upside, the same battlefield arithmetic suggests Russia will need to spend time rebuilding, whatever the war’s outcome, leaving little capacity for further aggression in the short term. Putin may thus achieve a partial, pyrrhic victory in Ukraine. But the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus has unhinged Putin’s position in the Middle East.”
The ongoing conflict in Europe undoubtedly has truly devastating impacts on other parts of the world, most notably in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific as these two regions rapidly emerge as the next great geopolitical and strategic playgrounds for competing great powers and their respective interests and designs for the broader global paradigm well into the next decade and beyond.
Kilcullen unpacked the impact of the continuing conflict in Europe on the Middle East’s balance of power, saying, “The sudden victory of Syria’s rebels, backed by Turkey (and assisted by Ukraine) and led by former al-Qa’ida faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), transformed the Middle East in mere weeks. The big winners, beyond HTS itself, are Israel and Turkey...
“The big losers are Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities and Assad’s backers, Russia and Iran. Russia’s bases – Khmeimim and Tartous, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast – are at risk but Russian forces, committed in Ukraine, lack capacity to reinforce them ... Things are worse for Iran. Tehran’s ability to support its ‘axis of resistance’ – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen – relied on a friendly regime in Damascus, which is why Iran invested in propping up Assad during Syria’s civil war.”
Perhaps most importantly, and what goes unsaid by Kilcullen, is the impact of Syria’s collapse on China’s own ambitions for the Middle East and Central Asia, particularly via its key proxy, Iran, which has leveraged its relationships with Russia and China to until now, secure dominance over the region, to the great economic benefit of all parties.
Kilcullen initially hinted at this, saying, “The Assad government, plus militias in Iraq, gave Iran a secure land corridor from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, 3,000 kilometres. This enabled money, materiel, advisers and fighters to transit a vast area, letting Iran threaten Israel from several directions, target Iran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia, support its proxies and hold US assets at risk.”
However, it is his initial glossing over of Beijing’s machinations in the Middle East that he has missed one of the clearest and most present challenges to the post-Second World War order Australia is dependent upon, that is not to say that Kilcullen overlooked the US-China competition as a whole.
Rather, it is viewed through a different lens.
A new Treaty of Tordesillas?
Beijing and Washington have, in large part, spent the last 25 years effectively engaging in the prelude to the 15th century Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal, where the two powers effectively divided the world between their two respective spheres of influence and interest.
This has largely taken place in the realm of economic and diplomatic competition, but, as Beijing’s military power has continued to accelerate and increasingly compete with that of the United States, is likely to play an increasing role in the bilateral relationship well into the future.
Front and centre of this is Beijing’s ambitions and designs for the Indo-Pacific and most directly its immediate region in the Western Pacific that will have wide-ranging impacts on the regional and global balance of power, something Kilcullen detailed, saying, “The multi-domain competition between mainland China and the US is accelerating ... Over Christmas, the Chinese navy launched its largest incursion into the Taiwan Strait in almost 30 years, putting 102 ships into the strait and astride Taiwan’s maritime approaches, while sending warships through the Miyako Strait between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako...
“Beijing is being equally aggressive in the South China Sea, harassing and ramming vessels inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Using artificially constructed islands as bases, China sent warships, submarines, undersea drones and warplanes, including nuclear-capable H-6K bombers into disputed territory numerous times in 2024.”
However, it isn’t only in its immediate region for which Beijing has designs. Its ambitions for regional hegemon expand across the Indo-Pacific as it seeks to expand not only its influence but also in an echo of Stalin’s pursuit of a “buffer zone”, with designs particularly for Central Asia and the Indian Ocean environs that will prove essential to China’s continuing economic growth.
This is front and centre for Kilcullen, who said, “The Pacific is only one of several arenas of competition. In South Asia, China continues its confrontational approach to India across their Himalayan border. Beijing is building relations with the Taliban, seeking access to Afghan mineral deposits and to Bagram air base, abandoned by the US in 2021. China also seeks a land corridor through Afghanistan to Iran, which would allow it to import oil (under its 25-year agreement with Tehran signed in 2021) overland, lessening dependence on seaborne imports vulnerable to US naval interdiction.”
It is this 3D chess, and some would say 4D, that is playing out before our eyes where Australia is truly lacking in terms of both the policy framework, broad planning and long term objectives, effectively leaving the nation adrift in an increasingly turbulent sea where we will be acted upon, rather than acting on the opportunities and challenges present in this new era of disruption.
While this may seem like a particularly grim outlook, Kilcullen said, “There is an important silver lining here for Australians. Despite the obvious risks – notably, the danger of catastrophic conflict between our principal trading partner and our major treaty ally – a multipolar system, where bottom-up innovation is increasingly decisive, favours innovative, dynamic middle powers such as Australia.
He detailed further, saying, “Much more than a unipolar system with one dominant player, a multipolar environment gives greater scope for diplomatic and military moves that advance our own interest. Though it may not always feel like it, Australia’s institutions – and public confidence in them – are stable and strong by global standards. A focus on resilience, mobilisation, innovation, self-reliance and independent capability will make Australia more valuable to allies, friends and neighbours, while equipping us for the volatile, uncertain and complex environment almost certain to continue this year.”
It is the central premise of this last paragraph where both the Australian public and our policymakers need to increasingly focus their efforts and attentions in order to ensure that Australia doesn’t fade into obscurity and rather emerges as a wealthy, powerful and independent middle power capable of charting its own course and shaping the broader global and regional order to our own benefit.
Because if we fail to heed these opportunities, we will ultimately falter and fade into a managed decline of obscurity.
Final thoughts
We have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.
Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.
Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic and economic policy making since Federation.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see both a narrative and strategy that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
